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ABSTRACT
RECASTING HEGEL’S ETHICAL THEORY
BY
Theresa Wambui
Duquesne University – Pittsburgh, 2005
Under the Supervision of Prof. Wilhelm S. Wurzer

This study focuses on the contribution of George Wilhelm Hegel to the modern ethical reflection
in which the state is understood as an ethical institution. The goal of this study is to recast
Hegel’s ethical theory in order to enable his ethical thought to contribute to contemporary
reflection on global ethical issues. At issue in Hegel’s discourse is the problem of individual and
community freedom. Hegel’s thesis hinges on the notion of the ‘truth’ as ‘the whole.’ In Herbert
Marcuse’s interpretation, the truth and the whole is freedom. Hegel’s ethical theory aims to
resolve the tension between individual and communal freedom by synthesizing the two poles to
make an ethical whole, the possibility of which lies in the concept of ‘recognition.’ This study
aims fill in the gap apparent in Hegel’s synthesis of individual and communal freedom. I
propose two principles: justice as fairness and reinterpretation of Hegel’s idea of development of
consciousness’ as the conditions for concrete realization individual and communal freedom.
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INTRODUCTION
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 1770 – 1831 is considered the greatest of the modern
philosophers. Hegel is esteemed for his profound understanding of human nature and the
elements that give meaning to human existence. Such elements include politics, religion and
other social institutions. Hegel anticipated issues of freedom and social organizations that would
occupy scholars and governments centuries after him. Allen Wood reflects that modern political
theories cannot resist Hegelian influence. Modern democracies can be traced from Hegel’s
thought. Originality in knowledge is hard to come by, for no thinker is a cradle of one’s thought
system. However, it must be admitted that Hegel’s superiority of thought has originality in that
he brings both ancient and modern into a relationship as a historical development of
philosophical thought, so that his system is a continuation of that long conversation.
This study aims at developing Hegel’s ethical theory. The idea of ‘developing’ is
consonant with Hegel’s philosophical system; in his main work, Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
characterizes the ‘truth’ as the ‘whole.’ For Hegel, a holistic conception of truth takes into
account not only its genesis, but also its ‘process’ and ‘goal’. This is the idea that permeates
Hegel’s entire thought and is evident in his claim, “The real issue is not exhausted by stating it as
an aim, but carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather, the result together with
the process, through which it comes about.”1 In his interpretation of Hegel, Herbert Marcuse
argues that for Hegel the ‘truth’ and the ‘whole’ is one and the same; it is freedom.2 This is the

1

G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) trans. A.V. Miller (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1977), §3.
2
Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1941),10.
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goal to which the process of human activity is directed. It can be inferred that Hegel’s ethical
theory is a theory of evolution of freedom from one phase to another.
This study is a critical analysis of Hegel’s thought on freedom as the central issue in
ethics, and examines the possibility of the realization of freedom. Alienation in the society is one
of the dark aspects in Hegel’s thought, an indication that there is a missing piece in his theory. It
is argued that as Hegel has it, the realization of freedom takes more than he offers in his theory.
This study aims to determine what is lacking for the realization of freedom for all, and to suggest
practical conditions for the realization of Hegel’s vision for humanity.
Some of Hegel’s critics hold that his ethical system is out of touch with reality, and so
cannot be appealed to for contemporary ethical problems. This is a limited reading of Hegel
because Hegel’s treatment of freedom influences all modern political and social thought. By
engaging the question of freedom, Hegel touches on the deepest issue in human existence. Given
that the problem of ethics/morality is a problem of freedom, to argue that Hegel’s ethical theory
cannot be appealed to in modern ethical problems would be tantamount to saying that ethics has
nothing to do with freedom.
The objectives of this study are twofold: (1) to highlight Hegel’s contribution to modern
ethical reflection, 2. to enable this master thinker’s thought to contribute to contemporary
reflection on global issues.
Hegel is a contextual thinker and his own words bears him out: every thinker is a child of
his time. With this in mind, the study comprises five chapters: Chapter One explores the context
of Hegel’s ethical thought, which is a critique of Kant’s theory of morality. The objective is to
offer a critical analysis of Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ so as to decipher the problematic
issues that are of concern to Hegel.

6

Chapter Two is on Fichte’s critique of Kant, the relevance of which lies in its influence
on Hegel’s reading of Kant. It examines Fichte’s criticism against Kant’s moral theory and how
he endeavors to resolve those issues. The main issues is Kant’s grounding of freedom as the
basis of moral and knowledge claims. Hegel disagrees with both Kant’s and Fichte’s views of
freedom.
Chapter Three explores Hegel’s ethical theory. The chapter is a critical analysis of Hegel’s
criticism against Kant’s theory as presented in the latter’s categorical imperative. I argue that
while in certain respects Hegel’s criticism is justified, there are respects in which Hegel’s
criticism is based on misinterpretation of the Kantian principles. Hegel’s criticism is more a
development of Kant’s theory other than a total rejection of the latter’s ethical principles.
Chapter Four is a critique of Hegel’s ethical theory. The objective of this chapter is to
explore both Hegel’s contribution to the modern ethical reflection and limitations inherent in his
position on various ethical issues such as freedom, the state, and the place of the human person
in this scheme. In this chapter, I take up polemics concerning the respects in which Hegel’s
ethical principles transcend Kant’s, and in which respects they cannot. I argue that despite
Hegel’s idea of the state as the realization of concrete freedom of the individual and society, the
freedom envisioned is possible only to some members in society. Consequently, at issue is not a
choice between Hegel’s and Kant’s principles, but what is best in both. Hegel’s ethical theory
needs Kant’s vision of humanity. The chapter articulates what Hegel’s idea of recognition would
mean in the contemporary world. The question concerns whether or how Hegel’s notion of
recognition can respond to the problem of alienation in contemporary society. I argue for the
need of integrating into Hegel’s ethical system other ethical reflections so as to bring it into
conversation with other cultures.

7

Chapter Five concludes with a proposal for the possibility of freedom both for the
individual and society. I argue for the need to retrieve the principle of justice as fairness as the
basis of concrete realization of freedom. Second, I argue for the necessity of a philosophical
contribution to a more comprehensive understanding of development in human life. This recasts
Hegel’s idea of ‘progression of consciousness,’ in terms befitting the issues of today in a given
cultural setting.
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CHAPTER 1
KANT’S MORAL THEORY

Many thinkers after Immanuel Kant would agree that it is impossible to sidestep him in
formulating a philosophical theory. John Ladd alludes to this fact in his introduction to Kant’s
Metaphysics of Morals Part II in his remark that Kant’s greatness as a moral philosopher is
indisputable even by those who disagree with him. Hegel asserts in his Phenomenology that a
theory can be superceded but cannot be rendered altogether useless. In Hegel’s view one aspect
is left behind while another is carried forward. Following Hegel, it means that to do justice to
Kant’s ethical theory, it is necessary to appreciate what is sound in it and to address the thorny
issues arising from his propositions.
This chapter focuses on Kant’s categorical imperative and comprises four sections.
Section A is be a critical analysis of the categorical imperative, which comprises three formulas,
the first and the third of which have their derivative formulas. The aim is to explore the content
of these formulas and to decipher important arguments in each. In addition, I address certain
difficulties arising from the categorical imperative, particularly the antagonistic relation of the
moral law and human nature. Section B explores Kant’s defense of freedom. This is significant
because it is from the idea of freedom that the moral law is deduced. Section C investigates the
postulates of pure practical reason. This section is important in Kant’s moral theory because he
considers these postulates as necessarily following from the idea of the moral law. These are: the
idea of freedom, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. Since section B examines
the idea of freedom, I do not examine it in this section. Finally, Section D is a critical evaluation
of Kant’s moral theory. First, I argue that certain aspects, such as the view of morality as pure
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duty and unmixed with nature, makes morality inconceivable. This means, there is a need to
integrate the moral law into human nature. Second, I argue that although morality is shown to lead
necessarily to the postulates of pure reason, there is a problem arising from certain
inconsistencies in Kant's position on the postulates. Concerning this problem, I focus on the
question of infinite progress towards complete harmony of will with moral law. Finally, I take up
the argument on what is sound in Kant’s moral theory. The focus is to establish the relevance of
the concept of “universal legislation” in Kant’s moral theory both to the individual and the global
community. Before examining the formula of the categorical imperative I discuss its conditions.
The point is to bring to the fore certain concepts that are pertinent to understanding the
categorical imperative.

10

A
THE FORMULA OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
The point of departure in Kant’s moral theory is the idea that there is in humanity a
universal concept of duty and moral laws. He argues that this universal concept of duty needs
justification. The reason for this justification is that if the moral law is to carry any obligation it
must be shown to be necessary and must have its basis a priori from reason.3
The key ideas in Kant’s moral proposition are the ‘necessity’ of moral commands and
their a priori basis. By necessity is meant that the moral law must command unconditionally;
i.e., it must be held binding for all rational beings. For Kant, to be “rational” is to be “morally
obligated.” This position is based on understanding of “rationality” as freedom. He points to the
fact that we think of ourselves as “causes a priori efficient through freedom.” Consequently, we
distinguish between seeing ourselves as agents through our freedom, and being passive
spectators of our own actions. This freedom is explicit in the distinction between forming our
own concepts as opposed to being passively affected by objects. Kant characterizes the ability to
produce concepts as ‘our own’ activity.4 His argument is that human imagination is engaged in a
free act of synthesis of empirical data resulting to concepts according to a rule. Rational
beings then can be said to be free in the sense that their activities are not imposed externally but
are the source of their own actions.
Kant’s concept of rationality is the capacity to set ends and willing the means to
accomplish them, i.e., capacity to act on imperatives. Imperatives are two kinds, hypothetical and
categorical. They are hypothetical if their command is conditional; that is, the conditions under

3

Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Second Edition, trans. Lewis White Beck,
(Uppers Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995), §389.
4
Ibid.,§ 451.
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which a given object is realized is to adopt certain actions. In Kant’s terms, the principle of
hypothetical imperative is, if one wills the end one must will the means necessary to that end.5
According to Kant, this imperative cannot be a law because it is contingent on the agent‘s
desire.6
On the contrary, a categorical imperative commands unconditionally; therefore, it has the
necessity of being a law and has its basis a priori in reason. As a law of reason, the categorical
imperative spells out how one ought to act if one is a rational being. Consequently, the
categorical imperative is binding to every rational will and does not consider the material aspect
of the action.7 Eanest Cassirer points to the difference between the two imperatives as pertaining
to ends and means. Hypothetical imperatives are concerned with adopting certain means to
realize a desired end. On the contrary, the categorical imperative presents itself as an
unconditional demand without further end in consideration; hence, it has ultimate value in itself.8
The idea of moral obligation following from freedom of the will is what Kant
characterizes as reciprocity between freedom and morality.9 Consequently, Kant’s moral theory
is grounded on the idea of freedom of a rational being, which is the source of human dignity. On
the basis of human dignity, Kant infers that the rational being is the source and object of the
moral law. The corollary of this proposition is that the rational will has absolute worth and so is
an end in itself.10 The fundamental question is how Kant arrives at the moral obligation from
human rationality. The relationship of rationality and the moral obligation is important and will
be explored in Section B of this chapter.
5

Ibid., §417.
Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1956), §20.
7
Ibid..
8
Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. James Haden, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1981), 245.
9
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, §30.
6
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Concerning the a priori basis of moral law, Kant means that the moral law must not
derive from object of desire, but it must have its ground entirely in reason.11 In this proposition
the argument is that the moral law does not have a material object as the end; rather, the moral
law is the object in itself. In addition, the moral law cannot be grounded in examples of morality.
The reason for this is that any given example is based on yet another standard, so it cannot serve
as the ultimate principle of morality. Kant believes that if the basis of morality is empirical, all
we can expect is mere confusion of principles, e.g., happiness, fear of God, etc.12 This is
problematic because his project is to establish the ultimate principle of morality. Kant’s position
on the moral law as end or duty raises serious controversies and is the basis of Hegel’s criticism
against Kant.
In his critique of Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer disputes the a priori basis of morality.
According to Schopenhauer, we are what we are by nature and so we are predetermined. To
know one’s nature is a question of trial and error until we find what is agreeable with our nature;
therefore, we must learn from experience what we are capable of. Character then is acting
according to the knowledge of who we are as individuals.13 Schopenhauer’s claim here is rather
problematic. If each character is already determined and one must discover what one’s nature is
capable of, only the individual can know one’s capability. However, it is not clear what can
prevent error in one’s judgment concerning what one is capable of. The problem with this
position is that it is difficult to avoid moral complacency. This position does not explain on what
basis can others make a moral demand.

10

Idem, Foundations, §428.
Ibid., §408.
12
Ibid., §409.
13
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I, trans. E.F.J. Payne, (New York,
NY: Falcon’s Wing Press, 1958), 305 – 305.
11
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The framework on which Kant’s moral theory is grounded is the principle of “pure
practical reason. What is practical means what is possible through freedom.14 As mentioned
above, the idea of freedom plays a central role in Kant’s moral theory. This notion is discussed in
detail in Section B of this chapter. At the moment, it suffices to note that Kant’s idea of freedom
is that ‘absolute spontaneity’ of a cause.15 In the Foundations, freedom is characterized as
causality in human practical judgment just as natural laws are the causality in all natural events.16
The principles that determine the will are either “subjective” or “objective.” Kant uses the
idea of ‘maxims’ to distinguish “subjective” from “objective” principles. By a maxim is meant
that the reason(s) for performing a given action are based on what is considered necessary for the
individual; therefore, the rules from which one acts are considered binding only for the agent. On
the other hand, principles are “objective” if they ought to determine the will of every rational
being.17 For Kant, if a given action is to have any moral worth, the principle under which it is
performed must be that of the moral law, which is valid for all rational beings.18 To act under the
idea of the “objective principle” of moral law is to act for the sake of duty, and consciousness of
duty on the subjective side of moral action is characterized as a good will. For Kant, a good will
and duty are intrinsically connected because a ‘good will’ is manifest in moral actions.
Consequently, a good will is that will which acts “for the sake of the moral law.” With regard to
a good will, Kant states:
“Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can be conceived which
could be called good without qualification except a good will.”19
14

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (1781 and 1787 editions) ed. Werner Pluhar, (Indianapolis, Indiana:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), B 828.
15
Ibid., B 474.
16
Idem, Foundations, §446.
17
Idem, Critique of Practical Reason, § 19.
18
Idem, Foundations, §401
19
Ibid., §393.

14

Based on the above text, Kant indicates that a good will has the prerogative of being
absolutely good. This idea is based on his premise that of all the things that are characterized as
“good” their goodness is not absolute. It follows that human qualities, such as intelligence,
courage, health, and indeed, material things like power or wealth are good, but not in themselves.
For Kant, all these things can be misused; therefore, their characterization as “good” depends on
their being used by a good will. In addition, qualities like temperance can endow the human
person with an admirable character, but still they do not have an intrinsic worth unless
accompanied by a good will. 20 According to Kant, only a good will is good in itself independent
of any end or utility; therefore, it is absolutely good.21
H.J. Paton understands Kant’s idea of a “good will” to refer to a moral will; hence, a
good will is so characterized on the basis of its moral character. According to Paton, a ‘moral
will’ is not limited by any circumstance; therefore, a moral will is ‘good’ in an absolute sense
and so without qualification.22
Following from the idea of a good will Kant distinguishes acts performed ‘from duty’ and
those performed ‘according to duty’. In the former, the action is the end and so not done in view
of any end other than it is right. On the contrary, the latter actions are performed for reasons
other than duty. Kant cites the example of a businessman, who may choose to be honest to his
customers not because to deceive his customers is against duty but because of fear of
consequences such as a bad reputation. In this instance, the action is in accordance with duty but
not from duty.23 For Kant, only actions performed from duty have a moral worth.24
Allen Wood understands Kant to mean that although the actions according to duty are not
20

Ibid.
Ibid., § 394.
22
H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1971), Ch. II, § 1.
21
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immoral, those done for the sake of the moral law are more esteemed than those performed
according to duty but not from duty.25 The distinction between the motives, of one and the same
action in Kant’s moral theory is problematic. If Wood is right, it is not possible to esteem one
and the same action higher or lower based on motives for we can never know with what motive a
good action is performed. It seems that only the agent is able to judge the principle of one’s
action in which case the judgment remains subjective. Consequently, all we can have are actions
performed according to duty. Since only actions performed from duty have a moral worth, the
public cannot assign a moral character to the human action. But this is a problem because the
human community should be able to do so as the agent may rationalize anything. In normal
circumstances however, once a “good deed” is performed, the person affected by the action is
not worried about the motive of the agent. It seems to me that the question of motive is important
in legal procedures wherein, the nature of motive may mitigate the degree of "imputability" on
the part of the agent.
Kant’s fundamental claim is that pure reason is practical. According to Kant, the moral
law is only justifiable under the presupposition that pure reason is practical. The implication of
this proposition is that the fact of practical reason not only accounts for rational beings’ general
conduct, but also that moral demand can be made on rational beings. The objective of the
Formula of the Categorical Imperative in all its variations, is to prove that reason is practical,
and in so doing justify or account for the possibility of the categorical imperative, the practical
law. Having explored the fundamental concepts in Kant’s moral theory the study proceeds to
explore the content of the three formulas of the categorical imperative.

23

Kant, Foundation, §397.
Ibid., §398.
25
Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 27.
24
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Formula I: The Formula of the Universal Law
This formula states: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.”26 This formula has its derivative, the Formula
of the Universal law of Nature, which states: “Act as though the maxim of your action were by
your will to become a Universal Law of Nature.”27 In the following section the discussion
focuses on Kant’s thought in the Formula of the universal Law and its variant, the Formula of
the Law of Nature.
The Formula of Universal Law sets a condition for all moral actions. We must act only
on the maxim by which we can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. The
main concepts here are the maxim and universal law.
As was noted earlier, a “maxim” was rendered a subjective reason for acting. Here the
formula of universal law requires that we act only on that maxim by which we can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law. The point is that whatever reason(s) we have for
performing a certain act, we must ‘be able to will’ that other human subjects base their action on
the same reasons. According to Paton, the significance of Kant’s introduction of maxims is that
they mediate between the abstract universal law and the particular actions. That means we must
always examine the principle of our action. Paton argues that a “maxim” is not simply a
question of choosing a principle for acting but choosing one that is valid for all rational beings.28
Concerning the idea of universality, Wood’s view is that universality is a fundamental
criterion if the moral conduct is to be considered rational and binding for all rational beings.
According to Wood, it is not necessary that all people in different cultures and situations judge

26

Ibid., §421.
Ibid.
28
Paton, , Ch. XIV, §4.
27
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the same action as rational in the same way. However, there is a standard and this standard is
that we act according to that principle such that we can will it to become a universal law.29
In order to understand Kant’s idea of the universal law it is important to recall his idea of
a good will. The absolute worth of a good will arises from capacity to act for the sake of duty and
to act for the sake of duty is to act for the sake of the moral law, which is universal. According to
Kant, if the will is not to contradict itself, it must be able to universalize its maxim. His point is
that a universal law, which we also will, cannot be in conflict with itself. Kant contends that only
the “categorical imperative” is such a principle, i.e., the principle of a good will. Its formula is to
“Act on those maxims, which can at the same time have themselves as universal laws.30 Kant
seems to argue that what is universally good is ultimately good for the self. As the formula of the
categorical imperative will show, the idea of universality plays a central role in Kant’s moral
theory. In Kant’s formula of universal law, there is a tension between duty i.e., acting according
to a universal principle and inclination, the subjective principle.
In his appropriation of Kant’s moral theory, Immanuel Levinas’ theory revolves on the
concept of the ‘Other’ as opposed to the moral subject. According to this view, the principle of
the self-satisfaction, which Levinas characterizes as Egoity is distinguished from the ‘Other’ by
radical objectivity. In Levinas’ ethical theory, the self is passive in the sense that the self
demands nothing from the Other. Edith Wyschogrod’s interpretation of Levinas’ thought is that
the objectivity of the moral law must be negative; meaning by this, the reference is the Other. If
it is positive, the self imposes the measures and this undermines the moral law because the
measures have to do with self-satisfaction. For Levinas, there is complete asymmetry in the
relation between the Other and the self. This means the Other is the point of reference, a

29
30

Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 57.
Kant, Foundations, §437.
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standpoint comparable to Kant’s concept of a good will, which requires a complete disregard for
material object as the end of moral action.31
While the human person is the principle of morality in both Kant and Levinas, the self
remains a problem. The question is how to relate the moral law to the subject of the moral law.
In Levinas’ argument the subject is bracketed in preference to the Other. However, as Heidegger
points out in his Being and Time, Da-sein is an issue to itself.32 The idea here is that the self is
concerned about its existence. Therefore, it is important that the ethical formulation include the
self since it is the moral agent. Consequently, this fact cannot be sidestepped in ethical
formulation as Levinas seems to do. Paton’s idea of reciprocity of moral law resolves the
problem of the question of the moral subject. It suggests a reality of mutuality in moral
obligation, a fact Levinas ignores. If Paton is right in his reading of Kant’s idea of universality,
Levinas undermines the meaning Kant has in this concept in his emphasis on the Other. In this
respect, Korsgaard’s point concerning this issue is valid. She contends that to hold one another
responsible is to treat each other as persons and so, reciprocity as such, is found both in friends
and in the state. The only difference is that for state it is enforced while in friends it is voluntary.
Concerning this issue, Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s idea of universality is that
egoism is the principle of his ethics. Schopenhauer insists that Kant’s demand that one must be
able to universalize one’s maxim is tantamount to saying “do to no one what you would not
want done to you.” The argument here is that this proposition is essentially based on selfinterest.33

31

Emmanuel Levinas, The problem of Ethical Metaphysics, ed. Edith Wyschogrod, (New York, NY:
Fordham University Press, 2000), 229
32
Marin Hedegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1996), §12.
33
Schopenhauer, 525.
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Regarding Schopenhauer’s criticism, my view is that it is based on a limited reading of
Kant’s moral theory. Schopenhauer’s evaluation is only based on the first formula. But as Wood
alleges, this way of understanding Kant misses the real import of Kant’s ethical theory, which
continues to unfold up to the third formula.34 As Kant’s whole formula unfolds the principle is
the dignity of human person as such, both of the self and of the other. This is the meaning of
Kant’s second formula of humanity as end in itself.
In view of Kant’s idea of universality, Paton’s argues that for a moral law to hold as
universal it must have an objective criterion and this is universality.35 He points out the important
characteristic of the universality of moral law – ‘reciprocity’ of obligation among persons.
According to the idea of reciprocity, there is inconsistency in the moral agent to apply a given
moral standard to the other human agent and demand to be treated with a different one. Paton’s
argument is that “if I claim to be treated in one way, I must be prepared to reciprocate the same
treatment to the other.36 We can now relate the formula of the universal law to its derivative
formula stated above.
Derivative of Formula I: The Formula of the Law of Nature
This formula states: “Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to
become a universal law of nature.”37 Wood’s interpretation this formula is that it is an attempt to
render the formula of universal law some content, because the latter is merely formal. The law of
nature is familiar to our experience. The idea then is to inquire if we can consistently will a
system of nature that works with the law of our maxim. 38
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Following Wood, Paton points out Kant’s awareness that to will that our maxim become
a universal law of nature is beyond our power; hence, he uses the phrase, we ought to ‘act as
though’ in the formula of universal law of nature. With this idea, we have to imagine ourselves
as part of nature under whose laws we are subjects; hence, the formula of the universal law is
only applicable through the formula of the law of nature. Paton points out that through the
formula of the universal law of nature we cannot arrive at perfect duties. This is because all that
this formula requires is that our maxim accord with the universal law of nature, but it does not
say anything about the particular duties we ought to perform.39
The significance of the law of nature however, lies in its ‘teleological law.’ Paton’s
reading of Kant is that in addition to the causal law in nature there is a teleological law. This is
evident in Kant’s claim that there is intrinsic purpose in all organized beings such that nothing is
without reason.40 According to Paton, Kant’s claim is that nature is purposive and everything in
it must be understood from this perspective. Consequently, proper understanding of human
nature includes the idea of purposefulness. Teleology is the law of human nature, and like the
teleological law of nature, human actions are purposeful. Morality then requires that we act with
the idea that nature has a purpose, i.e., considering human nature in terms of systematic harmony
of purposes in accordance with the law of nature.41 So understood, the fundamental question in
morality pertains to whether our maxim would accord with such a harmony, preserve it, or
altogether destroy it. Paton argues that at the heart of Kant’s division of duties into ‘perfect’ and
‘imperfect’ is the idea that these duties have to do with the realization of this harmonious
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purpose. The question then is whether a will that aims at such a harmony of ends in human
nature could will its maxim as the law of nature.42
Onora Nell draws our attention to the significance of the phrase “we must be able to will”
in the formula of the universal law. According to Nell, to ‘be able to will’ is a cannon for all
moral judgments.43 This follows from Kant’s argument that some actions are such that their
maxims cannot be thought of as a universal law of nature without contradiction, worse still being
willed to be such a law. Kant contends that although some maxims can be thought without
contradiction, yet they cannot be willed to be a law of nature, because a will that universalizes
such maxims would be in conflict with itself.44
Kant’s example of universalization of a subjective principle is false promising to get out
of a difficult financial situation. He argues that this maxim cannot be universalized without
contradiction because the very act of promising would end since no one would trust anyone else.
Consequently, the ends that prompt the act of false promising would be impossible to achieve.45
Kant’s argument is significant in this example. In everyday life, the implied, nonverbal
expression of trust is what makes life livable; for example, contracts of different sorts, and
promises simple or complex are possible only within the idea that people can for the most part be
trusted to keep their promises.
Nell’s interpretation of Kant is that there are two kinds of contradictions: ‘contradiction
in concept’ and ‘contradiction in the will.’ According to Nell, the ‘contradiction in the concept’
test must have the “maxim of the action’ and its ‘universalized typified counterpart’
simultaneously. That means the counterpart must not be universalized alone. The important
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question is whether the agent can ‘consistently’ and ‘simultaneously’ hold one’s subjective
principle and will its universalized form. According to Nell, not only must the agent intend the
immediate action but also all the conditions that can make the contemplated action possible.46 If
Nell is right, then successful false promising must intend such conditions as would make this
action successful. But if it is a law of nature, it means the promising would end because no one
trusts any other.
In Kant’s example of “refusing to help others” as a maxim, he contends that it is possible
to imagine the law of nature in which no one helps the other. However, a will that intends this
will be in conflict with itself, since there are times when one necessarily needs other people’s
help. The argument is, in willing such a law, one would be willingly robbing oneself of the very
help one needs from others.47 Wood’s interpretation of Kant is that we would not rationally
deprive ourselves of other people’s voluntary help. He argues that certain types of help, such as
love and sympathy, which we need from others, are well beyond what we can rightly claim from
them. Consequently, Kant’s argument is based on human interdependency. Our dependency on
others implies that our needs, projects, goals, and our very well being are subject to failure
without other people’s benevolence. According to Wood, this empirical claim attests that our
self-love cannot be separated from our need to be loved, which is manifested in other people’s
help when we are in need.48
Kant’s example of refusing to help others is typical of the “contradiction in the will.”
With regard to this, Nell argues that Kant’s basic assumption is that rational beings have ends.
According to the principle of hypothetical imperative, whoever wills the end must necessarily
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will the means to that end. However, to will the means to one’s ends, also implies that one must
will other people’s help, should one’s efforts alone prove insufficient for realizing the desired
end. To will others’ help implies that one cannot at the same time will a system of nature in
which no one helps the other.49
The significance of Kant’s claim should not be underestimated. Although at the first sight
it seems quite self-centered, it points to a fundamental fact of human life; what we are and what
we become is to a great extent determined by others. Aristotle is the precursor of this idea in his
claim that “…without friends no one would choose to live even if he had all other goods…”50
For Aristotle, to love another is equivalent to loving our very self.51 The important question
pertains not to whether Kant’s argument is based on self-interest and unfit for moral principle;
rather, the question is whether as humans we can get away from the need to love and be loved
without destroying an important element of what it is to be human.
On the whole, Kant makes the following remark concerning the human breach of the
categorical imperative: In any violation of duty, we do not actually will that our maxim should
become a universal law. We only make an exception for ourselves for the sake of our desires and
only for a given occasion. Kant maintains that if all is viewed from reason’s perspective, we find
contradiction in our will, in that a given principle is binding for all rational beings and at the
same time it makes exceptions.52 He argues that our will is affected by both reason and
inclination. Viewed in this way, there is no contradiction in taking the will as determined by
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reason, and also being affected by inclinations, and that this phenomenon arises from the
opposition of desires to the dictates of reason.53
I take Kant’s argument to mean that pure reason can determine the will, since even when
we choose to act according to inclinations, we still subject our judgment to reason with regard to
whether or not to go along with our desire. However, since the individual would not have anyone
other than oneself adopt this principle, this is an indication that we would not will a law that
permitted arbitrary choices in favor of individuals.
In view of both the formula of the universal law and its variant, the formula of the law of
nature, Wood notes certain difficulties. First, although Kant demands that the maxim of our
actions accord with the universal law, he does not spell out what this law is. In other words, the
“universal law” is introduced without its content. Second, the criteria to be able to universalize
our maxims without contradiction only yields knowledge of what is permissible and what is not
permissible but not any particular acts to be performed. In addition, the criteria for judging what
is permissible and not permissible, is introduced without explanation concerning the basis of this
standard. All that this test provides is the argument on what a rational being can consistently will
without contradiction. According to Wood, even though the practical law is a law that all rational
beings have reason to follow, nothing guarantees that all rational beings would will to have
everyone follow this principle.54 The issues that Wood raises against the formula of universal
law and the formula of the law of nature concern the real ‘ground’ of obligation in morality.
Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant is that the experience of obligation is crucial
to moral experience. She contends that moral judgments are normative and their being right is
our motive for performing them. According to Korsgaard, obligation is primary in
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conceptualizing ethics.55 For Korsgaard, obligation or duty refers not to the action but on the
demand it places on the will of the agent. Consequently, moral judgments are norms, and so
make claims on us, and this is the basis of motive for performing them.56 The motivation in a
moral action is the reasonableness of the action. The action is good because it is the law of
reason and that is sufficient ground of its obligating us to performing it. This interpretation of
Kant’s idea of obligation is evident in W.D. Falk’s discussion on “Ought and Motivation.” Falk
denies that any sanction is necessary for morality. He argues for the necessary connection
between morality and motivation. According to Falk, the thought of what we ought to do
includes the motive for doing it. In other words, if by motive is meant the reason(s) for
performing a moral act, the thought that we ought to do something is a sufficient reason for
doing it.57
Despite the analysis of Kant’s idea of the nature of obligation, it seems to me that
Wood’s criticism should not be overlooked. If his concern is on the ground of obligation,
analysis of its nature does not quite meet this demand. This problem, Wood thinks, lies in the
inadequacy of the formula of the universal law and the formula of the law of nature considered
as such. According to Wood, the first formula and its variant are a preliminary stage of Kant’s
thought on moral law. He argues that the significance of the second formula lies in its capacity to
address the question on the ground of the categorical imperative; to this formula this
investigation proceeds.
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Formula II: The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself
This formula states: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the
person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as means.58 In this
formula, the argument revolves around the notion of “end in itself.” With regard to this concept,
Kant states: “If in life there is anything that has an absolute worth and therefore, an end in itself,
only this can be the ground of categorical imperative.”59 This proposition is of utmost
importance to understanding Kant’s formula of humanity. On the basis of this supposition, he
argues that humanity has an absolute worth and therefore, is an‘end in itself’. Consequently,
humanity is the ground of categorical imperative. Kant distinguishes human beings from other
being, by characterizing the former as persons and the latter as things. By a person, Wood
understands Kant to refer to a being endowed with consciousness of moral responsibility arising
from a positive idea of freedom i.e., will legislating law.60 In Kant’s view, the relation between a
human being and things is such that things are always means to some end whereas, a rational
being is an end in itself.
Kant’s distinction between things and persons is raises the question of man’s relation to
the world. In Kant’s ethics, things are only means. On the contrary, in Heidegger’s ontology the
human Da-sein stands in a relation of dependence on the objects. This relationship is such that
the human Da-sein cannot be known apart from existential character of ‘being-in-the-world’.
According to Heidegger, this relation is such that Da-sein is a being among other beings but
raises itself above them in its way of being – its understanding being.61
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Frank Schalow understands Heidegger’s position as doing away with dualism in Kant’s
treatment of human relation with the world. According to Schalow, Heidegger demonstrates the
interdependent relationship between the objects and the human being and at the same time
allowing for transcendence by the very fact of going beyond beings in self-determination.62 In
Heidegger’s ontology, care is mode of being of the human being and signifies one’s engagement
with the objects as characteristic mode of being in the world.63
Hedegger’s characterization of the human being’s relation with other existents is of great
importance. If the approach is dualistic, the implication is that humans can choose either or not to
relate to beings other than themselves. In Heidegger’s strategy the human person does not have
this option. The ethical significance of this position is that humans cannot destroy the world in
their handling of other existents without hurting their very existence.
Concerning the idea of end in itself, Kant indicates that the moral activity does not
preclude an object as its principle. However, the principle of the moral action cannot be a
material object. According to Wood, this is why Kant distinguishes between the formal principle,
i.e., the will’s legislative form, and the material principle i.e., the material object. Only the
formal principles can be laws.64 The reason for this is that material principles fall under the idea
of happiness, which Kant dismisses as obscure owing to its indeterminate nature. Based on the
above distinction between formal and material principle in the action, Wood argues that for Kant,
“ends” are not limited to objects effected by human activity; rather, they can be objects of the
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will if what determines the will is not material but what is rational in which case, the ends in
question are duties.65
The implication of understanding humanity as an ‘end in itself’ is that any violation of
duty either against oneself or other persons is using oneself or others not as an end in itself but
only as a means. In the example typical of duty to others, false promising reduces the other to a
means for our purposes, since the person in question cannot share in our intentions. For Kant, to
treat the other as end in itself and not merely as means requires that the person share in our
intention. Further, the act of false promising encroaches on the other’s freedom and property, and
in so doing violates the other’s rights. The act of false promising, therefore, cannot be made into
a law because it violates humanity as an end in itself.66
With regard to the meritorious actions, i.e., duty to help others, Kant maintains that not to
do so may not conflict with the principle of humanity as an end in itself. He argues that humanity
can continue to exist even if no one helped others to achieve their ends. However, humanity as
an end in itself is only negative since no one wishes to further the happiness of others. Kant
maintains that the end of any person who is also an end in itself ought to be our end. Properly
understood, therefore, humanity as an end in itself implies that I make other people’s well-being
my goal.67 According to Wood’s interpretation of Kant, to refuse to help has far greater
repercussions than failure in our life-projects. It means that to universalize this principle is
tantamount to willing that others do not help; so construed, their refusal to help conflicts with
one’s view of oneself as an end in itself.68

65

Ibid., 115.
Ibid.
67
Kant, Foundations, §429.
68
Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 150.
66

29

Based on the above argument, Kant contends that the principle of humanity as an end in
itself is the limiting condition of freedom. In other words, humanity is the sole ground of the
categorical imperative, and so it is the principle that ought to determine the exercise of freedom
in human activity. Kant’s view of humanity as the ground of the categorical imperative is based
on his concept of a rational nature. His view is that without rational beings nothing of absolute
value is possible.69 Wood’s interpretation is that the prerogative of rational nature arises from
the very fact that a rational being is the source of value judgment concerning the goodness in
things. Consequently, rational beings confer absolute worth on themselves both subjectively and
objectively.70
Kant’s idea of human dignity as foundation for morality has been subjected to criticism
from contemporary philosophers. Pertinent to this subject is Richard Rorty’s criticism of Kant’s
idea of inherent human dignity arising from the fact of rational nature as the basis for morality.
According to Rorty, there is nothing significant in human moral capacity that separates them
from brutes other that historically determined facts of world culture.71 The argument here is that
we do not have to presuppose such a concept as human dignity as the ground of our moral
judgments for there is no such a priori basis. All there is, is a cultural development in the way
we understand ourselves. On the basis of this understanding we come up with certain concepts
such as human rights. According to Rorty, such ideas should replace the otherwise outdated
concept of human dignity based on human rationality, which he believes has no effect on human
moral development. Rorty’s attack is directed to traditional view of morality as founded on a
universal concept of “inherent human dignity” regardless of who one happens to be. According
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to Rorty, this has not proved relevant for moral evil continues to ravage humanity. Rorty claims
that the concept of human dignity presupposes certain knowledge of human nature but such
knowledge is questionable since its presupposition has not resulted to human realization of moral
ideals. Conclusively, there is no such knowledge; therefore, the concept of human dignity needs
to be replaced by a ‘human rights culture’ that has its basis on sentimentalism of human
suffering.72 The argument is that moral judgment should be based on moral feeling arising from
exposure to human suffering.
Rorty’s criticism concerning human dignity as having its source in presupposed
knowledge of human nature is rather inaccurate with regard to the real source of the concept of
human dignity. The value of human being as such is not based on knowledge of “theories” about
human nature. To value oneself in the sense in which Kant has it one does not need any
theoretical analysis of human beings. Kant’s argument that this absolute valuation has its source
from self and from self to other human beings is significant.
Second, Rorty’s argument for ethics based on moral feeling about human suffering rather
than view of human dignity is also problematic. If this were the basis of moral judgment there is
no basis for blaming those who are not moved by human suffering since sentimentalism cannot
be an obligation. If sentiments were a factor in our moral decision, the one inflicting the
suffering is the closest to see the suffering but yet this does not alter the decision of a sadist. The
moral decision is not about what one feels but about acting according to what is right
regardless of what sentiments one harbors. Most importantly, it is not what one feels that
determines what is moral/immoral but what one does regardless of what sentiments one harbors.
The fundamental question is how to understand the rational nature’s absolute worth as
presented in Kant’s formula of humanity, since setting ends is simply an exercise of freedom but
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not necessarily with moral considerations. There are two views of rationality for Kant: the first is
the capacity for self-determination in the practical sense, i.e., ability to set ends and willing the
means to accomplish them. On the other hand, there is a view of rationality from the perspective
of autonomy. According to Allison, the rationality in the formula of humanity as end in itself
refers to the latter. In Rorty’s criticism of Kant’s view of rationality as ground of morality, it
seems to me that Rorty’s view is limited to the first view. In the following analysis this study
will focus on human rationality from the perspective of autonomy. the content of the third
formula.

Formula III: The Formula of Autonomy
This formula is regarded as the most plausible argument as the ground of the categorical
imperative. It states, “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal
laws through its maxim.”73 The derivative of this formula is: “So act as if you were always
through your maxims a law-giving member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.”74 Kant argues that
this formula arises from the formula of universal law and that of humanity as end in itself.
Following Kant, Wood points out the important relationship between the last two formulas and
the formula of autonomy. According to Wood, the basis of the categorical imperative is the
principle of the rational being. The latter is the principle grounding the value of a rational nature
as the supreme authority, making objective universal law that commands absolutely. Wood
contends that the notion of the rational will as a legislator of universal laws carries with it the
idea of autonomy.75
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The formula of autonomy regards the will of every rational being as a legislator of the
universal moral law. According to Kant, the will obeys the law of which it is the author in
reason. He contends that in order to legislate a universal law, the rational being must be
determined by this same law if it is to avoid heteronomy, i.e., different principles determining the
will. Kant believes that if interests determine the will, we would require another law to render
universality to a moral maxim.76 He argues that interests are individual; therefore, if the basis of
moral action is the individual interest, every action would have individual interests as its
determining principle. Consequently, there would be no universality of the law as there would be
as many principles as there are interests. On the other hand, if the will of every rational being is
the legislator, the law would be universal, since the principle is the same, that of categorical
imperative. The law of reason as demanded by the principle of autonomy is based on
unconditioned principle, that of freedom from external laws such as objects of desire or external
legislation. This formula is based on the premise that the rational will is the author of its own
laws, i.e., the autonomy of the rational will. Kant points out that autonomy of a rational will
would be negative if it would only mean independence from external determination. In Kant’s
terms, a free will in terms of lawlessness would be meaningless.77 For a rational will to be
autonomous in a positive sense, the will must operate according to a law that it legislates, such
that the obligation is self-imposed. Consequently, the rational will is both the subject and author
of the moral law.
Jean Jacques Rousseau is the precursor of the idea of “universal legislation” in his Social
Contract. According to Rousseau, humans cannot survive in the state of nature. This is because
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there are obstacles that make their self-preservation impossible for individuals intrude on what
human beings can devote to self-preservation.78
The state of nature in its worst scenario is described in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. In the
state of nature one’s life is comparable to the time of war. Human beings are enemies to one
another, and the only security is one’s power and what innovation can provide. In Hobbes view,
in such a state “….there is no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”79
Rousseau’s claim is that in this state of nature human beings destroy one another and
cannot survive. He argues that for human survival, it is necessary for people to unify their power
and freedom, in Rousseau’s view, their means of self-preservation. Rousseau’s important
question is whether there is a way in which one can surrender these two means of selfpreservation without jeopardizing one’s security. According to Rousseau, the ‘Social Contract’
can meet this need. In this state the individual person and his property can be defended. Further,
though each member in the association obeys, one remains free for one only obeys one’s own
laws by virtue of participation in the general will.80 The argument here is that since the law
expresses the will of a people, in adhering to the law, one is obeying the collective will of which
one is a part. In Rousseau’s argument, he does not seem to recognize that the ‘Social Contract’ is
as shaky a principle as any other. The social contract cannot solve the social evils as easily as
Rousseau envisions. It is based on human freedom that can chose not to go along with this
contract.
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Paton points to the significance of the idea of rational beings’ legislative capacity. He
contends that the crucial point is that setting ends is characteristic of freedom. Consequently, a
rational will can be coerced into actions that are means to some end but it cannot be forced to
make those ends its ends, for to make something one’s end is necessarily an act of a free will. It
follows that an obligatory end such as to treat a human being as end in itself must have the agent
as the source of such a law to which one is a subject.81 Cassirer’s understanding of Kant’s notion
of “autonomy” of the will is that to be free and being under the moral law are one and the same
thing.82
Schopenhauer’s criticism against Kant is that there is inconsistency in Kant’s idea of
freedom of the will and at the same time prescribing the moral ought to it. Concerning the will,
Schopenhauer states:
…the will is not only free, but even almighty; from it not only comes its action but also its world; and as
the will is, so does its action appear, so does its world appear, both are its knowledge… The will
determines and therewith its action and its world also; for besides it, there is nothing, and these are the will
itself. Only thus is the will truly autonomous ….83

From the above text it is evident that the two thinkers have different views about the will.
For Schopenhauer, the will is what underlies any expression of force be it human action or in
nature.84 Despite this characterization however, it is still not possible to conceive of what the will
is. Since one cannot have a positive understanding of what will is in Schopenhauer’s terms, it is
difficult to grant his argument. In Kant’s view however, will is capacity to act according to
understanding laws of reason’s own making and so it is an intellectual capacity. Although both
thinkers speak of the thing in itself, yet the two have different concept of it. The thing in itself of
Kant, which could not be discovered through the theoretical reason is discovered through the
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practical reason as freedom and God as is evident in Kant’s postulates of pure reason. On the
whole, these two views give different conceptions of human being. For Kant, his idea of the will
as law legislating capacity results in the concept of human dignity. With Schopenhauer’s view of
the will, we cannot arrive at this view of human nature, for an individual has no value; only the
species has value.85 Further, Kant’s view of the will is only in relation the to moral law. For
Schopenhauer, the will is everything including the world. This is far too confusing a concept.
The essence of the idea of autonomy of the will and its ambiguity is captured by Beck’s
remark:
Man is the only being in the world that not only is he a manifestation of some universals but ought to be an
instance of others; he is an individual that gives no valid laws to others that he does not lay upon himself,
that gives no privileges to himself, that he does not give to others.86

This supposition of the rational being as the author of his own laws raises certain issues: first,
human history attests to human beings’ failure to live up to the principle of “humanity as end in
itself, which according to Kant, has the rational nature as its source. The greatest evil against
humanity is perpetrated by the human beings themselves. If indeed humans are the source of this
law, how does it happen that they are at the same time unwilling to live up to this principle? The
moral evil in human existence is an indication that humanity is not always willing to treat one
another as end in itself. Hence, it remains a question how Kant’s categorical imperative or
Rousseau’s idea of Social Contract can be reconciled with the self-destructive tendency in
human nature.
As already indicated, the Social Contract as an expression of the will of a people, is
meant to be a remedy to the human predicament mentioned above. Kant tells us that the principle
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of autonomy has a derivative formula meant to ensure the validity of the principle of autonomy.
This formula is the focus of the proceeding discussion.

Derivative of Formula III: The Formula of the Realm of Ends
By the Realm of Ends is meant the system of laws uniting rational beings as legislators
and members in the Kingdom of Ends. This formula is related to the formula of autonomy in the
sense that it is concerned with universal purposes. For this reason, the formula of the Realm of
Ends abstracts from particular interests and forms a unity of ends connected systematically
despite particular individual ends. Consequently, the Realm of Ends is only possible under the
principle of humanity as end in itself, for under this principle they all ought to act.87
Kant argues that rational subjects belong to the Realm of Ends both as members by virtue
of their capacity to legislate universal laws, and as sovereign because they are subject to laws of
their own will and not of any other legislator. He contends that this legislation is only possible
through a free will whether by membership or sovereignty. This last proposition is important in
understanding Kant’s idea of the Kingdom of Ends. Freedom for Kant, which is the locus of
universal legislation implies universal reciprocal coercion and is consistent with the freedom of
every member according to universal laws. According to Kant, the essence of justice is
awareness of every person’s obligation under the law.88 In Rousseau’s terms, if the public
agreement is not to be an illusion, there is a condition without which all other agreements based
on it are bound to fail. This condition is that in the event that an individual refuses to obey the
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will of the people, one must be constrained to do so; in Rousseau’s terms, one must be “forced to
be free.”89
Morality, therefore, is based on relating one’s action to legislation of a will under which
condition only is the Kingdom of Ends possible. Under this principle, all actions must accord
with universal laws as their criterion, and this means to act under the notion of the will as the
legislator of the universal law. The idea of a rational being as end in itself, derives from the
legislative capacity whose law is to treat every maxim of the will as legislating laws to other
rational wills and to self.90
Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant’s idea of the Kingdom of Ends is that it is an
agreement to join others in the Kingdom of Ends. The hallmark in the Kingdom of Ends is
reciprocity in holding one another responsible; in her view, treating the other as a person.
According to Korsgaard, reciprocity is an essential characteristic in human friendships and
extends to the political domain of human life. She contends that social contract is an ‘enforced
reciprocity’ that people agree on in order to exist together as free citizens.91 The significance of
Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant’s formula lies in what is implied by universal legislation. In
her view, this legislation has two aspects. On the one hand, it means making other peoples’ ends
one’s ends. On the other hand, it means that in choosing one’s ends, these ends must be such that
they can be other people’s ends. When extended to the Kingdom of Ends, individual ends
become objects of universal legislation through communal will. Korsgaard maintains that only
through this reciprocity is one’s autonomy realizable.92 I consider Korsgaard’s analysis as
extremely important not only in individual relations but also in the political sphere. In her
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argument, she restricts the choice of one’s ends to what is adaptable by others, for only in this
way can individual ends be other people’s ends. In the best political structures, individuals fair
better when their ends are a will of the people, such as is the case in democratic governments.

B
KANT’S DEFENSE OF FREEDOM
Freedom has been a central problem in philosophy and has continued to be up to our
contemporary times. It is also an issue in everyday life because it extends to every facet of
human actions. When all aspects of human activities are in harmonious relation, the idea of
freedom is taken for granted; but as soon as this harmony is disrupted by human conduct, the
question of what the individual(s) ought to have done is directed towards the person(s); implying
by this that the individual(s) have the capacity to do otherwise. Although Kant asserts that the
idea of freedom cannot be empirically proven, he also insists that the human person cannot act
except under the idea of freedom; that means, freedom defines the very essence of human being
in such a way that there is no other in which way a rational being can be understood. What is at
risk in Kant’s deduction of freedom is morality; it stands or falls to the degree in which, the fact
of freedom of rational will is accepted.
In order to understand Kant’s idea of freedom, it is important to examine this notion in
his first Critique. In the latter, Kant distinguishes two kinds of causalities: causality according to
nature and causality through freedom. With regard to the former, Kant contends that the idea of
causality is indispensable to the possibility of human experience. According to Kant, all
occurrences take place according to the law of connection of cause and effect and this is
according to a rule. That is to say, for every occurrence in time, there is an antecedent state and

39

this succession is a matter of necessity. Therefore, the category of cause as a synthetic a priori
concept is indispensable for our experience of the world.93
In the antinomy of pure reason, Kant contrasts the ideas of causality according to the law
of nature, which he characterizes as the condition of occurrences with the cause’s unconditioned
causality, which he conceives as freedom.94 Based on this distinction, he contends that the causal
law of nature is not the only cause responsible for the events in the world but that we must
assume the causality through freedom.95 Kant argues that the law of nature is such that every
event presupposes the preceding state. However, the cause itself is also an occurrence in time so
that it too is caused. According to Kant, this causality also presupposes the previous state
according to the law of nature and so on, ad infinitum. Kant holds that if this chain of causes and
their causality go on indefinitely, there would be no beginning and no completeness in the series
of the causes. In other words, all we have are intermediate occurrences in the series. But because
the law of nature demands that every occurrence be preceded by a previous state, this leads to a
contradiction since the last state in the series needs explanation, i.e., a sufficient reason for its
occurrence. According to Kant, we must admit the causality through freedom, meaning by this
the absolute spontaneity of causes to begin a state without reference to a preceding event.96
Sadic Al-Azm interprets Kant’s argument in the antinomies as pertaining to freedom
quite apart from a moral problem. He identifies Kant’s problem as cosmological, i.e., causal
determinism and the polemics surrounding this whole issue. In his reading of Kant’s third
antinomy, Al-Azm does not deny the moral repercussion such as “freedom of the will” that arise
from the denial of transcendental freedom. However, a moral problem does not encompass
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Kant’s whole problem in the third antinomy.97 Kant articulates this position in his view of
freedom as power to begin a state by itself i.e., spontaneously.98 The point is that the causality
through freedom does not refer to an existing state in turn but is absolute in initiating the series.
The issue of freedom is one of the thorny issues in Kant’s philosophy as a whole. As is
shown in the succeeding chapters, Fichte and Hegel hold that Kant does not have a proper
account of the problem of freedom as he limits it to moral aspect of the human being. In his
retrieval of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Heidegger revisits this complex problem. In his
reading of Heidegger, Schalow points out that Heidegger’s view of freedom is that it belongs to
the problem of the world. However, he argues that Kant’s limitation in his treatment of freedom
lies in his presentation of the two realities, the world and freedom as though they can exist
separately. According to Schalow nature and freedom are not separate entities but that nature is
manifestation of freedom.99 I take it that this criticism refers to Kant’s distinction between a
cause i.e., (nature) and a cause’s ‘unconditioned causality’ (freedom) referred to in the first
Critique.100
In this issue, it seems to me that Kant’s account of the reality of the two causes does not
indicate separation though this cannot be ruled out. In this account, the argument is more about
the dependence of the ‘conditioned cause’ on the ‘unconditioned causality’ such that the
conditioned cannot exist without the unconditioned causality. However, Kant is also clear that
the unconditioned causality is not dependent on what it causes; therefore, the implied separation
can also be inferred. He argues that if A is the cause of the being of B and C, A can exist without
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B but the reverse is not possible because the possibility of the first item on the series is not
dependent on the second or third.101
The point here is that Kant’s argument on freedom refers to the efficient cause and the
effect thereof. However, to argue that the efficient cause cannot exist apart from effect is to
place both efficient cause and its effect on equal footing. I argue that if by freedom Kant implies
the efficient causality, on which everything else on the series of causes depends, his argument
that its possibility does not depend on the effect is valid. This is because while the effect come to
be in time, the efficient cause must be prior to its effect. One can argue that nature is the only
causality there is. The question is, would this explanation meet the reason’s demand for ultimate
principle underlying all reality? Alternatively, one can argue that nature and freedom is one and
the same thing. The main issue is to determine whether freedom can exist prior to its
manifestation in nature. For Kant, however, transcendental freedom implies distinct not separate
causality through freedom being prior to causality of nature wherein, all the intermediate terms
in the series depend on the first term. If nature depends on the efficient cause in any given
moment, then it is difficult to speak of separation for that which is dependent would cease to
exist.
My view is that two realities can be distinct without being separate and human being is a
manifestation of such a reality. Through our rational power we know that human body is distinct
from the principle that keeps it alive but the two realities are not separate. Once the two are
separate, the living body ceases to be since it depends on that principle. Further, human beings
also know that the principle of life is not human product otherwise they would produce it at will
when they most need it but they are not capable of doing so. Consequently, we must assume that
the principle of life is distinct from the human body such that that source must prior to the body.
101

Ibid., B437/A411.

42

As Thomas Aquinas argues, it is does not belong to bodies to be alive.102 This analogy could
apply to freedom. We can distinguish freedom if by this we mean the efficient causality, from its
manifestation without separating them.
Although the overall problem in the antinomies is cosmological, Kant immediately points
out the fundamental relation between the transcendental freedom with practical freedom. This is
evident in his claim “…transcendental idea of freedom is the basis of the notion of practical
freedom.” Consequently, what is problematic in “freedom of the will” is the possibility of
transcendental freedom. Practical freedom is defined as the “power of choice” without being
necessitated by sense objects. This implies that rational beings have the capacity to determine
themselves apart from impulse. Based on this premise, Kant argues that we cannot do away with
the idea of transcendental freedom without doing away with “freedom of the will” at the same
time.103
Allison’s reading of Kant’s position on freedom of the will is that Kant’s concern is
freedom of will as such, irrespective of morality. He argues that freedom of the will interpenetrates all human actions. Based on the fact of freedom of the will in general, Kant uses the
latter premise to ground morality.104 The significance of Kant’s strategy lies in the fact that to
accept the fact of freedom outside of moral consideration, which all humans do, means that one
cannot deny its corollary, the moral freedom. Allison contends that although the practical
freedom is empirical it has a transcendental dimension, characterized as the absolute spontaneity
of action and this is the only basis for "imputability" of the action on the agent. He contents that
the notion of transcendental freedom admits of free agency, and this introduces the idea of
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“unconditioned causality.”105 What is needed is an account of the relationship between
transcendental and practical freedom. In order to adequately defend the idea of freedom of the
rational will, the above problem must be addressed.
In view of the relationship between transcendental and practical freedom, Allison
distinguishes two kinds of beginnings: “beginning in time” and “beginning in causality.” He
agues that while both causalities are attributable to the divine, only the “beginning in causality”
can be attributed to free agency.106 What Allison means is that nothing is prior to the divine with
respect to time. In addition, the divine also is the “beginning in causality” as the divine causality
does not refer to a preceding cause. On the contrary, free agency like that of rational nature is a
“beginning in causality” since it can spontaneously initiate events in the world without referring
to the preceding state. However, free agents are not prior in time, as finite rational beings
presuppose a cause other than themselves. Allison argues that in both cases, that is to say,
“beginning in time” and “beginning in causality” it is necessary to recognize the causality
through freedom even if its possibility is not conceivable.
Allison’s conclusion here is quite ambiguous . It seems to indicate that freedom cannot be
accounted for but can be accepted as a fact. This position however, is precarious. As Kant points
out in his first Critique, any proposition without justification is subject to counterattack by
equally strong proposition.107 In this respect, Allison’s position is vulnerable.
Allison contends that there are two aspects in the nature of action: first, actions are
beginning in causality; meaning by this, a free agent is absolute beginning in every action.
Second, in every free action the fundamental idea is the “resolution and the act.” Consequently,
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the decision to act is central because this marks the beginning of a new series. According to
Allison, the problem involved in Kant’s position of free agency pertains to the fact that both
beginning in time and causality are not empirical; hence, they can be dismissed as empty ideas.
In addition, even if the possibility of a first beginning is granted, it may not be possible to apply
it in nature because of the conflict in holding these two positions. Based on these two problems,
Kant resorts to a distinction between empirical and intelligible nature of free agency. 108
Allison characterizes the polemics concerning Kant’s theory of freedom as compatibility
of freedom with natural causality on one hand, and incompatibility of freedom with natural
causality on the other. The former position holds that it is possible to be free and necessitated at
the same time. In this view the action is only understood in terms of a preceding state. If the
preceding state and conditions are not taken into account, then the agent is said to act without
reason. Further, the compatibility view argues that if the action is not causally connected to the
previous state or disposition of the agent, it cannot rightly be ascribed to the agent.109 The
question then concerns the criterion for attributing the action to the agent. Allison argues that for
a given action to be imputed on the agent, there is ‘activity requirement’; meaning by this, that
the agent actually performs the act as opposed to “being acted on”. The second requirement is
that the action must be explainable in terms of the agent’s nature, which means the necessity of
accounting for the why of the action. Based on the above requirements, Allison contends that the
‘activity requirement’ can only be met within the view of incompatibility, i.e., transcendental
freedom. 110 This means that, Kant must resolve the problem of how one and the same agent can
be said to be free on the transcendental level and determined on the empirical level.
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Allison’s interpretation of Kant is that for a causal agent to be so conceived, it must have
a determinate “mode with which it operates” without which it cannot be designated as cause, as
there would be no basis for assigning such a causality to a given effect. Further, an empirical
causal agent must comply to the rule of possible experience. However, certain agents can be
ascribed both empirical and intelligible character, in which case the intelligible character of such
agents cannot be explicated in terms of conditions of time, a necessary condition for experience.
Following from Kant’s analysis of analogies, this agent cannot be determined by an antecedent
state.111 I take it that Allison is referring to the idea that the rational being’s actions cannot be
explained in terms of a preceding state because there are no alterations in terms of before and
after on the intellectual principle as on objects of experience; therefore, Kant’s doctrine of
human freedom is based on his view of the will as such. With regard to human actions Kant
states:
“Everything in nature works according to law; only a rational being has the capacity of
acting according to the conception of laws. This capacity is the will.”112
This proposition is fundamental for understanding Kant’s theory of freedom and the
resultant moral responsibility. His moral theory is grounded on the idea of pure practical reason,
that is, freedom of the will. It follows that to act according to conception of the laws the will
must be free to choose between one course of action among others. The significance of Kant’s
argument is that it does not actually refer to moral concerns but simply on ordinary
human activities; that is, he is appealing to what we are ordinarily aware of. Kant’s thesis is that
“pure reason is practical” and only from this presupposition is morality conceivable in Kant’s
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terms of the categorical imperative. In his Critique of Pure Reason, he contends that practical
freedom is concerned with what ought to occur even if it does not take place. 113 The point here is
that since rational beings set ends, the practical reason is concerned with imperatives necessary
for realizing these ends. In the Foundations, Kant’s view of the will of a rational being is that it
is a causality through its freedom.114
Beck’s analysis of Kant’s thought sheds light on the idea of freedom of the will as a
causality in the distinction between actor/spectator perspectives. In Beck’s view, the agent is
related to his action as an actor and not as a spectator who is not involved in the action. Beck
adds that unlike an actor in a drama, the agent is not an imitator; rather, the rational agent
deliberates his actions. Beck characterizes the act of human deliberation as “taking thought.”
Consequently, this “taking thought” is the basic cause of human actions and the two are
inseparable. According to Beck, deliberation is an intentional search for sound reason(s) for
choosing one course of action among other possibilities.115 According to Beck, from the
perspective of the agent, the process of decision-making (deliberation) is an important
experience. In this the agent understands the difference one’s thinking process makes. Above all,
one experiences one’s freedom and realizes oneself as the author of his own actions rather than
obeying extrinsic laws. Beck maintains that the human agents always act according to the
implications of their actions based on self-knowledge, the world and the idea that deliberation
makes a difference in their actions. As a result, humans always act according to principles and
not impulse. Beck contends that Kant is not denying the effect of our drives on our actions;
rather, he is denying that human beings are at the mercy of these drives. He is arguing that reason
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interpenetrates all our human actions and determines how we respond. Conception of laws and
patterns, and actions based on that conception are not based on mere imitation of experience, but
are grounded on our understanding, the practical reason.116 We are now in position to relate this
freedom of will with obligation to moral law.
Kant’s position is that granted that the will is free, i.e., in the sense explicated above we
must find a law sufficient to determine it necessarily. He contends that the object of a subjective
principle can only be given to us empirically. However, freedom of the will must mean
independence from empirical determination, i.e., sensibility.117 Since in Kant’s view a lawless
will is meaningless, a free will must nevertheless be determined by a law but not a material law.
Kant argues that all that is left for the law to determine the will is the legislative form; i.e., the
will making universal laws. Consequently, the maxim of law is a legislative principle and can
determine the will independent of the object of desire. In Kant’s view, freedom and moral law
imply each other such that the relation between them is reciprocal.118
Kant’s argument in this proposition is crucial; it is the crux of his deduction of the
possibility of the categorical imperative as indicated in the principle of autonomy. According to
Kant, it is not freedom that is immediately known to us, for the only freedom we know is
freedom in a negative sense, i.e., independence from natural determination. According to Kant, it
is the moral law that reveals the fact of freedom because we represent this law to ourselves as
rational and therefore, obligatory.119
Kant distinguishes between practical freedom and transcendental freedom. In the first
Critique, practical freedom is the capacity for self-determination, a capacity to act on
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imperatives. Transcendental freedom as required by the principle of autonomy, demands
complete independence from empirical determination, which is the principle of heteronomy as
the latter is concerned with the best means to achieve the desired object. In transcendental
freedom, the basis of choice is not impulse but universal legislation.120
Allison’s reading of Kant is that from the perspective of transcendental freedom, material
object is not sufficient to establish the autonomy of the rational will unless the subjective side of
the actions accords with dictates of practical law, valid unconditionally for all rational beings.
Transcendental freedom, therefore, bridges the gap between the concept of the practical law and
moral law defined by Kant. In other words, the law of freedom i.e., the practical law, and the
categorical imperative are connected by autonomous legislation of moral agents. According to
Allison, we cannot affirm our freedom and reject the categorical imperative.121
According to Beck’s view of Kant’s idea of autonomy, freedom manifests itself in one’s
consciousness of obligation. Beck argues that if freedom were to be understood as freedom from
determinism, it would have a negative meaning. Positively understood, freedom is spontaneity of
freely legislating laws. Understood this way, freedom or autonomy is not a matter of power to
begin a new series; rather, it is the source of law, which the agent follows in commencing the
series. According to Beck, consciousness of moral law rather than obedience to it is freedom in
its positive meaning.122 He points out the significance of Kant’s proposition in the Foundations.
According to Kant, “a being who cannot act except under the idea of freedom is free in a
practical sense even if theoretically this cannot be proven.”123
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Kant’s position that freedom is cannot be proven theoretically leaves certain problems.
Some thinkers criticize Kant’s doctrine on freedom as being involved in a ‘vicious circle’ arising
from reciprocity between freedom and morality; that is freedom is deduced from the moral law
and the moral law from freedom.
To avoid this problem Kant resorts to the argument on the distinction between
phenomenal and to intelligible aspect of the moral agent. The consequence of this position is that
human beings are free in so far as they are intelligent beings. However, since they also belong to
the natural world, they are subject to causal laws. This position raises a serious problem of
holding both that the human actions as both free and determined, which is a contradiction in
terms. According to Allison, Beck’s reconstruction of Kant’s account of freedom in human
actions is significant. Beck contends that ordinarily, we do not view human action as both
determined and free at the same time; therefore, a theoretical account of human actions as both
free and determined is superfluous.124
I think Beck’s reconstruction is valid in the sense that he demonstrates how Kant’s
position is untenable. However, this yet does not quite answer the question concerning how we
arrive at the concept of freedom. In this respect, Schopenhuaer’s critique of Kant’s account of
freedom is important. For Schopenhuaer, humans do not arrive at freedom through speculative
idea of unconditioned causality, or indirectly through the moral law; rather, we know this fact
immediately in our consciousness.125 The problem with this position is that it not yet clear what
Schopenhauer characterizes as will; therefore, it is impossible to grant his argument concerning
its freedom. As indicated above Kant and Schopenhauer have quite different views of the will.
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As we shall see in Chapter two of this study, the question of freedom become one of the major
issue in Fichte’s philosophy in his effort to resolve Kant’s problem.

C
THE POSTULATES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
Kant’s definition of a postulate is, “ a theoretical proposition, which is not demonstrable,
but which is inseparable inference of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.”126 The
central point in this definition is that a postulate is a synthetic a priori idea inferred from the
concept of the moral law. Owing to the a priori nature of this a postulate, it is not demonstrable.
However, although a postulate is an indemonstrable proposition it does not follow that it is an
empty idea. According to Kant, it follows necessarily from the idea of the moral law. In his
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant posits three such postulates: the idea of freedom, the
immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.127Kant’s claim is that the relationship
connecting the “postulates of pure practical reason” is neither logical nor empirical; rather, these
“practical propositions” and how they are related to each other is a synthetic a priori proposition.

The Highest Good
Kant argues that in its practical use, reason seeks the “supreme principle,” - the
unconditioned principle of human conduct. This unconditioned principle is the highest good,
which comprises morality and happiness and is the proper object of pure practical reason;
therefore, it determines the will of a rational being.128
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Kant contends that the moral law is the ultimate determining ground of the will. Since the
highest good is realized through the moral law, the moral law determines the will. According to
Kant, though the highest good is the sole object of the will, it is not the determining ground of
the will; rather, the moral law does determine the will and this must be the case if we have to
avoid heteronomy.129 Kant argues that the moral law is the “supreme condition” of the possibility
of the highest good. Consequently, its realization is the determining ground of the will. For Kant,
morality is a component of the idea of the highest good; hence, no other object determines the
will as demanded by the principle of autonomy.130
The problem with the above position is, since morality and happiness are both
components of the “highest good,” it is not clear why morality by itself is said to determine the
will rather than both since they are already connected. In other words, it is impossible to tell why
the will’s object is the moral law detached from happiness yet, Kant already argues that morality
is the condition of the highest good, which comprises morality and happiness. As such Kant’s
argument concerning the relation of morality and happiness is rather confusing.
Concerning the relation of happiness to morality, Kant holds that happiness is in the
deserving of it. He contends that virtue is the supreme condition of all that is “good” and
worthiness to be happy.131 This claim has two points: first, whatever goods we pursue, their
being good depends on a good will, which manifests itself in virtue. Second, Kant indicates that
it is not sufficient to be in possession of “happiness,” one must be worthy of it, i.e., one must
deserve it through a virtuous life. Based on the idea of the “highest good” as a ‘whole’
comprising virtue and happiness, Kant contends that virtue is not the whole and perfect good. As
humans, we need happiness. This agrees not only with human judgment but also with judgment
129
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of impartial being who considers the dignity and worth of rational beings. According to Kant, to
be in need of happiness and to be worthy of it and not possess it is contrary to the desire of an
omnipotent rational being; therefore, virtue and happiness together make up the highest good,
and happiness is given in proportion to virtue. Kant insists that although happiness is a “good” it
is not an absolute good since its characterization as a “good” is contingent on a moral will.132 I
take this to mean that since anyone, even a sadist can claim to be happy, it matters whether the
happiness is derived from moral conduct.
With regard to the relationship between virtue to happiness, Kant contends that this
relation can be understood in either of the two ways; as logical or as cause and effect. In the
former relation to seek virtue is to seek happiness, just as in logic, the conclusion necessarily
follows after the premise(s). Kant denies that the relation of morality to happiness, which are
constituents of the highest good, is not logical. That is to say, this relation is not analytical such
that one concept is contained in the other. In the latter relation, in seeking virtue, something
radically different, i.e., happiness, results. In this relation, the concept of virtue does not include
the idea of happiness.133 According to Kant, the highest good is a synthetic a priori practical
concept that necessarily combines the two ideas, virtue and happiness. Consequently, the
justification of this relationship is transcendental; that is, a priori connecting virtue and
happiness through a practical principle.134 According to this proposition, the highest good is a
practical possibility, i.e., it is realized through free human conduct. Consequently, virtue and
happiness are a priori necessarily connected, such that virtue cannot be thought by a practical
reason without happiness.
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Kant posits that either desire for happiness is the principle for virtue, or virtue is the
efficient cause for happiness. The first is not possible since the determining ground is inclination
and not moral principle, which for Kant, is worthiness to be happy. The second proposition is
also impossible for cause and effect, as relations between virtue and happiness do not coincide in
this world. This is because we cannot connect cause and effect as a result of determination of the
will; this is not dependent on ‘moral intention,’ but on knowledge of laws of nature and our
ability to use them to achieve happiness. Kant holds that such knowledge is beyond finite
rational beings.135
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that we are commanded to further the highest
good.136 For Kant, furthering the highest good through the practical reason is to connect “virtue”
and “happiness” a priori as a necessary object of the will. According to Kant, if the highest good
is not possible, the moral law is also false, and the command to further the highest good is in
vain. Since the highest good includes the idea of virtue and happiness, and virtue is worthiness to
be happy, the highest good is a possibility through freedom.137 Kant’s claim is that the moral
agent belongs to the world of nature since one’s acts are performed in the sensible world. As an
intelligent being however, the agent also belongs to the intelligible world. Owing to the
phenomenal and noumenal dimensions of the moral agent, moral intention can only indirectly
cause happiness in the world as an effect. For Kant the relationship between morality and
happiness is mediated by the author of nature.138 What is problematic here is separation between
the moral action and happiness such that the unity of morality and happiness is reserved for
Divine mediation.
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The Immortality of the Soul
Kant begins this argument by referring to the idea of the highest good as the necessary
object of the will under the moral law. He argues that complete harmony of the will with the
moral law is the ultimate condition of the realization the highest good. However, no finite
rational being is capable of such perfection in this world. In his Religion, Kant points out to the
rational nature’s propensity to evil. For Kant, this is a natural disposition and is the greatest
obstacle to moral development in the rational nature.139 According to Kant, since furthering of
the highest good is commanded, its realization is only possible through an endless striving
towards complete harmony of will with the moral law. For this endless striving to be possible,
we must assume that the rational soul is immortal. Consequently, the highest good is only
possible under the supposition of immortality of the soul.140
Kant’s position of endless striving for complete harmony of will with the moral law is
problematic. First, the question of endless striving is contingent on whether or not one takes the
highest good to be realized in the moral action. Further, since all that a finite rational being can
do is strive for the moral goal, virtue in Kant’s sense is impossible because for him all we can
do is approximate a remote goal of realizing virtue. Consequently, if there is happiness it is
given because to strive for virtue is equated to its possession. It seems in this argument Kant
modifies his earlier position on happiness as being accorded in proportion to virtue.
Consequently, this argument collapses his earlier position that happiness is in the
deserving of it through virtue. The question the is whether or not there is possibility of
conceiving virtue in a different way. In the subsequent chapters this possibility will be explored.
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The following section examines Kant’s last postulate whose significance in his ethical theory
cannot be underestimated.

The Existence of God
In the idea of the highest good, Kant argues that it includes morality and happiness, and
that happiness is given in proportion to virtue. According to Kant, complete justice of granting
happiness in proportion to virtue is only possible by impartial reason. God is the only cause who
can bring about the coincidence of virtue and happiness in just proportion. Consequently, we
must assume the existence of God as a necessary presupposition for the possibility of the highest
good, i.e., the harmony of moral law with our will and also coincidence of virtue with happiness.
According to Kant, the moral subject is not the cause of nature; therefore, one cannot, through
the will cause the necessary connection between morality and happiness in proportion to
virtue.141
The practical reason, however, must strive to further the highest good, thus effecting the
necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Kant contends that we must assume a cause
of nature, who is distinct from it and accords with the moral law. The best of the world, i.e., a
derived good must presuppose the original highest good and that is, God, in whom happiness and
moral law coincide.142 Kant maintains that although it is morally necessary to assume the
existence of God, this assumption is only subjective; therefore, not a duty as we cannot be
commanded to assume the existence of something. Most importantly, Kant insists that the
existence of God must not to be understood as the ground of validity of duty; the validity of duty
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arises not from the idea of God but from the principle of autonomy, i.e., will as legislating its
own laws.143
D
EVALUATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
One of controversial proposition in Kant’s moral theory is his argument that if moral
action is to have any moral value, it must be done not only ‘according to duty’, but ‘for the sake
of duty.’ That means it ought not to consider the end of action, but simply the form of the action,
or its universality. What is problematic in this position is that it seems indifferent to individual
nature, circumstances or individual good. The question this theory presents is whether or not this
kind morality is possible. My answer is negative. Human actions cannot be detached from their
personal end, for concern for self accompanies all that we do. Even if we make human being end
in itself as the second formula proposes, this still has to take into account the rational nature’s
ends. As Kant has it, pure duty for duty’s sake unmixed with nature considers only the universal
dimension of the moral agent. What is needed is the reconciliation of universal and particular
aspects of the moral actions since they are essential to moral judgments; in other words, Kant’s
position stands in need of showing how duty is related not only to the universal good but also to
the good of the moral agent.
On this controversial point, Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Kant’s moral theory is of
great significance. His premise is that any formulation of a thematic inquiry presupposes a
certain understanding of human beings and other existents. This presupposition is referred to as
pre-ontological understanding of being.144 Schalow’s reading of Heidegger is that Kant’s
morality presupposes certain understanding of human nature as such. Based on this fact, he
143

Ibid., §126.

57

argues that the underlying motif in Kant’s ethical theory is the fact of human finitude; i.e., the
limitation imposed on finite rational beings by their very nature. The human finitude is manifest
in human existential mode of care; i.e., the human activity in their engagement in the world.
According to Schalow, the freedom Kant refers to as autonomy of the rational will implies ability
to appropriate certain values that arise from the notion of who we are as persons. Autonomy of
the rational will is seen as taking responsibility and this is only possible through ethical
freedom.145
According to Schalow’s understanding of Heidegger, feeling of respect for the law is not
detached from the self. In Heidegger’s terms, “feeling for is also self-feeling.” I take it that at the
same time that one feels respect for the law, this same feeling of respect is related to the self as
the source of the moral law. Consequently, Heidegger’s view that a feeling of respect is
connected with ‘what is the highest’ in the human being i.e., the rational part of the self is valid
because the respect for the law translates into self-respect.146 The significance of Heidegger’s
phenomenological reinterpretation of Kant’s concept of respect, is that the tension between selfinterest and duty does not arise as it does in Kant’s moral theory. For Heidegger, the concern for
self is the genesis of self-respect such that respect for the moral law and respect for self are
intrinsically related.147 He argues that it is the feeling of respect that mitigates sensuality’s
obstruction of respect for the moral law. For Heidegger, the law is not primary; rather, what is
primary is the subject’s inner nature, which determines its reception. In this reading of Kant, the
validity of the moral law depends on the moral-consciousness arising from our understanding of
who we are as persons.
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The second problem lies in Kant’s position that the ultimate principle is transcendental
freedom as opposed empirical perspective. According to Kant, the moral law has its basis a
priori in reason. Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant is that Kant’s theory is agent-centered as
opposed to an approval /disapproval perspective. Korsgaard argues that this is a distinctive mark
of Kant’s moral theory because it is not empirically based principle but that the personal decision
is the crucial part of the moral action.148
I disagree with Korsgaard on this point for the following reason. Decision-making cannot
preclude the empirical dimension of approval/disapproval. It seems to me Korsgaard undermines
the tremendous influence that the fact of human co-existence has on out moral judgment. The
fact of co-existence implies that our thought system is never solitary. This point is emphatically
pointed out in Heidegger’s Being and Time. “Being- with- others” is an existential mode of being
of human Da-sein. Consequently, one’s world view and this includes the moral world view, is
shaped by other people’s views. In Heidegger’s terms, the ‘they’ prescribe the attunement of Dasein and determines ‘what’ and ‘how’ one sees.149 I take ‘attunement’, to meant Da-sein’s
disposition or the attitudes towards the self and the world. This means that the decision-making
that Korsgaard emphasizes on the part of the individual presupposes what is already approved or
disapproved by the community with whom one lives. In a word, our first school with regard to
what is right and wrong is our culture, and we are socialized into moral values that become
ingredients for our personal choices. Heidegger’s claim is that “Da-sein is always “lost in the
they” in its being-in-the-world.”150 What this implies is that every decision on the part of the
agent carries others with it whether one is disagreeing or complying with them.
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In view of Hedegger’s recasting of Kant’s moral theory certain issues can be raised. First
the ethical moment is subsumed under the larger project of ontology. I argue that while the
concern for being is manifest in all human activities, the ‘ethical moment’ stands out uniquely
unlike any other mode of being. I call it a “moment” because it has a different character as a
“decisive” moment; it can result to loss of life itself, a complete transformation of life on the part
of individual(s) concerned, change the history of a nation or even of the world as a whole. The
significance of this moment is evident in human history; for instance, Socrates moment of choice
not to leave Athens; a moment to take unpopular stand against genocide or any degradation of
human life, a decision for or against going to war, or a medical decision for self or for another
etc. In Heidegger’s recasting of Kantian concept of respect, or autonomy, this moment is not
adequately articulated. Granted that respect for the law does not preclude respect for the self, this
position does not bring to the fore the “paradoxical” nature of ethical decision in the shape it
takes.
With regard to Kant’s a priori grounding of the absolutely good will, Edith
Whychongrod’s interpretation is that Kant separates value from the phenomenal world. Levinas’
contribution is significant in that he overcomes the problem of dualism in Kant’s ethics by
attaching the ultimate value to the phenomenal person and allowing this value to have a
transcendental source.151 Levinas’s position is that Kant is right in his demand that morality
should not have empirical ground as its principle. However, since the Other is a phenomena in
the world, we must attach the transcendental value to the phenomenal person.152 Levinas’
argument resolves the problem of dualism between phenomenal and intelligible world by relating
the transcendental aspect of the moral principle, the rational nature, to the empirical person. In
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this way Levinas not only succeeds in doing away with phenomena/noumena problem but can
allow heteronomy in the moral law and still retain its universality which Kant tries to preserve in
his position of autonomy of the moral subject.
In Kant’s postulates, the problem lies in the separation between happiness and morality.
For this reason, he introduces the idea of God to apportion happiness according to virtue. It
seems to me that the existence of God is better arrived at in the idea of transcendental freedom;
in Kant’s terms, the unconditioned causality of causes. Therefore, happiness should be realized
in the moral action itself. Concerning the immortality of the soul, there is inconsistency in
Kant’s position of infinite moral progress, which is at the same time unattainable. This is evident
in his proposition “Virtue is always in progress and yet always begins at the beginning.”153 Kant
argues that virtue is an ideal and so it is unattainable, but yet it is our duty to strive towards the
goal of virtue. Further, the idea of immortality of the soul and infinite moral progress are two
separate issues because the soul can be immortal without reference to infinite progress in virtue;
therefore, the fact of immortality of the soul does not yield to infinite moral progress. In addition,
duties to self and others through which the rational being fulfills the obligation of the moral law
presuppose a corporeal nature. Consequently, the argument on “infinite moral progress” of these
duties in the afterlife is superfluous.
Despite these problems, a case can be made concerning the soundness of Kant’s moral
theory. The significance of Kant’s moral theory derives from his positive idea of human freedom
and the dignity resulting from it. At the same time, Kant not only accords the human nature such
a prerogative but also joins this dignity with moral responsibility.
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In Schopenhauer’s philosophy human being is negatively portrayed. In his view, human
life is essentially emptiness and boredom. Human beings are left to their on devices and are
never certain of anything except their need and misery. As such, a human being is reduced to a
meaningless existence of suffering under life's demands and propagation of species.154
I think Kant’s view of human being has positive consequences. On the one hand the wellbeing in human life depends on respect or failure to respect the bare truth concerning the value of
human being. Conversely, humanity fairs well in the nations that have made it their goal to
realize human worth. Based on this idea, Kant places the rational nature as legislator of the moral
law. The significance of Kant’s idea of universal legislation is that as individuals we are able to
make moral demands on one another; in Korsgaard’s terms, a reciprocity of moral responsibility.
In the global community, Kant’s universal legislation should not be underestimated. With this
presupposition, the international community can reproach one another’s nation for degradation of
human life.
The significance of Kant’s moral theory is also derivable from his idea of postulates.
Despite certain inconsistencies, there is a positive element in his position in the sense that what
he denied to the speculative reason he has discovered through the practical reason: the existence
of God, positive concept of freedom and immortality of the soul. The significance of these
concepts is that they refer to human being’s ascendancy to something larger than themselves.
We see this bent even by the ancients. In Aristotle’s view, wisdom is refined knowledge
not merely of human matters but of highest objects. He argues although practical wisdom and art
of politics are good for human affairs, they are not the best of knowledge there is for even certain
animals have practical wisdom concerning what is good for them. Consequently, even to argue
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that the practical wisdom is highest because man is the best of animals is superfluous for there
are other things more divine than humans.155
The point here is that through his postulates Kant brings the human being in contact with
higher objects of knowledge: freedom, God, immortality of the soul, and the moral law in
relation to them all. What is crucial is that the human beings not only attach ultimate value to
these objects but their existence is shaped by the pursuit of these objects. Charles D. Keyes,
points to the effect on human live deriving from what they value most. According to Keyes, if it
happened that Platonic forms of the good, the just and the fair were illusions, the human beings
who attach ultimate values to these objects would be worthy of respect.156 In Keyes’ terms the
"valuer is valuable".157 This resonates with Kant’s view that the value of human beings derives
from the fact that they are the source of value for all good things.
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CHAPTER II
FICHTE ON KANT’S MORAL THEORY
In the previous chapter the main focus was to explore the important features in Kant’s
moral theory for the purpose of providing the context of Hegel’s ethical theory, which is the
central focus of this study. Hegel’s ethical theory cannot be understood apart from certain
thinkers who mediate between him and Kant. In this chapter the objective is to explore Fichte’s
ethical theory because it influenced Hegel’s reading of Kant.
Fichte’s general discontent with Kant’s critical philosophy is evident in his Science of
Knowledge as laid out in his Wissenchaftslehre (rendered, Doctrine of Knowledge). According to
Fichte, Kant has an adequate grasp of the problem of philosophy, namely, the possibility of
‘synthetic a priori judgments.’ He points out that Kant’s response to this fundamental question
revolves not on things but on the reality of reason and its representing capacity according to
necessary laws, the laws that render validity to representations.
Fichte’s problem with Kant is that although the latter claims that the possibility of
experience has its basis in reason, he does not provide a rigorous account of the nature of reason.
According to Fichte, Kant establishes only how different modes of the mind’s operation work
together but not that they all derive from the same principle. Fichte argues that the most serious
limitation of Kant is his failure to account for the validity of representations. For Fichte, Kant’s
method is inductive rather than deductive.158 By inductive method is meant that the validity of
representations presupposes certain laws according to which the mind works: the categories.
Since the laws of the mind’s operation are necessary, therefore universal, the representations are
valid. The argument has an if/then feature, such as is characteristic of hypothetical propositions.
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The problem is that the inductive method cannot establish strong claims because it depends on if
one accepts the first condition(s), in this case the laws of the mind’s operation. Fichte’s criticism
is that these laws are not established and cannot merely be assumed. Further, it is unclear if these
laws are exhausted or if there is still more to be said concerning them. A deductive account on
the contrary is a genetic account that returns to the first principle so that there is no need to go
beyond it. Fichte is concerned that Kant’s method of establishing his claims is inadequate to
ground philosophy.159
The focus of this chapter is to investigate Fichte’s reconstruction of Kant’s practical
philosophy. For this reason, the discussion addresses aspects of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge
that facilitate clarity of his overall goal, to establish the claim of the ‘primacy’ of practical
reason. Fichte’s criticism of Kant is that the latter’s claim on the primacy of practical reason is
not adequately established. Consequently, moral propositions cannot attain the validity Kant
seeks.
With regard to Fichte’s critique of Kant, this chapter comprises three sections. Section A
examines Fichte’s theory of the subject, in Fichte’s terms, the “I.” This section analyzes two
propositions that constitute the subject: (1) the I as a ‘self-positing activity’ in which it posits
itself as ‘subject-object,’; (2) the condition that the I must posit an other, the ‘Not-I’ in
opposition to itself. The significance of this section is that Fichte’s ethical theory hinges on the
concept of the subject as a ‘self-positing activity.’
Section B explores Fichte’s thesis of the primacy of practical over theoretical reason. In
his Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte’s criticism is that although Kant claims that practical reason has
prerogative he does not establish how the latter is the basis of theoretical reason. The objective
158
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of this analysis is to investigate the content of Fichte’s proposition and to determine to what
extent Fichte succeeds in resolving Kant’s problem.
Section C examines Fichte’s two concepts of freedom: moral and formal. Fichte asserts
the value of each concept relative to their respective ends. The objective of this section is to
investigate the relationship between theoretical freedom required for ‘self-positing activity’ of
the subject, and moral freedom. Accordingly, this section focuses on three areas: (1)
decipherment of the basis of the demarcation between the two realms of freedom; (2) locating
the principle of morality; (3) discerning the place of the state in this scheme. The main issue
concerns the relation between right and morality. Fichte argues that the idea of right is not
derived form morality. Contrary to Fichte, I argue that the idea of right arises from morality and
the latter extends beyond the concept of right.
This chapter concludes with a retrieval of the significant features in Fichte’s
reconstruction of Kant’s moral theory. I will argue for the plausibility of Fichte’s arguments on
the one hand. On the other hand I will point out the limitations in Fichte’s theory of
representation and his propositions on freedom.
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A
Fichte and the Subject
Properly understood, Fichte’s critique of Kant is a development of Kant’s moral
principles by filling the lacunae in Kant’s moral theory. This way of understanding Fichte is
articulated by Gunter Zoller. In the latter’s view, Fichte seeks to be consistent with the spirit of
the critical philosophy of Kant while at the same time rejecting what is inconsistent in it.160
Consequently, Fichte reconstructs Kant’s practical philosophy without destroying its overall
orientation, which is to account for the possibility of the practical law of reason. Fichte maintains
that his intent is to provide a deeper foundation to Kant’s philosophy as a whole.161
From Fichte’s position it can be inferred that he upholds Kant’s fundamental claim
concerning the ‘primacy’ of practical over theoretical reason. As it becomes clear in this chapter,
Fichte’s appropriation of Kant’s principles is undeniable. His view is that both Kant and him
arrive at the same conclusions but that their methods are different.162 Conclusively, it can be said
that Fichte’s project is Kant’s project.
However, Fichte is not merely adapting a different method. His position is quite radical
and parts company with Kant in important aspects. Wayne M. Martin affirms this by claiming
that Fichte’s problem of the primacy of practical reason extends beyond method; it is the essence
of his claim in his Doctrine of Knowledge.163
The point of departure for both Kant and Fichte is to answer the fundamental question
regarding the ‘ground’ of experience. For both thinkers, the concept of ground refers to what
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accounts for or justifies the human claim to objective reality. Fichte asserts that to claim that a
given object exists beyond representation amounts to claiming that the object has an “objective
reality” therefore, implying that it is not mere fantasy. Consequently, inquiry about the existence
of God or mortality is to seek to know how these representations acquire objective reality beyond
our representation of them.164 Fichte’s basic claim is that consciousness of objects is not direct;
rather, all knowledge is representational, that is, mental determinations about objects not objects
themselves. He argues that what we are immediately conscious of is not objects but our mental
states. Consequently, to claim that there are things existing beyond our representation of them is
a certain leap, an ‘assumption’ that we make.165
Kant’s question is: how are ‘synthetic a priori judgments’ possible?166 According to him,
the validity of experience derives from certain rules of the mind’s operations, the ‘categories.’
Kant’s response to this question is what marks the break between him and thinkers before him
because unlike his predecessors who sought the ground of experience in things, Kant’s point of
reference concerning the ground of experience is the subject.
Fichte’s inquiry concerning the possibility of experience is a reframing of Kant’s but far
more encompassing. For Fichte, the issue concerns not simply the possibility of ‘synthetic a
priori judgments’ but the possibility of objectivity as a whole. His question then is, how do we
come to assume that any representations have reality beyond themselves?167 Zoller notes the
radical nature of Fichte’s inquiry; it seeks the ground of any objectivity rather than a certain type
of objectivity.168 Fichte’s reason for this strategy is captured in his claim that the validity of
representation of the world is as fundamental as one concerning God and immortality. According
164
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to Fichte, if the validity of representation of the world cannot be accounted for, objective claims
on the existence God, immortality or freedom cannot account for human experience of the
world.169 Fichte maintains that to answer this question requires a system,170 By system is meant a
pivotal point in the structure of reason from which all experience can be grounded.171
Fichte’s claim is that seeking the ground of experience implies acknowledging that
experience is contingent. Since experience is a fact, to seek its ground is to seek that which is not
part of experience; hence, the ground of experience cannot be part of experience. Fichte contends
that the ground of experience is a rational ground; hence, beyond experience. Accordingly,
Fichte advances the claim that the ground of experience is the ‘representing subject,’ which is a
presupposition since the representing subject is not immediately an object of experience. What
we are aware of is determinations or modes of being of consciousness of the representing subject
but not the representing subject itself. In Fichte’s view, representation of a representing subject is
a result of the self-reverting activity of consciousness.172
Fichte argues that there are two ways of accounting for the validity of representations:
one is to suppose that representations have their ground in things themselves, a standpoint
characterized as dogmatism. On the other hand, one can locate the cause of representations in the
‘representing subject,’ a point of view characterized as idealism.173 Martin understands Fichte’s
concern to be about the ‘principle’ responsible for our objective judgments. Accordingly, Fichte
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is not denying that things themselves exist independently of the representing subject; rather, he is
denying that things are responsible for human experience.174
As is evident from Fichte’s claim, dogmatism and idealism refer to opposing accounts of
the possibility of experience; the former view focuses on things, the latter on the subject. This
becomes the most distinguishing feature not only of Fichte’s philosophy but also of idealism.
Fichte’s fundamental position is “Not-I does not impinge on the I, instead, it is the I which
impinges on theNot- I in course of its expansion.” 175
In experience there is a relation between the subject of

experience and what is

experienced. In Fichte’s position, anything to be experienced cannot be between things; rather, it
must be an intelligent being capable of relating the object to itself. The subject intrudes on the
object or in Fichte’s terms, ‘impinges’ on it and not vise versa. Accordingly, the activity of
experiencing is on the subject’s side. Fichte asserts that both “idealist” and “dogmatist” go
beyond representations, for both assert there are objects corresponding to those
representations.176
Owing to the subject’s vital role in accounting for the possibility of experience, Fichte’s
point of departure in the treatment of the problem of objectivity is the subject characterized as
the ‘I.’ Accordingly, Fichte must show what it is about the subject that makes possible the
objective experience; hence, this discussion proceeds to investigate Fichte’s notion of the subject
from two perspectives: the subject as ‘self-positing activity’ and the subject and the ‘other’; in
his terms the Not-I.
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The Subject as Self-positing Activity

In Fichte’s analysis there are two propositions that make up the possibility of the I. First,
the I posits itself. In Fichte’s thought, the term “positing” implies the act of representing. Tom
Rockmore interprets Fichte’s idea of “positing” to mean “positioning” in opposition to
something else.177 This means, the I’s act of self-positing is in “opposition” to itself. The
problem with this principle is that it has a Cartesian tendency of immediate self-contemplation
without the world. Later on in his analysis, Fichte shifts from this view and presents the subject
as dependent on the world for its self-positing. It seems that he wishes to hold both positions, the
I as independent and the I as dependent. However it is not clear what he wishes to accomplish
with the former position and this becomes the basis of Schelling’s criticism against Fichte. It
seems to me that Fichte’s proposition has the problem of complete abstraction of the subject such
that it can think itself.
The claim in this proposition is that the I has two moments: the first moment is the
positing activity; what Fichte characterizes as the real activity. The second self-positing moment
is the I reflecting on its own activity of positing. In Fichte’s analysis, the latter is rendered the
ideal activity. Accordingly, since the I is also a subject, this act of self-positing makes it an
object to itself. Consequently, in the I, the subject and object coincide so that the I posits itself as
subject-object. For Fichte, the I is “self-positing activity” by virtue of its self-reverting activity.
One “posits” oneself as positing and this is original consciousness. Fichte argues that the I must
be presupposed in all consciousness prior to any other consciousness.178
Frederick Neuhouser interprets Fichte as making distinction between reflection and selfpositing. Neuhouser argues that the subject disappears in the object; meaning by this, that in self177
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consciousness the subject does not distinguish the subject doing the positing from the object;
rather, the two blend into one. Neuhouser’s view is that self-positing is not explicit; instead, it is
explicit only if the subject intentionally turns its regard on itself. In other words, self-positing
activity is not intentional. Reflection on the other hand, is intentional awareness in any
determinate thinking, which is also accompanied by self-posing activity, ‘intellectual
intuition.’179
An equally important point is Neuhouser’s insistence that self-positing is not a
representation. The I is not an object to itself as external things are. According to Neuhouser,
intuition directs its regard to beings. On the contrary, self-positing or intellectual intuition has its
object as the activity of consciousness.180 In Neuhouser’s view, since self-positing takes place
within the subject, it is the subject itself. Consequently, in self-positing there is no synthesis of
uniting separate data into one; rather, the self-awareness referred to in this case is immediate.181
In other words, there is nothing mediating between the subject’s thinking and the subject’s
awareness of the same.
The significance of Fichte’s characterization of the subject as capable of self-relating
activity has another implication; it resolves K. H. Reinhold’s problem of representation. In
Reinhold’s characterization, the subject is distinguished from its act of self-awareness such that
self-awareness is also a representation. Consequently, this representation requires another subject
to represent the latter the result of which is infinite subjects and infinite acts of representation.182
Following Fichte, Neuhouser argues that consciousness or any mental determination whatsoever
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must be accompanied by self-consciousness. However, self-consciousness itself cannot be
another representation. Having explicated the first principle that constitute the I, we now turn to
the second proposition.

The Subject and the Other

Earlier on this analysis centered on Fichte’s proposition that the I comes to be only
through its self-positing activity. That is to say, the I must posit-itself as subject-object in one
single action. Concerning the subject and the Other, Fichte, claims that for the I to be, the latter
must posit an opposed Other, which it posits as Not-I.183 This opposed other is the world.
Following from this proposition, Fichte contends that the I can come to be only through relations
with the world. It seems to me at this point Fichte holds a rather different position concerning the
I’s absolute and unmediated self-posing. In this principle the world is the condition of the I’s
self-positing activity. It follows that the I cannot be absolute since it needs the world for its selfdetermination.
The objective of this section is to examine the content of Fichte’s principle. Fichte’s
claim concerning the I is that it comes to be only through an activity of self-positing. However,
this self-positing activity is a self-determination of the I. That is to say, in self-positing the I
makes a movement from indeterminate state to a determinate one. He argues that only one kind
of activity can be intuited and therefore real; the freedom and its limitation.184
Fichte’s idea of limitation on the part of intellectual activity is crucial because it is what
makes possible the intuition of the I. In Fichte’s thought, limitation stands for an object of
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activity which limits the Ego’s activity and hence, determines it. According to Fichte, “pure
activity” cannot be intuited apart from this limitation. Since any action is determined by the
object to which it is directed, the object becomes the goal or the limitation of the Ego’s free
activity.185 Fichte characterizes this limit as the Not-I. In Fichte’s view however, the Not-I is not
something real in itself but something that accounts for the I’s limitation.186
Fichte’s thought in this position is obscure. It is not clear why he holds that the Not-I
limiting the I is not actual. If the Not-I is so essential in self-determination of the I as Fichte
argues, it cannot be dismissed as not real, seemingly, inessential. Fichte explains that all actuality
has its source in the “original actuality”; meaning by this, the activity of the I. According to
Fichte, everything originates from the relation of I and Not-I. Consequently, the Not-I is not
actual unless it is posited or determined by the I as its object. Fichte argues that this proposition
applies also to the I. The I comes to consciousness only by relating to the Not-I. This is because
in so doing it determines itself. In Fichte’s view, the I must posit itself in order to be for itself.
However, this activity can only take place within the relation between the I and Not-I. Fichte
concludes that the possibility of the I is only through its relation to the world. The two relations
therefore are such that the I and the Not-I come to be from this relationship.187 It seems in this
proposition Fichte is confusing two ideas; how objects come to be ‘for the subject’ (in which
case the subject’s activity has a prerogative), and how the objects come to exist irrespective of
the subject. I think the two are separate issues.
Fichte considers the relation between the I and the Not-I as the most fundamental
relationship; it distinguishes the critical philosophy from philosophy before Kant. The critical
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philosophy is characterized by positing a reciprocal relation between the I and the Not-I. In
Fichte’s view, the I is primary in that it can be thought in isolation to the Not-I but the Not-I
cannot be conceived in isolation to the I.188 What this means is that the I and the Not-I determine
each other. In Fichte’s view, Kant did not intend to account for the subject without the object,
nor did he account for the objects without the unity of subject and object, the central question in
critical philosophy. In Fichte’s thought, objects are arrived at as a result of the nature of
consciousness; hence, the starting point is the unity of the I and Not-I.
F.W.J. Schelling’s reading of Fichte is that the I referred to in Fichte’s doctrine of
consciousness is the human I; the I that each finite rational being is.189 However, Schelling raises
a number of issues against Fichte’s characterization of the subject.
First, he points out that nature in Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge is not explained in its
differentiation but only in terms of a limit to the I, as an abstract other. In Schelling’s view, there
is more differentiation of objects in Kant’s philosophy than in Fichte’s Doctrine of Science.190
Second, Schelling argues that Fichte extends the autonomy that Kant attributes only to
moral agency to the theoretical sphere of the I. Schelling is referring to Fichte’s position that it is
only through the I’s ‘self-reverting activity’ that objectivity comes to be. Schelling contends that
Fichte’s proposition is erroneous; it accords too much independence to the human I from external
reality.191
Finally, Schelling, argues that the I cannot possibly posit objects outside itself freely and
at will. If this were the case, the human subject would posit things differently since there are
188
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certain realities it would rather have posited. Consequently, the I must depend on its nature for its
objective positing rather than at will.192
Concerning Schelling’s argument on Fichte’s characterization of objectivity as merely
‘other’ without differentiation, I think Schelling’s point is valid. The human subject does not
merely posit other, but things in their differences and relationships to one another; this is
necessary for self-determination. This is because the human subject does not determine itself
through a concept of ‘indeterminate’ other but through some particular objects and only through
them does the subject realize its goals.
With regard to Schelling’s argument pertaining Fichte’s position that “everything comes
to be through the I and for the I,” the important issue concerns how Fichte’s proposition ought to
be understood. On the one hand, Fichte can be understood as claiming that the I is the efficient
cause of the objective world. On the other hand, Fichte’s proposition can be understood to mean
that if objective reality is to exist for the subject, the latter must be both capable of representing
the objects and be conscious of its activity. It seems to me that Schelling’s reading of Fichte is
according to the former but I think this interpretation is mistaken. My understanding of Fichte is
that he means to advance the latter claim as is evident in his text: “…the representing subject is
whatever it is only by means of self-activity. This proposition should not be taken to suggest any
creation of representations….”193 I take this to mean that the representations as determinations of
the I are not the subject’s production out of nothing; rather, they originate from the objective
world, the experience of which is possible on the basis of the subject’s activity. For Fichte,
experience is an activity and this is only in reference to an intelligent being. Based on Fichte’s
position stated above, it does not seem to be his claim that the I “creates” the world; rather, his
192
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claim is that if the I is to experience the world, it must be capable of relating the objective reality
to itself. On the whole, Fichte’s fundamental point is that there is something in the nature of the
subject that makes it possible to experience the world and this is its self-positing activity.
This way of understanding Fichte is supported in Martin’s analysis of Fichte’s distinction
between dogmatism and idealism as indicated above. According to Martin, Fichte’s claim is not
that things can exist only for consciousness, for things can and do exist independently from a
representing subject. Fichte’s problem according to Martin is with regard to the condition of
experience, that is, if there is such a thing as experience or representation of objective reality,
there has to be a “representing mind” for things are not capable of representing.194
However, despite Fichte’s statement above, there is a tinge of confusion in proposition
concerning the I and the other. In some instances, it is unclear whether he means the Not-I
cannot exist ‘for’ the I unless the I can represent it or the Not-I cannot exist independently of
being posited by the I.
Regarding the autonomy of the I, Schelling argues against Fichte that the I must owe its
free activity not to itself but to its nature.195 I take this to mean that the Ego is determined to be
free in its nature; therefore, its free activity is not at will. The problem in Schelling’s argument is
that it introduces another principle characterized as nature as the ground of freedom of the I. This
is problematic because if freedom of the I depends on something else, then it is not freedom. In
Schelling’s argument we lose the freedom of the I that is ultimately needed to ground morality. It
seems one cannot grant Schelling’s argument and still uphold the freedom of moral subject if
what is ultimate is nature. In Fichte’s doctrine of consciousness, freedom and nature are
193
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united.196 His major claim, which is the centerpiece of his entire thought, is that the transition
from ‘indetermination’ to ‘determination’ has its basis in the I itself. He characterizes the activity
of representing as the real activity while the act of reflecting on the real activity is ideal activity.
He argues that the movement from indeterminacy to determinacy is freedom and is the ground of
all other species of consciousness. The question of freedom is central in Fichte’s thought and it
will be addressed in Section C of this chapter.
The crux of Fichte’s theory of the subject is showing that the latter has prerogative in the
possibility of experience. Concerning the theory of representation, Fichte argues that human
beings are conscious of representing something. In addition, there are objects corresponding to
these representations, independently of representation of them. According to Fichte, the
connection between representation and things is also a representation but things outside the mind
really exist. He contends that the representation connecting representation with objects is a
necessary representation.
According to Fichte, representations are of two kinds: those arising from free acts of
imagination and those “accompanied by a feeling of necessity.”197 I understand this to mean that
the former representations need not have reality beyond these representations as they could be a
mere fantasy, which our imagination is capable of representing at will. With regard to the latter,
our representation of a world with objects is not a result of choice but arises from necessity of
rational beings. These representations are necessary in that one cannot not think the world. As
will be shown later the rational being not only has to represent the world but must also order its
actions according to its concept of the world.
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B
The Primacy of Practical Reason
Fichte’s claim of the ‘primacy’ of practical reason is based on his notion that the ‘selfpositing activity’ of the subject is possible only on the condition that the subject possesses a
practical power. In Fichte’s thought, to have practical power is to have the capacity to make a
transition from one state to another. In his terms, to “possesses the possibility to become
something else…” For Fichte, this is the meaning of absolute freedom.198 He contends that the
possibility of theoretical reason, which is a capacity for self-determination through self-positing
activity, depends on practical power.199
To be sure, Kant refers to the primacy of practical reason both in his second and third
Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment. According to Martin,
Fichte’s view of the priority of practical reason is not a matter of adapting a different method but
is rooted in his Doctrine of Knowledge concerning the ground of experience.200 In his Critique of
Judgment Kant argues that we are commanded to further the highest good.201 In Kant’s moral
philosophy, only free beings can be commanded; hence, as many of Kant’s interpreters have
pointed out, “ought means can,” that is, only if one is not predetermined can one be commanded.
In his second Critique, Kant asserts that in its theoretical use, reason seeks the unconditioned
condition. In its practical use, reason discovers this principle that the theoretical use cannot
discover but needs for its very operation.202 What Kant is referring to in this statement is that
theoretical use of reason is not able to deduce the fact of freedom for everything operates
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according to necessary laws of nature. However, this freedom is discovered in practical use of
reason through the moral law, which is a command of reason. It follows that the human subject is
free for only free beings can be commanded. However, freedom is necessary for the theoretical
reason to form concepts needed for self-determination. In Martin’s understanding, the primacy of
practical reason does not imply subordination of metaphysics under the practical philosophy;
rather, the argument is that theoretical judgments on the existence of God or immortality
presuppose a practical judgment, “the command to further the highest good.”203 Fichte’s
criticism is that Kant has only mentioned this fact without showing how practical reason has
priority such that it is the basis of theoretical reason.204
In the preceding discussion, Fichte’s argument concerning the activity of consciousness
has centered on showing how the subject comes to be, the subject must posit itself. This ‘selfpositing’ implies a movement from indeterminate to determinates state of consciousness.
According to the second proposition, the subject must posit an other, the Not-I in opposition to
itself. Fichte maintains that what has been established is that the I carries on this activity.
However, this alone is insufficient because it does not say whether the subject ‘must’ do so. In
other words, for an account of the activity of the subject to be complete, the necessity of its
activity must be established.205
Fichte’s answer to this question is that the reason or the ground for this act cannot be
sought. For Fichte, there is no ground for the foundation. In Fichte’s view this is the end of all
reason because there is nothing that mediates between the subject’s self-positing activity and
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itself. In other words, the subject is its activity and reflects on its very self. According to Fichte,
the subject is the sole ground of its own action.206
What is significant in Fichte’s claim is that necessity and freedom are reconciled. This is
because the I is essentially indeterminate, that is its nature. However, since indeterminacy on the
part of the I implies freedom to determine itself, its nature dissolves.
This is where Fichte and Schelling part company. In Schelling’s view, the I is what it is, a
‘self-positing activity’ by nature and does not do so at will. The problem with Schelling’s
position is that nature needs to be explained. On the other hand, granted that the rational being is
what it is by nature, it is not clear to what extent nature plays a role in self-determination for to
be rational is to have the capacity of self-determination as opposed to being extrinsically
determined.
Fichte’s thought can be understood in his distinction between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ activity of
the I. Accordingly, both activities refer to the I’s ‘agility’ in its movement of self-determination;
therefore, the movement in question in both real and ideal activities, is from indeterminacy to
determinacy. With regard to ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ activity, however, there is a difference. In Fichte’s
analysis, ideal activity is an activity in an inactive state for it determines itself through reflecting
on the representing activity which must take place for self-posing to occur.207
Real activity on the other hand, is the actual activity of representing; hence its actual
activity consists in agility of movement to activity. As such, real activity determines itself
through its activity of representation. Fichte’s claim is that the ground of this activity is
completely in the subject itself. This proposition is of utmost importance in Fichte’s account
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because it is only in this sense that the I can be said to be indeterminate and so determines itself.
In Fichte’s understanding, the reason for the I’s self-determination in any given manner lies
within it; in other words, the I’s ‘transition’ from one state to another is possible because it is
free.208 I understand Fichte’s claim to imply that the basis or the why of the I’s ‘selfdetermination’ is rooted in itself as opposed to an external principle.
In Fichte’s account, the same agility refers to ideal activity. However, the selfdetermination in the ideal activity is characterized as ‘mirroring’ the real activity. That is to say,
it reflects the real activity. This is an important feature of this argument in that it shows the
relation between theoretical and practical reason. The theoretical reason ‘mirrors’ the real
activity, that of representation. Unlike the mirror, which does not see, the I sees itself since the
determinate activity observed, freedom is itself. Fichte’s thought on the subject’s act of imaging
is characterized as ‘seeing of seeing.’209 That is, the subject sees the activity of representing
which is also a kind of seeing. However, what is copied is not an image but something real, the I
itself in its true being, that is, its freedom. The significance of this argument is that selfdetermination on the part of the I is not optional but a law such that ‘imaging’ becomes an ethical
ought of the I.210Since ideal activity only copies the real activity, its activity depends on the
object rather than on itself. In Fichte’s terms, “the ideal activity has its foundation on the real
activity that lies before it.”211 The real activity then is a productive activity since it is the source
of representations intuited by the ideal activity.
Fichte’s claim here is meant to distinguish the theoretical activity of self-positing of the I
from the practical activity of self-determination through concepts. Fichte’s claim in this
208
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distinction is that the self-positing activity has as its ground the actual activity. The reason for
this can be stated as follows: the I’s positing must have an object; its immediate object is the
freedom of the I. However, freedom as such, unless determinate, cannot be an object of intuition.
As a result, the determinate freedom is what becomes the object of the I’s intuiting activity.
Without this object (freedom) the I cannot posit itself, for then there would be no object of
intuition. Accordingly, the I’s real activity must take place for the self-positing activity to take
place. Conversely, for the I to reflect on its own activity it must posses the practical power. This
is explicit in Fichte’s claim: “It is in the course of acting that the I first encounters objects…If
there is no practical activity, and if there is no acting, there is no representing.”212
In this text, Fichte establishes that theoretical activity must be practical to be possible.
This is because in both positing and self-positing, the I is engaged in activity. Based on this
position, Fichte’s argument is that human beings cannot be representing beings without engaging
in activity.213
In view of what has been discussed so far, it can be inferred that by advancing his claim
concerning the primacy of practical reason, Fichte also establishes the idea of the unity of
practical and theoretical reason, which for Kant, remained separate. This endeavor on Fichte’s
part is evidenced in his text: “There is only one action considered from different viewpoints. One
is what is conceptually grasped the other is what is intuited. None can exist without the other for
it is nothing.”214 The latter proposition is pivotal in Fichte’s project for establishing the relation
between practical and theoretical reason. For Fichte, practical power is understood as the
capacity for self-determination. But since ideal activity must be practical the two are one and the
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same reason, viewed in their different moments. Regarding the issue of primacy of practical
reason, Fichte argues:
It is correct…. that philosophy must begin with a postulate, but one that is grounded in an act and not a
fact. An act is what occurs when I let my I act within itself and observe what happens. A “fact” in contrast,
is present within consciousness as something already given or discovered, which can only be analyzed
subsequently.215

Fichte’s position in this text is crucial; it captures the core of his thought. For Fichte,
activity is the first principle. Since the theoretical judgments are acts of consciousness, activity is
condition for all such judgments and this is what Fichte implies by the primacy of practical
reason. According to Fichte “act” means acting “internally and observing what one is doing.”216
This means, positing and being aware of one’s activity of positing. The postulate referred to in
the text is the first act of positing, which Fichte establishes that cannot be proven and need not be
but must be assumed. Ultimately, Fichte’s claim is that one cannot be “self-aware” as acting
unless one is actually in activity. However, ‘self-reverting’ activity, is only possible if the first
activity occurs; hence, theoretical reason depends on practical reason. Accordingly, both the first
act of representing and the one that reflects on it require absolute freedom.
We can now cross-examine Fichte’s analysis of primacy of practical reason. It can be
argued that the strength of Fichte’s account lies in his thoroughgoing deduction concerning the
primacy of practical reason. This has developed and grounded Kant’s claim that reason is
practical. Not only does Fichte establish the claim that practical reason is primary but his project
also establishes the validity of this claim by establishing how theoretical reason is necessarily
practical and in the latter lies its possibility.
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On the other hand, there are claims in Fichte’s analysis that are controversial, for
example, “…all that exists is through absolute freedom and without freedom there is nothing.” In
this statement, it is not clear whether Fichte means the freedom of ‘finite rational beings’ or the
freedom of the divine as Kant has it in his antinomy of pure reason.217 I think the two senses of
freedom are not interchangeable. This is because there are certain characteristics of freedom such
as, freedom as efficient causality that are not applicable to the finite rational agent. This
difference is articulated by Allison in the distinction between the divine causality and causality
through free agency such as finite rational being. According to Allison, the divine causality is
prior both in time and in causality while the free agency is beginning only in causality.218
Further, Fichte’s position, “Nothing exists except what is within the consciousness” is
controversial. This is because it is not the case that all that exists is within consciousness. While
some reality is within the reach of human experience some reality is inaccessible by finite
consciousness. Fichte’s position limits everything to consciousness but reality is more complex
than he seems to acknowledge. Robert R. Williams points to the problem of representation by
advancing the argument that Fichte’s theory of representation is limited when it comes to
representation of a rational being, for the latter cannot be reduced to a mere representation.219
Williams’ criticism is valid because the human subject is unlike other objects in that it
determines itself. Consequently, any representation of rational being would be inaccurate owing
to the transcendent aspect of the human subject. Emmanuel Levinas points to this reality in his
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view that the ‘Other’ always overflows our representation of him.220 I understand Levinas’ claim
to indicate that the Other cannot be contained in a representation in virtue of its transcendental
aspect.

C
Moral and Formal Freedom
In preceding sections, freedom of consciousness, is deduced from the subject’s selfposing activity as the ground of experience. In the last section, the focus was to examine Fichte’s
claim concerning the primacy of practical reason. The significance of this section was Fichte’s
genetic deduction of how practical reason is the ground of theoretical reason and therefore, the
principle responsible for the possibility of experience. Fichte’s reconstruction of Kant’s practical
philosophy aims at providing it a firmer foundation. In this section, the aim is to investigate the
relation between theoretical freedom manifest as self-posing activity of the subject and morality.
Fichte distinguishes two kinds of freedom: freedom of choice and transcendental
freedom, autonomy. He argues that transcendental freedom operates in accordance with the
practical law of reason. In the latter sense of freedom no choice is involved as the law of reason
is necessary. In this the meaning of freedom is negative for it refers to freedom from compulsion.
In Fichte’s view, if the transcendental freedom cannot be defended, freedom of choice cannot.
Freedom of choice on the other hand is one’s capacity to determine oneself whatever way. 221
This distinction is important because, empirically considered it is impossible to know if one is
free or determined by objects of one’s choice. However, the only way to defend empirical
freedom is to establish its basis, that is, transcendental freedom for this is freedom from natural
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necessitation. The moral law is based on the idea of transcendental freedom for it is only in this
that the human will can be understood to be autonomous.
Freedom according to Fichte is the essence of consciousness, therefore, it is not inferred
from any other principle. For Fichte, “freedom appears to us as a fact of consciousness.” Fichte
argues that there is nothing behind this ‘appearance’ and that it is real freedom. He contends that
practical reason is the only reason for not seeking anything beyond the appearance of freedom.222
Fichte’s argument is central to his grounding of Kant’s moral principle. In Kant’s
account, there is the dualism of ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ in accounting for freedom with the
result that freedom is this in itself and cannot be known.223 For Fichte however, there is no true
being beyond the appearance of freedom. Accordingly, if it appears to us that we are free we are
actually free.
Neuhouser’s understanding of Fichte is that self-positing activity is at the basis of all selfdetermination. Consequently, since morality has to do with self-determination through freedom,
self-positing of the I can be transported to the moral sphere of the subject.224 Concerning the
notion of self-positing, Neuhouser makes an important remark. He argues that self-positing is the
subject, it is not a power; it is an activity of self-awareness. The implication here is that selfpositing is ‘self-awareness.’ The subject sees itself as it actually is. For Fichte, the most
immediate object of self-positing activity is freedom. In Neuhouser’s interpretation of Fichte,
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freedom of the subject is not a phenomenon as opposed to noumenon; instead; the subject is
immediately aware of its freedom as it actually is in its very activity.225
According to Fichte, there are two ways in which the subject manifests itself: thinking
and willing. The former refers to reflection while the latter refers to actual activity of relating
objects to subject. According to Fichte, willing is thinking in representing activity.226 I
understand this to mean that thought and action are united in one important respect, both are
activities of reason. The only difference is that the thinking or reflection is directed to the activity
of consciousness, while the willing activity is directed to the objects
The question is how the idea of freedom required for self-positing is related to morality.
Zoller’s understanding of Fichte is that the I that is to have an effect on morality has the same
character as the I that does self-positing, the agility and positing of Not-I. Agility is a
characteristic that defines its being. On the other hand, there is the character of the I as
intelligence through which it reflects on itself and relates all beings to itself. Viewed from this
perspective, the I both acts, and intuits its activity. Willing, that is, making determinate choices,
is the feature that marks who human beings actually are.227
This brings us to Fichte’s notion of “finding ourselves.” To “find” oneself means to be
aware of oneself as willing and to find oneself willing presupposes an activity of so doing; in
other words, to be conscious of oneself is to be aware of one’s activity. However, the subject
cannot be aware of its activity unless it is actually in activity. Fichte’s concept of finding oneself
is that consciousness is “consciousness of one’s consciousness,” a notion that sounds repetitious
but which conveys his idea of original objectivity. Originally, it is simply consciousness that is
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not an object of reflection for it only becomes the object of reflection when it is modified into
consciousness of something. Fichte’s point is that consciousness is prior to particular
determination. It is this consciousness that manifests itself in thinking and willing.
In Fichte’s account, to think of oneself in a determinate way is to have a concept of self.
Fichte argues that since one arrives at a concept of something only as it appears in the mind, an
objection could be raised that even the concept of oneself as free is conditioned by the way the
mind is so that the self in itself might as well be different from the concept of it. Accordingly, the
only way to know the ontology of the self is to obtain this knowledge by means other than
thinking. In Fichte’s view, the concern of this objection is not that this is the way the subject
thinks of itself but to go from thought to something objective.228 What is implied in this
argument is that in the mind’s way of thinking, the subject has the concept of itself as free.
However, this could as well be an illusion but that there may not be freedom at all; therefore, the
only way to know if the subject is indeed free is through some other means. Fichte however does
not wish to go in this direction because the only route to knowledge is through the intellect.
Consequently, if this is not capable of attaining to objective truth of itself, there would be no
truth about the self from any other source.
Fichte’s dealing with this problem is that there is no movement from thought to
objectivity though to do so is possible. To move from thought to existence outside of thought is a
necessity such that being must be thought. This is necessitated by the fact of consciousness,
which is always “consciousness of something” and so a necessary activity of the Ego. Fichte
argues that to move from thought to object is already in us and were it not the essence of the Ego
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to do so, this transition would not be possible. Consequently, the human subject does not say that
it appears to be free but that it is free.229
Fichte’s argument here is crucial for it points to the fact that he already insists on in his
Wissenschaftslehre. Here he distinguishes things that are a products of mind’s freedom from
objects that are “accompanied by a feeling of necessity.”230 The moral significance of this is that
there is a demand made on the subject to posit objectivity. In Martin’s interpretation of Fichte,
this is the first evidence of constraint, we are constrained to think objectivity.231 Fichte’s
argument translates to ‘thinking of ourselves as free is a demand made upon us’
Fichte’s claim is that the main characteristic by which the Ego differentiates itself from
anything unlike itself is the “tendency to activity.” For this reason, when we abstract the Ego
from its objects, this is what is thought.232 Accordingly, the essence of intelligence is absolute
activity. To posit the Ego as absolute activity is the same as positing absolute freedom as the
essence of the Ego. For Fichte, freedom and intelligence are one and the same thing. In Fichte’s
thought however, being absolute implies two things: first, its self-determination is grounded
entirely in itself and second, that it exists prior to its being determined or posited. I understand
Fichte’s position to imply that intelligence as such is indeterminate; therefore, it must exist as
such for it to determine itself.
Fichte distinguishes self-determination from being determined. He argues that natural
things are determined by their own nature. In Fichte’s thought things do not determine
themselves; rather, their determination is a natural necessity. On the contrary, to determine
oneself is to do so from an act of freedom. Fichte maintains that freedom must not be understood
229
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as groundless being; rather, freedom is a ground that is not a being in turn.233 I understand in this
Fichte to rule out any possibility that freedom as a determinate being. As he argues in the
Wissenschaftslehre, that which is the ground of experience cannot be itself an object of
experience, instead it can only be arrived at through thinking. Fichte contends that thinking is
such a principle, it is essentially an activity not a being. So understood, it is an activity of selfdetermination.
An important point that Fichte makes with regard to freedom is that to be free, something
must be able to determine itself as opposed to being determined. It follows that only intelligent
beings can be free to determine themselves, free in the above sense and its freedom arises from
self-positing activity. Owing to this freedom, the intelligent being can subsume its being under a
given concept.234
Fichte’s major premise is that what the Ego can be in ‘actuality’ depends on a concept.
The Ego determines itself through a concept at any given moment. Consequently, even what the
Ego will be in the future must first be determined by itself through a concept. What is peculiar
about this self-determination is that it is a necessary determination; that is, the ego must form a
concept. However, not only does it have to form a concept, it must act in accordance with this
concept. In other words, the Ego is constrained to act according to this concept.
Wurzer points to this in his discussion of laws of imagination. Imaging is not arbitrary
but according to a law. The law of imagination arises from the relation of the I and being.235 I
understand ‘being’ here as the idea of what ought to be through freedom. Self-determination is
then a moral command to be what one ought to be; the image must strive to be. In imaging,
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reason emancipates/tears itself from itself. The significance of this is that in so doing, the subject
realizes its own freedom by forming its own concept, the image. In Wurzer’s analysis, to see
what ought to be is to be obligated. Image ought to mirror its being and this is the meaning of the
“moral ought” because the I is not free not to be what it ought to be.236
Fichte like Kant, posits the relation between freedom and law. In Kant’s theory of ethics,
the relation is “reciprocal” such that the idea of moral law arises from freedom and the vise
versa.237 In Fichte’s account however, freedom and law are not two different things as they are in
Kant’s account of freedom and moral law. In Fichte’s view, freedom does not follow from law
nor law from freedom; the two are not separate concepts but both are one and the same thing. For
Fichte, freedom is lawless in as much as this means determination from external principle but it
is under its own law so far as it determines itself.238 Freedom is determinable in countless
possible ways but under a fixed conception of a rule by which the rational being determines itself
to act under a given maxim, moral or otherwise.239
Morality comprises in the necessity of acting according to a conception; this means that
some actions accord with what should be while others are contrary to what ought to be, and
therefore should be avoided. Acting on this law is an unconditional conception and has no
external basis but is solely in the subject. According to Fichte, the choice to act according to a
concept has its justification in itself. That is to say, a choice to engage or to refrain from certain
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acts has no other sanction save that they ought or ought not to be chosen. Futher, what ought to
be is what is to be made actual without exception; in other words, it is a command.240
In Fichte’s view of necessity of acting according to the concept of a rule and not just
arbitrary rule, arises the universality of the moral command. The necessity of acting according to
a law means that although the rational being is free, freedom is limited as it must be determined
by the law.
On the basis of the conception of a rule and acting in accordance with it arises the
autonomy or self-legislation of rational beings. It means that the Ego gives a law according to
which it ought to order its actions and this law is discovered by free judgment. Accordingly,
morality in rational beings exists because these beings are capable of self-legislation, a law to
themselves and so capable of self-determination in higher spheres than in accordance with
individual interests. So far as the law is concerned, it requires complete independence from
determination by anything besides reason.241 In this analysis the rational being is both free and
determined. It is determined in the sense that its freedom is freedom under the law of selfdetermination. However, since this self-determination is through its own freedom, selfdetermination and freedom are one and the same.242
Concerning the self-determination of the subject, Fichte argues that reason is practical in
so far as it is the means of realizing its external ends that pertain to our human nature. In this
however, reason is only technically practical; its practicality is pertinent to what is necessary to
achieve what one needs for one’s well-being. According to Fichte however, reason is the ground
of the ends it conceives so long as it is absolutely practical; that is to, it is only its own ground if
240

Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 61.
242
Ibid., 64-5.
241

93

these ends are only possible through freedom. In Fichte’s view, the ‘dignity’ of practical reason
lies in its capacity of self-determination outside of external influence.243 The implication of this
claim is that reason determines its own action as it reflects on itself.
The significance of the Ego’s self-reflection is that morality concerns actions that arise
from the self-awareness of one’s freedom. What is crucial concerning the moral acts is that they
are thought to be free and therefore, as they ought to be. Fichte acknowledges that the
universality of morality is not immediately inferable from consciousness of it. Consequently, if
one denies freedom it cannot be proven. However, he insists that although consciousness of
freedom is clouded with desires, the subject nevertheless, judges the actions of others as free.
This is an indication that even though one can deny the moral principle in judging one’s actions
one cannot avoid using it in judging other people’s actions. The implication about judgment is
that the subject, whose actions are under judgment, has within itself the capacity to act
differently.244
In his Review of Aenesidemus Fichte is wrestling with a question of deriving ‘ability’
from ‘obligation.’ According to Aenesidemus, Kant is justified in deriving capacity to fulfill the
moral command from the fact that it is commanded. 245 I take this to refer to Kant’s proposition
that a moral command means one can fulfill the moral ought. Aenesidemus objection is based on
the premise that one cannot know what is commanded before judging what one is capable of.
Therefore, commands must be based on theoretical knowledge of one’s capacity to fulfill them;
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that means one has to rely on experience. The conclusion is that what Kant deduces from
command must be deduced before the command.246
Fichte argues that Aenesidmus objection is based on his failure to distinguish between
theoretical judgments from practical judgments. According to Fichte, Aenesidemus fails to
understand what is at issue in moral commands; they do not refer to what is possible in the
sensible world (in which case this is under the theoretical judgment); instead, the moral
commands are addressed not to the physical capacity but to the volition. Therefore, the moral
commands are not about doing or avoiding something but striving and this striving is sufficient
even if one achieves nothing in the sensible world.247
The problem with Aenesidemus criticism is that it leaves unexplained who determines
what the subject is capable of and the standard to be used to determine the capacity for moral
responsibility. Consequently, what one is capable of is contingent on individual judgment. The
result is one cannot be held responsible for not fulfilling what in one’s judgment one is not
capable of. As a result, there can be no laws since laws are indifferent to such judgments.
Fichte contends that conception has a reality and its applicability implies that there is a
world and consciousness about this world. Everything is what it is because that is the way we
conceive it. Fichte argues that our conception of a cause results in our relating cause to its effect
the world. Similarly, the concept of a law has influence in the way one sees the world. In the
realm of freedom, which is not only subjective, one takes oneself as limited so that other subjects
can exercise the same freedom. Fichte contends that the point of contact with other human beings
is the reciprocal limitation of human freedom. From the concept of law there arises a community
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of free beings.248 Consequently, morality is a determinate way of understating freedom.
Consciousness of freedom is determined by the concept of a goal. In morality, this determination
does not have a material object but only what ought to be. A moral goal is a concept not of a real
object but of what ought to be through freedom.249
So understood, morality is an idea but nothing corresponds to it in the real world. Hence
the question concerns the content of morality. Fichte argues that the content is the concept of
what we ought to be. To ought to do something means to produce an effect in the world in which
moral subjects find themselves. But since morality is not about what is, its idea is a constant
approximation of the end since morality is always what ought to be.250 In this, Fichte follows
Kant in the idea of striving. However, as noted earlier, the notion of striving is problematic and is
one of the issues towards which Hegel’s criticism against Kant is directed. Accordingly, since
freedom must be determined it must have an object of its activity. It follows that we must
connect the moral principle with the sensuous world. The issue concerns how to arrive at what
ought to be done in particular situations and what the sphere of our action is.
Fichte argues that since the world is theoretically determined through freedom as a
principle, the world constitutes the objects of moral duties. Therefore, the practical law directed
to our consciousness is a continuation of the practical law, which is the theoretical principle. The
law of freedom has general determination and it is the same law of freedom, which is practically
conceivable.251
The content of freedom, which is under the law, has practical applicability; hence, its
general expression is to act according to the original determinations of sensible objects.
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Theoretically, the concept of my own freedom implies that all human beings are free. Practically
understood, this proposition results in a command to treat each rational being as a free being.
Further, if in theory I conceive my body as instrumental to all my free activity in the world, then
in practice I ought to treat my body as an expression of my freedom.252 Having examined
Fichte’s idea of the moral freedom, the investigation proceeds to analyze his concept of formal
freedom.
In Science of Ethics Fichte argues that concepts have reality; for example, the concept of
cause results in the ability to connect cause and effect. Similarly, the concept of a rational being
connects to legal rights. The difference is one cannot will to eliminate an effect from its cause for
this is beyond human power. On the contrary, a rational being can will to deprive others of their
legal rights. The concept that every event has a cause necessitates one to acknowledge and to act
accordingly. However, the concept that all people have legal rights does not necessitate an
individual to act according to that concept.253 I understand Fichte’s argument to mean that the
concept that rational beings are free does not necessarily translate into reality of how they are
actually treated. To treating the other according to this concept, the rational will has to make that
choice and can chose otherwise. Because it is important that the rational will makes the choice to
treat the other as one ought to, the question of how this can be ensured becomes Fichte’s project
in the Foundation of Natural Right.
Neuhouser argues that Fichte’s aim is to ground the theory of right as a science
independent of morality. Although Fichte at one point espoused the notion that right is derived
from morality, Foundation of Natural Right is a complete shift from this earlier view. According
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to Neuhouser, Fichte’s concept of right is rooted in his notion of a person as explicated in
Fichte’s major work, Wissenschaftslehre. In “Doctrine of Science,” the Ego is possible only if it
posits itself. However, self-positing activity is an act of freedom. Accordingly, Fichte’s ‘theory
of right’ hinges on the person’s freedom. Properly understood, this freedom is formal, for it
refers to the subject’s self-determination irrespective of kind. Freedom of choice is opposed to
external coercion and is distinct from autonomy of moral agency, which pertains to selflegislation according to universal principles of practical law.254
Neuhouser’s reading of Fichte is that the idea of a person carries with it awareness of
oneself as an individual, a free agent. Emphasis is on the the ultimate ground of one’s actions as
based on the self’s capacity to form concepts and to act on them. On this basis the subject
ascribes the freedom of decision-making and actions based on this decision to oneself. This is
different from being caused to act by something external. Neuhouser argues that it is the act of
freely choosing a particular action among other possibilities that is the distinguishing mark of an
individual. So construed, formal freedom is not only the basis of a person’s awareness of
individuality but also distinguishes the person from others in important respects.255
In Fichte’s theory of right, the rational being cannot posit itself as free in the sense
indicated above without ascribing the same freedom to other finite rational beings. T.P. Hohler
understands Fichte to imply that a rational being requires another rational being for realization of
one’s freedom.256 Following Fichte’s premise, Hohler argues that a rational being only realizes
freedom by acting freely. However, acting freely on the part of the rational being is conditioned
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by a provocation to act.257 Fichte characterizes the challenge to act freely as a 'summons' which
is necessarily external to the subject. The unique character of a summons is that the subject is
‘determined to self-determination.’258 This means that the subject must act and is thereby
limited, but at the same time free through a free act. In other words, a summons, or in Hohler’s
terms ‘provocation,’ must leave the freedom of the subject intact as it is necessary for selfdetermination. Accordingly, the relation between the subject and the other is a relation of right.
In Hohler’s view, the idea of right arises from the notion of an individual and there can be no
individual, apart from the context of plurality. Individuality implies that the rational being is
necessarily one among others.259
Williams’ interpretation is that a summons is an invitation to the subject to exercise free
causality. According to Williams, a summons is an encounter with the other such that it obligates
the freedom of the subject.260 The idea of a summons is central to Fichte’s thought because it is
in response to this summons that the subject realizes freedom, for to acknowledge an obligation
is to acknowledge one’s freedom to act according to the obligation.
Fichte maintains that a rational being cannot act except in response to a summons.
However, a summons can come only from a rational being outside the subject because only a
rational being can understand freedom. Consequently, a rational being must posit other rational
beings. Therefore, Fichte contends that a human being can become a human being only within a
community of human beings. In Fichte’s thought, the concept of human being refers not to an
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individual but to the species.261 He maintains that the possibility of human being depends on free
reciprocal exchange of knowledge, which is the hallmark of humanity and only in such a
condition can the human subject assert oneself as a human being.262 In this argument, Fichte
introduces the importance of community for self-realization, a notion that becomes the
centerpiece in Hegel’s ethical thought. What this amounts to is that the Ego is not as independent
in the absolute sense in which Fichte it in his Doctrine of Knowledge.
Fichte points to the significance of positing oneself as free and existing with other free
human beings. The subject cannot posit the co-existence of rational beings without positing
oneself as related to them in a specific relation, the relation of right.263 According to the principle
of right, the subject must recognize rational beings as free and limit one’s freedom according to
this concept.264 This means that by ascribing ultimate causality to oneself, the subject does the
same to others so that the ultimate principle of causality is both within and external to the
subject. As a result, a summons is the basis of causality for each subject and the mutual
conditioning of each one’s activity and the sphere of activity.265 I understand Fichte to mean that
in the relation of right, there is a limit as to what the subject can or cannot do and also a physical
sphere of activity beyond which a subject cannot cross without breaching the rights of others.
Fichte contends that freedom implies a possibility of overstepping one’s sphere of
activity, the result of which is deprivation of freedom to another person.266 According to Fichte,
original right implies the right to life and the right to exercise one’s influence in the sensible
world. If these rights are to exist within a free community of rational beings, there is a limit
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within which one can exercise freedom and beyond which it must be coerced. This coercion is
for ensuring justice; in Fichte’s terms, ‘equal original right’ to ensure that the concept of right
belongs not only to the individual but to all free beings. That means the right to coercion arises
only in the event that equal original right is violated.
According to Fichte however, the idea of coercion goes against the concept of right;
therefore, this power cannot be entrusted to the individual but to civil legislation. It follows that
security of rights is only possible through the unity of will, i.e., agreement. In Fichte’s view, the
concept of security for all must be made actual in the sensible world.267 For him, realization of
the concept of right is made possible in the sensible world through civil contract. Since this will
of all is valid for everyone at all time, it becomes a law. Therefore, the will of all determines how
far each individual is to exercise freedom according to civil legislation, and the consequences
ensuing from violation of this law. The state authority has the right to judge and to execute its
judgment; hence, the power of all keeps each person’s power to its proper limit so justice is
possible.268
George J. Seidel argues that there are implications in understanding the human person as
a social being; one cannot exercise one’s freedom without limit for then others cannot be free.
For the good of all it is necessary to limit one’s freedom.269 According to Seidel, the goals of
freedom belong to the state collectively as well as to the individual. As a result, these goals must
be secured not only for the sake of the individual and the state but also for the sake of all
humanity.270
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Based on close relationship between the state and an individual a just state can be
understood as a moral/ethical institution. This is because it is based on the idea of the individual
as a rational, therefore, free being. For both Fichte and Kant, freedom in the sense of autonomy
is the source of dignity of the human person. Based on the above view, it seems that Fichte’s
amplification of the separation between right and morality and his argument that the concept of
right does not derive from morality is unjustifiable. Both right and morality belong to the same
subject.
In the Foundation of Natural Right Fichte argues that morality would be in conflict with
itself if it is understood as the basis of the concept of right, for right must be enforced while
morality cannot.271 There is not conflict between morality and enforcement of right as Fichte
postulates. This is because the enforcement of rights is not against the will of the individual, for
each subject values and wills one’s own security of rights to realize one’s goals. The state's
enforcement is meant only for the individual who wishes to deny the same entitlements to others.
Consequently, the concept of right must derive from morality because the principle of morality is
the value of the human person. While the place of the principle of right cannot be denied its
independence from the moral law is unjustified since the human person is the source and object
of both.
Finally, Fichte’s view is that the idea of right reaches further than morality. I argue that
that if human beings do not have a universal sense of morality that civil law presupposes, no
policing in the world would be adequate to curb evil in the whole of humanity. Civil law builds
on the individual’s sense of self-value. This sense of value is ascribed to other rational beings.
Kant refers to this in his view that nothing would have any value if the human person did not
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value oneself in the first place.272 Consequently, if dignity did not exist in each human person,
civil law would not be adequate to govern the subjects who would be radically depraved. The
principle of right is therefore, not an end in itself but for guarding the value of the person.
In addition, what rights afford to the human person is considerably minimal compared to
what a being needs to be truly human. In order to take another person’s goals and projects of life
as one’s own, morality is required and this arises from the value attached to the human person. In
other words, to be committed to another’s well-being takes more than right for it cannot be
enforced. For this reason, relationships of morality are more far reaching than the relationships of
right.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this chapter concludes with a retrieval of the
significant feature in Fichte’s reconstruction of Kant’s theory of ethics. I argue for the
plausibility of Fichte’s arguments in this issue on the one hand. On the other hand I point to the
limitations arising from certain propositions in Fichte’s arguments.
In Fichte’s analysis the subject has priority over the object regarding the possibility of
experience. My understanding is that if experience pertains to how it is possible for human
subjects and not objects to experience each other, then Fichte’s claim concerning the priority of
the subject is plausible. In Fichte’s view, experience is an activity of consciousness and only
intelligent beings are capable of experiencing.
With regard to the primacy of practical reason, a case can be made concerning the
soundness of his arguments. It is only with the presupposition that reason is practical that moral
claims can be made. However, it is one thing to claim that reason is practical and quite another to
establish that claim. The significance of Fichte’s contribution lies in grounding Kant’s moral
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theory by deducing the idea of freedom from the nature of consciousness. This is important not
merely for human knowing. In Fichte’s view, knowledge is to be applied in the world in which
the human subject finds oneself. Therefore, the important question about human existence for
Fichte is “What ought I to do?”273 From this question is born infinite moral responsibility that
Fichte characterizes as the ‘vocation of man.’
In Schelling’s view the subject does not have the privileged position one has in Fichte’s
analysis. In his introduction to Schelling’s discussion on human freedom, James Gutmann
indicates that Schelling’s position is that humans do not act freely but the divine acting in
them.274 Gutmann’s reading of Schelling is that since human beings only act within God they act
from both necessity and freedom because in God both necessity and freedom are united. In this
view the divine is free in that nothing conditions the divine activity but is also necessitated
because the divine can only act according to his nature.275 In Schelling’s analysis man can only
act within the divine freedom and necessity such that freedom is inconceivable outside the divine
framework. It follows that since the human beings cannot live outside God, their activity is
divine activity.276 Seidel’s understanding of Schelling is that freedom is only possible for God,
the absolute such that the human freedom of choice is mere appearance. Consequently, human
activity is both free and necessitated. Necessity in this context is acting according to the divine
purposes even though the human beings are not aware of it.277 In this view, the absolute freedom
Fichte assigns to human subject is not possible.
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The problem with Schelling’s position is that granted that a human being is determined in
the way postulated, it is difficult to know the extent to which this necessity play a role in human
choices. In real experience, human beings do not explain conduct in terms of freedom and
necessity. Since Schelling’s theory does not correspond to rational beings experience of
themselves, it is impossible sustain.
In both Kant and Fichte, freedom raises the rational being above one’s nature through
self-determination. It seems that Fichte’s view of the subject goes overboard in his claim that the
I can be thought without the world but not vice versa. If Schelling is right in his interpretation of
Fichte’sidea of the I as the human I, the human subject cannot be thought apart from the world.
However, that the subject is responsible for one’s experience as an intelligent being, through
self-posing activity is a major contribution on Fichte’s part. In other words, even though Fichte’s
theory of representation has limitations, it cannot be rendered altogether useless. Not only does
this principle unite the theoretical and practical dimensions of the subject but unites the subject
with the object of experience. Most importantly, Fichte uses the theoretical freedom of selfpositing activity to account for moral self- determination.
The problem of representation lies in its inadequacy to provide experience/knowledge as
objects can be represented without being known. Knowing goes beyond representation. For
example, if the subject encounters an object never seen before, one can represent the object as
‘other,’ in Fichte’s terms, ‘Not-I’; hence as opposed to self. However the object remains
indeterminate. Fichte ignores the role played by culture, language and actual use of objects.
Consequently, representation alone cannot yield knowledge/experience. The point is, relating to
objects of experience requires a more active encounter than representation can deliver.
Representation seems to indicate that something exists but does not say anything about the
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significance of the object in relation to the subject or the relation of objects to each other.
Knowing something takes on a more dynamic relationship between the subject and object, the
kind of knowing articulated in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. For Heidegger, things are
not known through representation but through being involved with them. In Heidegger’s terms
Dasein’s involvement with objects is characterized as ‘heedful absorption’ in things.278 I take
Heidegger’s view to indicate a more intimate relation between the subject and things than the
one depicted in Fichte’s representation theory. In Heidegger’s analysis, the relation is more
primordial and less reflective.
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CHAPTER III
HEGEL’S ETHICAL THEORY

In the previous chapter the focus was Fichte’s reading of Kant’s moral theory and the
development arising from his critique. Fichte’s critique of Kant is important because Hegel’s
theory emerges from his critique. Hegel claims that Kant’s moral theory is abstract and without
content. He argues that the latter’s moral principles render morality itself impossible owing to
their inherent contradictions. Hegel proposes that ethical life is the solution to defects in Kant’s
moral theory. This chapter examines the content of Hegel’s critique and his attempt to resolve
what he believes, are the problematic issues in Kant’s moral principles.
The objective of this chapter is to determine the validity of Hegel’s critique and to what
extent it can be said to develop Kant’s moral theory. The chapter examines prevailing polemics
with regard to the two thinkers’ theories. Some hold that Kant’s theory cannot be transcended
much less discarded; others hold that it is legalistic and abstract and should be replaced by a
more liberal approach. I argue for the significance of Hegel’s contribution towards the
development of Kant’s moral theory. On the other hand, I point to limitations in Hegel’s ethical
theory citing certain principles in Kant’s moral theory that remain relevant in forming the basis
of any sound moral/ethical formulation. One such principle is Kant’s notion of human dignity as
the principle determining exercise of human freedom.
This chapter comprises five sections. Section A examines the idea of freedom from the
perspectives of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The importance of this section is to highlight each
thinker’s understanding of freedom for their respective theories hinges on this concept. Section
B analyzes Hegel’s idea of ‘abstract right.’ The notion of abstract right is crucial in Hegel’s
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ethical formulation because it characterizes the individual’s awareness of freedom expressed in
various aspects of personal life. For Hegel, it is impossible to speak of ethics without a proper
grounding of the idea of ‘abstract right’. Section C examines Hegel’s critique of morality. For
him, morality is a necessary transition from individual freedom manifest in the concept of right.
The significance of this section is that it contains Hegel’s critique of Kant’s view of morality.
Hegel’s critique is an attempt to gauge the dualism he holds that renders morality in Kantian
terms untenable. According to Hegel, dualism is between the particular and universal aspects of
morality, happiness and morality and human and divine. Section D explores Hegel’s notion of
‘ethical life.’ Ethical life embraces (1) the family (2) the civil society and (3) the state. This
section deciphers the content of these concepts. Section E examines the role the concept of
‘recognition’ plays in Hegel’s ethical thought. For Hegel, recognition is the condition for the
possibility both of ‘abstract right’ and ethical life.
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A
Kant, Fichte, and Hegel on Freedom
All thinkers from ancient to our day agree that morality is a problem of freedom. Kant,
Fichte, and Hegel consider freedom to be the ultimate principle for the possibility of
moral/ethical claims. Accordingly, freedom is the hinge on which the moral theories of these
thinkers revolve.
In Kant’s moral theory, freedom is autonomy, or reason’s self-legislation. His moral
theory aims to deduce the ultimate ground of our moral judgment, and he locates this ground in
the freedom of a moral agent. In Foundations, Kant states:
It is not enough to ascribe freedom to our will, on whatever grounds, if we do not also have sufficient
grounds for attributing it to all rational beings. For since morality serves as a law for us only as rational
beings, it must hold for all rational beings, and since it must be derived exclusively from the property of
freedom, freedom as property of the will of all rational beings must be demonstrated.279

The above text indicates Kant understands rationality and freedom to be essentially one.
Based on the property of the freedom of a rational being, moral claims can be made and
responsibility attached to human conduct. Consequently, the basis of Kant’s moral formulation is
the idea of the freedom of human nature.
In his moral theory, Fichte aims to provide a firmer foundation for Kant’s deduction of
freedom. Fichte holds that although Kant’s moral theory has its basis in practical reason, he does
not establish how reason is practical. For Fichte, without such a deduction, Kant’s moral theory
falters. Tracing freedom from the nature of reason itself, Fichte argues for a synonymous relation
between law and freedom. For him, freedom is neither deduced from moral law nor moral law
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from freedom as Kant has it; rather, both are one and the same.280 The place of freedom in
Fichte’s thought can be better appreciated by noting that knowledge and morality stand on the
same principle, practical reason, and without it both knowledge and morality are impossible.281
In Hegel’s ethical theory, freedom is the ultimate goal. In his terms, “...the good is
freedom realized.”282 On this premise, Hegel’s theory of ethics diverges from that of Kant’s and
Fichte’s because he aims to show that abstract right, morality, and ‘ethical life’ are all distinct
phases that the subject realizes freedom.283
Since for Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, moral /ethical problems are to do with freedom, it
remains an issue as to how each understands freedom. According to Kant, freedom is a means for
the realization of the highest good.284 From his perspective, freedom is not the ultimate end but
has as its ultimate end as realization of the highest good, which comprises morality and
happiness. Seidel’s reading of Fichte is that the latter’s conception of freedom is that it is the
ultimate goal of human existence.285 I take this to mean that human activity itself is the
realization of freedom. It seems then that Fichte views freedom differently from Kant. For Hegel,
freedom is the end and absolute good. The difference between Fichte and Hegel is that for
Fichte, freedom is an immediate fact of consciousness. On the contrary, Hegel views Fichte’s
understanding of freedom as abstract because it has not made itself actual. In George Seidel’s
interpretation of Hegel, one is free only in the context of society.286 If Seidel is right, Hegel’s
idea of freedom is more encompassing than Fichte’s and Kant’s. Kant and Fichte understand
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freedom as a fact, whereas freedom for Hegel is a process that culminates in a rationally
organized state.
Terry Pinkard argues that Hegel rejects Kant’s idea of freedom in that for Hegel, freedom
is not outside nature; that is, not a non-natural or ‘transcendental’ causality as Kant claims;
rather, it is the human beings’ capacity to stand against inclination, desire and impulses.287
Both Kant and Hegel hold that the will is a practical reason of acting according to
principles, but Hegel disagrees that a distinct causality is needed for the will to so act. For Hegel,
freedom is the position we take in relation to our actions. According to Pinkard, to be free is to
act according to reasons that are one’s own as a subject.288 It follows that for an agent’s impulses
and desires to have a normative status, they must be incorporated to the overall life project of
who one is. Pinkard’s analysis is relevant because although the subject must adapt principles
consistent with one’s true identity, in Hegel’s thought identity is not an abstract truth but a
synthesis of the ‘I and We’.
To have a will means three things: first, the ability to order one’s actions according to
practical commitments arising from one’s life project. Second, having a will means the ability to
reflect on those commitments in relation to other important ends and principles that one upholds.
Finally, having a will means to take these commitments as one’s own, as opposed to their being
imposed from without, or against one’s will. Consequently, not to be free is to act according to
something one cannot rationally justify for oneself.289
Hegel argues that freedom is not something outside of nature: the question is whether he
considers all natural beings to be free. Although Hegel’s reading of Kant is that the will needs a
286
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‘non-natural’ causality, it remains an issue as to what Kant means by ‘non-natural.’ My
understanding is that Kant claims that rational beings are not driven by natural necessity as nonrational beings are; rather, any action for which one can claim responsibility is a result of
deliberation. In Kant’s terms, this is “to act according to conception of laws.”290 Consequently,
while freedom in one sense means freedom from external interference, for Kant this is a negative
sense of freedom. True freedom means acting from objective and therefore universal principles
arising from conception of laws. It is for this reason that Kant limits true freedom to rational
activity as opposed to activity in non-rational beings.
Hegel’s position is that the only freedom worth the term is ‘absolute freedom.’ According
to Hegel, free will can be so construed only if it is absolutely free. He explains that only in
freedom without qualification can the will be said to be free because it relates to itself free from
any dependency. In Hegel’s view, freedom of the will is truth itself because in it there is
correspondence between the concept of itself and what it is as an object.291 Therefore, Hegel’s
view of the absolute good is not happiness but freedom. This is not capricious freedom of the
individuals but the universal freedom that transcends particular wills and has attained a synthesis
of the particular and the universal.292 As will be shown in this chapter, such synthesis is realized
in ‘the ethical life,’ the state. .
Hegel is right in his characterization of freedom as a good, but can freedom be the
absolute good.? The answer to this question is alluded to in Schelling’s treatise on human
freedom. According to Schelling freedom is capacity not only for good but a capacity for both
good and evil. Heidegger’s interpretation of Schelling is that this is the most comprehensive
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conception of freedom. He argues that it is a one sided view to understand freedom as a capacity
only for good for with human freedom comes also the reality of evil. 293 While it is not the aim
in this study to go into detail on the question of evil as a metaphysical problem, it suffices to note
that freedom cannot be characterized as absolute good without qualification for with human
freedom comes not only the creation of good but also the moral evil. For this reason, in freedom
both human grandeur and misery coincide. This reality is reflected in Hegel’s civil society and is
discussed in later sections. Hegel’s characterization of freedom is that human understanding of
the latter evolves both in the way it is understood and manifested in human life. The first phase
of freedom is what is characterized as abstract right. It is to this notion the study proceeds.

B
Abstract Right
The concept of right concerns individual freedom, which is expressed in various ways in
a person’s life. Hegel argues that freedom pertains to an individual as a ‘person’ only and not to
other relations that distinguish one person from another. Since the idea of a person also
presupposes that there are other persons, the injunction of this right is: “Be a person and respect
others as persons.”294
Hegel’s proposition about abstract right reiterates a position held by Fichte in
Foundations of Natural Right, in which the imperative is to limit one’s freedom so that others
can exercise the same freedom.295 Concerning the idea of right, Hegel holds that abstract right is
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subjective; for a person to actually exist, freedom must be objectified. According to Hegel,
objectification of will is realized in ownership of property. Hegel insists that property must be
understood as an external manifestation of freedom rather than mere satisfaction of one’s
needs.296 In the former view, the emphasis is on the person as a rational being as opposed to a
brute. It is characteristic of a rational being to own property. I take this to imply that since
rationality implies a capacity to set ends, there must be means to attain those ends. Property is a
means not only for satisfaction of needs but also for realization of higher purposes. In other
words, property is a means for self-actualization. However, ownership must be ‘recognized’ by
others for it to be valid.297 The motif of ‘recognition’ is pivotal in Hegel’s ethical theory and will
be treated later in the chapter. In the meantime, it suffices to note that ‘recognition’ by other
rational beings is a condition for realization of individual freedom.
Hegel contends that the idea of right is not concerned with how much one owns; rather, it
is concerned with freedom of personality; therefore, property which is contingent on particular
elements such as abilities, aims, and needs, falls outside of abstract right.298 Hegel explains this
position in terms of equality of personality considered in universal sense. Hegel’s notion of
abstract right occupies a central position is his theory of human freedom. Although abstract right
is capricious type of freedom, it is freedom nevertheless. In his view, any other type of freedom
has its basis from abstract right.
According to Hegel’s theory of abstract right, it is necessary that rational beings enter
into contractual relationships with one another. For Hegel, rationality requires this relationship.
The significance of this element is that contracts are the medium of human relationships. Hegel
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contends that the important characteristic of property is its externality and so exists for another
since the other is in relations with it. In addition, property is an objectification of the will.
Accordingly, the other for whom property exists is another person. Consequently, property is a
will existing for another and this becomes the basis for existence of objective freedom. Contract
then serves as the principle of mediation of the will.299 An important element in Hegel’s notion
of abstract right is that it is on the basis of the latter that he justifies the idea of private property
since property is objectification of freedom. This position commits Hegel to explain the status of
those without property. The later problem becomes the basis of Marx’s criticism against Hegel
for in Marx’s view private property is the cause of alienation. The problem alienation and Marx’s
attempt to resolve it addressed in later sections.

C
Hegel’s Critique of Morality
Many of Hegel’s readers see his dissatisfaction with morality to be its abstraction from
the context of society. Limitations of a moral view are articulated in Hugh Reyburn’s text:
Morality is individualistic; ethical life must be social; Duty is a formal principle; ethical life must be
concrete. The freedom claimed by moral consciousness is ultimately capricious and indeterminate; the
ethical will must manifest necessity. The moral sphere is subjective; the ethical order must be objective.300

Some scholars share Reyburn’s views while others differ in varying degrees. My view is
that Reyburn’s analysis of morality is incomplete. One discovers that Hegel appropriates many
of Kant’s principles; for instance, the universality of ethics and the place of the subject is
paramount to both thinkers. Both Kant and Hegel agree that freedom is the condition for the
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possibility of moral/ethical claims. For this reasons, it is incorrect to characterize morality and
‘ethical life’ as opposites as Reyburn’s analysis suggests.
To agree with Hegel’s ethical theory one need not subscribe to the whole of his
philosophical system. However, there are concepts that characterize his entire system without
which his ethical thought cannot be fully appreciated. Those concepts are the context in which
his ethical thought acquires significance. Therefore, I would like to focus on Hegel’s idea of
‘development’ and ‘mediation’.
The spirit that characterizes Hegel’s system is, “The true is the whole. But the whole is
nothing other than the essence of consummating itself through its development.”

301

Hegel’s

statement is pivotal not only in his theory of knowledge but also in his practical philosophy. The
important concepts in Hegel’s proposition are ‘the whole’ and ‘development’. In Hegel’s view,
‘the whole’ with respect to truth encompasses the beginning, the process, and the goal. Based on
the position of ‘the true as the whole,’ Hegel contends that a holistic conception of truth must
take into consideration not only the genesis but also the process and the goal. For him truth
holistically considered is a ‘development,’ that takes place through various stages. This idea is
captured in his claim, “The real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but in carrying it,
nor is the result the actual whole but rather, the result together with the process, through which it
comes about.”302 Hegel explains that the aim or the goal is a ‘lifeless universal’ and the process
which he characterizes as a ‘guiding tendency’ is an ‘empty drive’ and the goal is a ‘corpse’
which has no content if it is detached from the labor that leads to it.303 The claim Hegel makes in
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the above argument is that with respect to truth, we can settle neither for the beginning, nor the
process, nor the goal, but that all must be considered.
Concerning the development of truth, Hegel argues that immediate knowledge is the
lowest kind of knowledge, even though it seems the richest and truest owing to its direct
accessibility. The limitation of immediate knowledge arises from the fact that it pertains to the
being of the object without considering its relation to other beings. Owing to the abstract nature
of immediate knowledge, the subject remains a pure ‘I’ and the object a pure ‘this’. The idea of
this proposition is that the two are not yet related in a dynamic fashion that transforms the
subject through reflection on various aspects of the object. Hegel contends that the truth of selfcertainty lacks the development effected by the process of ‘mediation.’304
The concept of ‘mediation’ in Hegel’s argument is central; it refers to the principle which
the human knowing must consider. For Hegel, knowledge of objects is not as direct as it seems;
rather, it takes place through relationship to other objects with the result that knowledge is not
‘immediate’ but ‘mediated’ through multiple relations.
Hegel’s position is that moral consciousness is a development and is complete only if it
considers the ‘development process’ on the part of consciousness. This is the focal point of
Hegel’s ethical thought and has significant bearing on its formulation. In his critique of Kant,
Hegel aims to develop Kant’s theory rather than to demolish and build anew in the Cartesian
sense. Hegel holds that each stage of development of self-consciousness has its truth on which
subsequent phases stand. For Hegel, ‘preservation’ and ‘displacement’ are important
characteristics in the evolution of consciousness.305
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Hegel, further maintains that holistic consideration of ethics means development through
a process of reflection within the wider human community. Since development takes place
through various phases, no single phase can exhaust the whole. Since the ethical emerges only in
and through a process, what is ethical will be expressed differently at different phases of human
history despite the continuity of various elements. As will be shown later, Hegel’s position has
both positive and negative facets.
Hegel’s view differs from Kant’s regarding the ‘ultimate’ source of morality. For Kant,
the ultimate source of morality is divine. Although moral law is a command of reason, it is
ultimately a divine law and specific duties are God’s commands.306 Hegel contends that morality
is not demanded but emerges in the process of consciousness itself.307
The difficulty in Hegel’s position concerns how universal standard of what is right is
possible since evolution of consciousness cannot be in the same phase for all people at the same
time everywhere. Hegel’s position implies that each society would have its own ethics. The
question concerns the basis on which any other society would reproach another for its
degradation of human life since each society can legitimize its own stage of consciousness as
true and valid for it. On the other hand, if Hegel is referring to universal consciousness, it is not
clear how the latter is possible. Further, Hegel’s view of development of consciousness seems to
suggest that this development is progressive with succeeding phases being better than preceding
ones. However, this is difficult to establish. Technological development may indicate
progression; modern warfare may indicate a regression. It is difficult to judge whether evolution
of consciousness is a development or a regression.
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The two thinkers part company over the relation of divine to the human, and is treated in
the next chapter. For the present, it suffices to note that for Hegel, the human is in divine and the
divine in the human. In Jean Hyppolite’s terms, ‘man becomes the other consciousness that he
perceives to be God so that the divine and the human are identical.’308
Hegel’s critique of morality is directed against the idea that the value of moral action lies
in one’s motive so that individual conscience determines how one ought to treat the other. From
this view, morality is seen to depend on personal judgment of the agent irrespective of rules in
the social world. Right, on the contrary, demands compliance with respect to the rights of others
irrespective of the motive.309 Given the above claims on the abstract right and the right of
conscience, Hegel recognizes their significance but insists that they are not adequate to realize a
lasting community that Kant seeks in his moral principles.
It is possible to see why it would be dangerous to rely only on conscience to determine
what is right; many evils have been committed in clear conscience. However, I do not think that
Kant is arguing from the perspective of a conscience in isolation from society’s standard of what
is right. The issue is who determines what is universally right. For Hegel, the law of the state
determines what is ethical. In Kant’s view, the determinant is another human being whose
freedom limits the exercise of one’s freedom. The central issue pertains to what can guarantee
that this principle is not violated. Is the matter to be left to the individual conscience and if not
how is this dilemma to be resolved? Hegel’s ethical theory with all its ramifications is geared
toward resolution of this issue. In other words, Hegel’s objective is to secure the same freedom
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of the human being as Kant does through the ‘categorical imperative’ but through the distinct
route of ‘ethical life’.
According to Hegel, consciousness must be ‘for itself’ in order to exist; that is,
consciousness must relate to itself. Since consciousness is by mediation through an ‘other,’ an
object cannot effect this mediation. Self-consciousness is effected by recognition by another
subject. Consequently, self-consciousness can only exist for another self-consciousness.310
Hegel’s argument aims to show that self-consciousness arises from intersubjective relations
rather than from subject and object. As will be shown, the subject is also an object by virtue of
its relation to itself, yet it knows itself to be not a mere object.
Hegel’s position reiterates Fichte’s position that a person can be human only among other
human beings. The presence of other human beings is what makes possible ‘Spirit’. From
Hegel’s standpoint, Spirit is realized in the unity of different consciousnesses. Spirit for Hegel is
characterized as ‘independence’ and ‘opposition,’ which makes possible the experience of
freedom. In Hegel’s terms, “the I becomes the We and We becomes I. In this unity arises the
reality of Spirit.311 This implies that the community is reflected in the individual because without
the individuals there is no community. Conversely, the individual is reflected in the community
because the individual cannot be without others; that is, self-realization is only possible through
the community of other human beings. Accordingly, there is a mediation of self-actualization
through the community and the community through the individual.
In abstract right, free will is an immediate object opposed to the world. As such, the will
relates to itself as individual with its purposes and desires. Based on the principle of mediation,
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this is not true freedom because it has not developed beyond the self. The freedom pertinent to
the concept of right is therefore negative.312
In Hegel’s analysis, abstract right develops to morality. In relation to morality, Reyburn
argues that for Hegel, mind is not merely an internal sphere but external as well because in
rational activity the mind manifests itself in the objective world. According to Reyburn, in
morality a person rises to the sphere of a subject by reflecting the will to the self.313
Reyburn’s interpretation of Hegel is that there is a continuity in preservation of right so
that both abstract right and morality are developments of the concept of freedom. Accordingly,
the right of property passes on to right of rationality in one’s actions. The implication of this
transition is that each subject understands the self as autonomous and the only principles
recognized as rational are subjective principles.314 I take this to mean that the subject’s
appropriation of one’s own actions in terms of responsibility belong to the subjective right of
self-determination. Reyburn argues that this is a distinct understanding of freedom from one
embodied in property. Freedom in this sphere is autonomy of the will, a right to selfdetermination.315 However, the subject is for itself; that is, one acts only on what one recognizes
as right in one’s conscience. Consequently, subjectivity is opposed to universality. For Hegel, the
difference between subjectivity and objectivity is not yet a synthesis of ‘ethical life’ and so
universality of morality is not explicit. Hegel’s criticism against morality is that it is subjective
and cannot avoid capriciousness. Hegel further argues that anything can pass for moral maxim,
with the result that even an immoral conduct can be justified as duty to others.316
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Hegel’s characterization of morality gives the impression that anything can pass for
morality. If this were what Kant means by morality, it hardly deserves the term. For Kant
however, morality is transcendental in that it arises from the idea of freedom and it is teleological
in that its goal is social. Consequently, the moral standards cannot have its basis on individual
whims. Morality is not an idea in the mind, but a standard of how one person must treat the
other(s). In actual relationships not anything can pass for morality because certain conducts
conflict with the good of the community.
Although there is emphasis on conscience in morality, conscience is not license to do
whatever one feels. Individual conscience though individual is socially informed for humans do
not lead a solitary existence; they think and judge in a community setting. In public, one cannot
universalize just any conduct. It is for this reason that individual caprice is private and has no
place in the community. It seems that Hegel denies morality the vital place it has in society.
Walsh argues for the place of the individual in morality by pointing out that it takes the
individual commitment to adhere to what is moral because it involves the will.317 The subjective
aspect of morality is central because the individual must be willing to adapt principles that are in
keeping with the good of the community.
Hegel argues that duty is pure thought and so has not become actual. In this he means that
duty is an immediate object of consciousness. According to Hegel, this is opposed to ‘moral selfconsciousness’, because morality is realized in action, pure duty is mere thought and so the
subject’s consciousness is not a ‘moral self-consciousness’. He adds that duty, as immediate
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knowledge is not adequate for knowledge, it is by mediation. In his view, the subject and duty
are two independent realities.318
Since consciousness is independent from duty, it is free from it, and duty is also free,
with the result that each relates only to itself. For Hegel, this is the absolute independence that
exists between morality and nature. It arises from Kant’s separation of morality from nature. The
result is ‘indifference’ since nature has its own laws irrespective of morality, which is also
absolute in its own purity.319
Hegel is referring to Kant’s position that for any action to have moral value it must be
done ‘for the sake of duty’ and not for any other motive. If pure duty means unmixed with
‘nature’ it is not difficult to see that this position is problematic. Hegel’s critique of Kant is
therefore justifiable, for separation of morality and one’s needs is an impossible enterprise. In
acting, the whole person must be involved. Hyppolite advances this argument by indicating that
duty unmixed with nature is duty without activity for activity is mixed with inclination.
Hyppolite’s understanding of Hegel is that action is a transition from pure thought the mediation
of which is sensuousness. It follows that since every action is imbued with impulse morality
must be compatible with sensuousness for it to be actual.320
Hegel contends that at the moment one acts, morality and nature are united, and the
separation of duty and nature is annulled, resulting in displacement of the idea of pure duty.
According to Hegel, nature is related to consciousness for consciousness is also nature, which
means inclination is also consciousness. Inclination is involved in acting and so separation of
inclination from morality is also annulled, with result that duty is made compatible with
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sensuousness.321 Hegel points out the contradiction in Kant’s position that one must act if duty is
to be actual. However, once the subject acts, duty is mixed with nature. Consequently, one
cannot be said to fulfill one’s duty in the Kantian sense of the term. In his criticism against Kant,
Hegel does not realize that Kant’s theory of morality does not preclude nature; rather, his
argument is that in morality, it is not by inclinations that one judges what is right. Indeed, at
times one acts contrary to the dictates of inclinations.
Hegel notes another contradiction in the relation of happiness to morality. According to
Hegel there are two states of consciousness, the moral and the non-moral. The former seeks
coincidence of morality and happiness whereas the latter is about self-fulfillment. Hegel argues
that since nature as such is indifferent to human happiness, moral consciousness is dissatisfied
with its status because its morality does not coincide with happiness. The non-moral
consciousness on the other hand, finds its fulfillment in activity and derives happiness thereof.322
In Hegel’s argument it is not clear what he means by ‘non-moral’ consciousness. If a ‘nonmoral’ consciousness can find happiness in mere activity whatever, it would seem that even a
sadist can be happy for it is a non-moral consciousness.
According to Hegel, morality cannot be detached from happiness. Duty is individual
self-consciousness in fulfillment of duty. As such, duty is in the doing of it, and in the act of duty
happiness is realized. For Hegel, this happiness is not immediate feeling but arises from a deeper
level. It is happiness that is a result of self-actualization.323 According to this line of thinking,
pure duty is impossible and so morality cannot be actual. For this reason, Hegel points out that
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the moral self-consciousness should not complain as there is actually no morality if morality
means ‘pure duty’ in the Kantian sense.
The significance of Hegel’s argument here is that he does away with dualism in morality.
In Hegel’s view, the subject is entitled to happiness in moral activity. This is contrary to Kant’s
position, which is that the only true happiness arises from acting for the respect of the moral law,
which is universal. For Hegel, the action that is directed toward fulfillment of one’s duty is the
same action through which the subject realizes its goals of self-actualization.
The real issue pertains to individual good as opposed to universal good. Hegel argues that
the subject puts into activity what is of interest to oneself. Consequently, a determinate content
pertains to the embodiment of needs, the satisfaction of which is happiness.324 Thus, to separate
the subjective from the objective is an abstraction. It amounts to claiming that the presence of
subjective satisfaction is the only aim of the subject. So understood, the objective ends are only
seen as means to personal ends. Hegel insists that the subject is a configuration of actions and if
these actions are worthless, the subjectivity of willing is meaningless as well.325 Along this line
of thinking, self-satisfaction is necessary for objectivity of action. What Hegel is pointing out
here is that whatever the objectivity an action might be intended to accomplish, it must be of
some interest to the subject or else it is not possible.
While Hegel’s argument is plausible in the sense that happiness and morality cannot be
separated, the question to be answered is, if one and the same action accomplishes both
subjective good and universal good, how come poverty is so pervasive a problem in the modern
society? It seems that conceptually, Hegel’s argument holds but in reality it falls apart. This issue
will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.
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Further, Hegel does not seem to address the whole of Kant’s problem concerning the
individual vs. the universal good. Kant’s point is that there is a difference between having a
sense of self-fulfillment as a result of doing what is right as opposed to doing evil, for even a
sadist finds self-fulfillment and happiness. Kant is making a distinction between the sources of
happiness some of which are unjustifiable. That duty is limited to Kant’s meaning is doubtful,
but certainly, his argument is valid from this perspective.
Hegel argues that the unity of morality and nature means that morality must always be
postponed to distant future, because the moment this unity is effected, morality ceases to be, for
morality means struggle against inclination.326 In this argument, Hegel is alluding to Kant’s
position that finite rational beings can never attain morality for morality means a complete unity
of will and the moral law, which is impossible for human beings who struggle with inclinations.
In Kant’s view, the best human beings can do is to approximate the union of will and moral law,
and this means infinite moral progress.327
Hegel points out that emphasis on pure duty has various consequences: First, it places the
‘moral self-consciousness’ in consciousness other than the actual moral agent. He maintains that
when an action has taken place, it divides into many duties, and these duties are not sacred
because they do not fall under pure duty. However, they are necessary, as morality is fulfilled in
action, a relation between will and the world. Since these duties have to be in a moral
consciousness, they exist in divine consciousness, other than the human agent. Hegel concludes
that the particular duties exist in the moral being, who sanctifies them as duties. The divine being
knows and wills them as duties. In this context, duty exists but in another consciousness who
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mediates between pure duty and specific duties. Hegel argues that in particular actions the self is
individual, and actions must have the actual world as their purpose. Yet as it stands, duty is in
another consciousness, the divine lawgiver. For Hegel, this position is problematic because
consciousness knows to be holy only what it sanctifies. For this reason, consciousness sees itself
as imperfect because its morality is imbued with sensuousness. In Hegel’s view morality exists
for consciousness, since it has to act, but the same morality does not exist, for it exists in
another.328
The second problem of pure duty is that it abstracts the action from its consequences.
Hegel argues that in ‘acting’ knowing and willing of pure duty are related as a complex reality.
In this complexity it is difficult to determine which one is duty among the many duties.329 In
Philosophy of Right, Hegel advances this argument:
The freely acting will, in directing its aim on the state of affairs confronting it, has an idea of the attendant
circumstances. But because the will is finite, since this state of affairs is presupposed, the objective
phenomenon is contingent so far as the will is concerned, and may contain something other than what the
will’s idea of it contains….330

What Hegel is arguing is that in pure duty one wills to accomplish a given purpose. However, the
situation on which the subject is to act is presupposed. Owing to the limited nature of human
knowledge, it is impossible to comprehend all the circumstances surrounding the situation, which
means, the situation may or may not be as the agent knows it. Hegel explains that the will’s right
is to recognize and to accept responsibility only for what it intends with its actions.
Consequently, the agent cannot be blamed for what it did not know or intend as the goal of one’s
actions. According to Hegel, the agent has a right to deny any responsibility for consequences
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that are not within one’s intention.331 He insists that the principles of “ignoring the
consequences” or “regard only the consequences” as right or wrong are both abstract maxims
arising from understanding. For Hegel, consequences are part of an action and inseparable from
it.332
The difficulty in the foregoing arguments is that consequences of an action can be far
reaching into the distant future. It remains an issue as to how far the agent can be held guilty for
those consequences given all the variables factors besides the agent. In addition Hegel gives the
impression that owing to the limit of human knowledge, the situation may or may not be as the
agent knows it as one cannot determine the consequences with precision. This could be true only
to a certain extent. For the most part human beings act as a result of certain understanding of the
situation and so there is unity of thought and action. Consequently, it is not justifiable for agent
to subdue other people’s interests under one’s interest under the auspice of ignorance as Hegel
seems to conclude.
Hegel’s criticism is also directed against the ‘moral ought’. According to Hegel, the
‘ought’ in morality never attains reality. He holds that what is, is universally valid; therefore,
what ought to be actually is. For Hegel, what merely ought to be is not real and so has no
truth.333 Hegel’s argument is directed against Kant’s position that morality is concerned with
what ought to be, even if it does not take place. In Hegel’s argument, he equates what is
universally valid to be actually operative in human life. But this is mistaken assumption. For
example, the fact that respecting other’s property is a valid proposition, human being still find
reasons not to respect others property. Ethical decision is made anew and until one makes the
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decision to act that way it is still not actual. If what ‘ought to be’ actually is as Hegel holds, there
would be no need for law enforcement. The fact that it is there it implies that what ought to be is
not yet actual. Hegel’s problem is to hold that what ought to be is, but this position has the
problem of ignoring the process through which though and reality coalesce. For instance that
substantive freedom is the synthesis of subjective and objective freedom, it does not follow that
in at all times this is the case for individuals can and do violate what is so understood as
substantive freedom.
Hegel’s criticism of morality distinguishes what can be enforced and what cannot. He
suggests that civil law can be enforced but morality cannot, for morality has to do with one’s
disposition and falls outside the law. Seidel interprets Hegel to mean that ‘moral ought’ has
inherent circularity and only results in infinity, for what ‘ought to be’ is grounded on the same
‘ought,’ that is, one ought to do something because one ought to do it.334
If Seidel is right, there is a misinterpretation of Kant on Hegel’s part. In Kant’s theory,
‘moral ought’ has humanity as end. In reading Kant, this is the point of his formula of humanity
as end in itself. As such, the charge of circularity on ‘ought’ in morality is incorrect. In addition,
what ought to be the case is not limited to what is enforced; rather, it also means the ‘necessity’
of acting. What one ought to do does not necessarily mean what is enforced. Morality falls into
the category of what one ‘ought’ to do not because it is enforced, but because it is consistent with
what is right. Consequently, the ‘ought’ in morality is internal to self.
Although Hegel and Kant use the concept ‘ought’ they have different meaning for it. For
Kant, ought is limited to a moral command. On the contrary, the ought in Hegel’s thought
extends to all nature. Herbert Marcuse’s reading of Hegel is that ‘oughtness’ is a call to ‘self-
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determination.’in all beings. According to Marcuse, this determination is not only a limit but a
limitation indicating what a thing ‘ought’ to be. Understood from this perspective, ought is an
imperative for a thing to go beyond itself, to be something other and in so doing, becomes
itself.335 In Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegel, ‘ought’ has an ontological meaning and refers to
all actual becoming and not just the moral self-determination. According to Marcuse, Hegel’s
thought unifies the human and the world that in Kant’s pure ethics remain separated.336
The conception of ontological imperative leaves unanswered question, the difference
between being determined and self-determination that Fichte and Kant clearly make. Human
beings are not determined to become. The non-rational beings cannot choose otherwise than their
natural determination. Human’s becoming in the ethical sense is a result of understanding and
knowledge so that there is deliberation and choice. Consequently, only human beings can be
confronted with a moral imperative both from within and without.
Jonathan Robinson claims that the problem of morality for Hegel pertains to ‘real’ and
‘ideal’. Robinson holds that the value of morality cannot be judged from the success in its
transformation of the world, but in persistence in moral activity; simultaneously, the goal of
morality is to change the world from what it is to what it ought to be.337
Robinson’s argument is crucial regarding whether Hegel can dispense with the moral
‘ideal’. Can Hegel maintain both positions; that is, dispense with a moral ideal and uphold moral
concerns that face society in all periods of history? I argue that whether one understands
morality in terms of the Kantian ‘categorical imperative’ or in Hegelian sense of ‘ethical life,’
334
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the ‘ideal’ is indispensable in human activity, moral, ethical or otherwise. Human beings
generally refuse to settle for the given and have a propensity to strive higher.

Moral

responsibility is infinite, not in the sense of inability to fulfill its demands but because there are
always new situations arising. This means, that one act cannot exhaust present and future
responsibilities in a single stroke.
With regard to ‘real’ and ‘ideal,’ human beings base present acts on future aspirations.
Heidegger’s view of the temporality of human Da-sein is of great insight here. “Da-sein is its
possibility.”338 The idea is that self-determination is concerned with a future vision of oneself
and the world. The significance of Heidegger’s thought is that what ought to be is not an empty
idea for it determines the present of the human Da-sein.
I assert that Morality/ethics is a life-long responsibility, and that the world about which
morality/ethics revolves can always be better than it is: there can be less destitution in the world,
more prevention of diseases, more literacy etc. These achievements are ideals that can be
realized. Hegel argues against the moral ideal as inadequate to change the world. In his view the
moral ought is an empty concept without truth because truth is ‘what is.’ Hegel’s position is
captured in his statement on the role of philosophy:
To comprehend what is, is the role of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every
individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. … If his theory
really goes beyond the world as it is and builds an ideal one as it ought to be, that world exists indeed, but
only in his opinions, as unsubstantial element where anything you please may, in fancy, be built.339

The above text reveals what Hegel holds to be the place of philosophy in the world; to
understand reality. Reality for Hegel is not the phenomenal but the unchanging beneath the
contingent. What is real is the divine aspect of reality. Even accepting the role of philosophy as
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Hegel has it, one can deny that this is its ultimate goal. Human knowing/understanding is not for
mere contemplation, but has as its end as enabling human beings to order their lives according to
that knowledge. There is no knowing for its own sake as Aristotle has it in his Metaphysics.340
Knowledge has its ultimate goal as ordering of life. Plato ties knowledge to activity in his
insistence that once the philosopher has acquired knowledge one must go back to the cave and
assume responsibility for enlightening others.341 Karl Marx reiterates this same critique when he
points out that “Philosophers have interpreted the world in different ways but the important thing
is to change it.”342 As will be shown in the next chapter, Marx’s position has considerable
implication on Hegel’s philosophy.
In Hegel’s argument the philosopher is distinguished from the citizen but this is an
incorrect characterization of the philosopher, who is also a member of the society. Concerning
the role of philosophy, Hegel misses its real place in the world when he limits it to understanding
reality. For him, philosophy cannot prescribe to the world what it ought to be because it comes to
the scene too late.343 The question is what Hegel means by ‘too late’. It is never too late to
enlighten human beings about the best they can become.

D
Ethical Life
Walsh argues that the background from which Hegel formulates his ethical theory is
modern society, featuring the family, civil society, and the state. Accordingly, any moral theory
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that does not consider these aspects is limited in important respects. In this regard, Hegel’s
ethical theory exhibits a wider scope than Kant’s because it shifts moral emphasis from the
individual to the social. In Walsh’s view action is important for more reasons than having a good
will attached to it.344
Walsh understands Hegel to argue against Kant’s position that the only action with moral
worth is action done out of ‘good will’, According to Walsh, Hegel values the right of the
subject to judge as right only what one recognizes as rational, but insists that choice and
intention have no value for the moral act other than rendering the action imputable on the agent.
Although the right of conscience is the highest subjective right, it is only formal. Consequently,
objective right takes priority.345
Robert Williams advances this claim, arguing that the limitation of morality is that
although it has a positive relation to others with respect to freedom as its end, it is still
individualistic in its approach. Because morality means right of conscience, intentions, and
knowledge, the subject is held responsible only for what one knows and intends.346
Hegel identifies ethical life with the realization of freedom, the good. For Hegel, the
realization of freedom is the synthesis of individual and universal will. Characteristic of will in
this state is

‘recognizing’ and ‘being recognized’ by others. Williams points out that an

important characteristic of ‘ethical life’ is that the ‘other’ is indispensable because one
recognizes oneself in the other. I take this to mean that the self depends on the other for selfrealization. Williams argues that the ‘We’ that is the essence of the ethical life is a qualified
unity, and not a ‘totalization’ of others; the self must leave the others free, and acknowledge their
343
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differences. In this transformation, the whole that comprises the individuals, the society, takes
priority. Consequently, it is the mediation of the individual through the community that marks
the break between the individual and the whole.347
Hegel argues that although subject and object still exist in ethical life, the subject and
object are of a distinct kind because the will embodies both particular and universal will in the
institution of the family, the civil society, and the state. He explains that crucial in the ethical
community is understanding of its unity not only as substance but also as subject, for this unity
depends on the consciousness of the members of a given institution. For Hegel, the individual is
related to ethical order in such a way that one identifies with it because one is not distinct from
the laws and institutions of ethical life. He characterizes the “ethical order” as the “soul of the
individual.” 348
Hegel contrasts the duties of ‘ethical life’ from those of morality, characterizing the latter
as empty and indeterminate, while the former are a synthetic development of ethical necessity.
Accordingly, specific levels of ‘ethical life’ are necessary relationships essential for realization
of freedom. Hegel’s criticism against morality is that nothing in it indicates the necessity to
conform to ethical institutions.349
I disagree with Hegel’s criticism on the above point. In Kant’s ‘Kingdom of Ends’
individual ends are intrinsically related to communal ends. Although Kant is obscure on the
relation of morality to state laws and institutions, it does not follow that he ignores the place of
these institutions in the moral subject. His idea of perfect and imperfect duties is an indication of
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his awareness of ethical institutions that reflect the rationality of theople. For Kant, only in this
context can freedom be understood in a positive sense. Further, to treat another human being as
an end and not a means is a requirement of reason. For this reason, Kant introduces the
universality test and the test of non-contradiction. What is missing and what Hegel supplies is the
means to realize the freedom Kant postulates in the Kingdom of Ends. Hegel’s idea of ethical life
is meant to be the concrete means to ensure the same freedom. In Hegel’s system of ethical life,
to deny this right to another is tantamount to denying oneself the same right. Although morality
cannot be enforced, societal laws sanction the dignity and worth of human beings that Kant seeks
to secure with the moral law. For Hegel, state laws are ethical and condition of realization of
freedom.
Hegel’s view of duties is that they are a restrictions only to an indeterminate will, or
abstract freedom or the moral will, which determine their goods arbitrarily. He argues that the
truth of duty is that it sets the moral subject free from natural drives and from the moral ‘ought.’
Moreover, it liberates the individual from indeterminate subjectivity, which is enclosed in itself
without concreteness. In duties of ethical life, there is realization of substantive freedom.350
In view of Hegel’s distinction between duties of ethical life and those of morality, he
overlooks the fact that there is a paradox his position on duties that is difficult to avoid. Duties
are both freeing and restricting. They are freeing in the Hegel’s sense above but on the other
hand, human beings as Kant has stated do not always will duties and they tend to extend freedom
limitlessly. In this sense, duties restrict this tendency.
In ethical order, the identity of the particular with universal will, right and duty, point to
the intrinsic relation between right and responsibility. For Hegel, right and responsibility imply
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each other. In Hegel’s terms, “Man has rights in so far as he has duties and duties in so far as he
has rights.351
The principle governing the ethical life at all levels is that of recognition. Objective Spirit
requires that there be justice, for without this no community and no freedom is possible among
human beings. Williams’ reading of Hegel is that the latter’s practical philosophy revolves
around the notion of recognition at all levels of ethical substance. Recognition facilitates the
actualization of justice in the ethical community.352 At this juncture, the discussion proceeds to
explore the content of each level of ‘ethical life,’ the family, the civil society, and the state.
I. The Family
The family has a profound place in Hegel’s system of ethics. It is the immediate substance; that
is, the immediate manifestation of Spirit. Members are not independent persons but parts of a
whole, the family.353 The idea of whole as opposed to a part is significant in Hegel’s thought. It
implies that the whole of which individual is a part is prior to and above the individual. For
Hegel, the family is only a moment not the absolute state of substance for the member’s dissolve
into civil society wherein they claim their abstract right.354
An important aspect is that the family is an ethical relationship because the basis of its
union is not property but the mind and so is a spiritual union consciousness of which is their
substantive unity and aim. According to Hegel, though marriage starts with contract it goes
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beyond it. In contract, each person remains individual. On the contrary, marriage is based on
unity of the mind such that each surrenders one’s caprice characteristic of abstract right. 355
Williams highlights the differences in marriage as opposed to contractual relationship.
The former relationship is based not on property but on unity of mind characteristic of the ethical
relationship. Williams argues that Hegel distinguishes contract based on common will from one
based on reason. According to Williams, contract is a weak form of objectivity because it lacks a
vital element of ‘recognition’ that is central to an intersubjective relationship in which one
recognizes oneself in the other. In the family durability of relationship is central, and the parties
are willing to make it a lasting one. Additionally, in marriage the disposition of the parties is
necessary, and is seen as essential to those involved in that relationship, while in contract,
disposition is immaterial and all that is required is fulfillment of contractual terms.356
Hegel contends that marriage is essentially monogamous because it is the individuals that
consent to this relationship. Williams’ interpretation of Hegel is that only this context can ensure
equal right on women. According to Williams, Hegel recognizes Spirit both in men and
women.357 The weakness in Hegel’s analysis of the family is the stereotypes which he
characterizes the two sexes; for example, the male is a mind with public orientation and so
objective while the woman is on the level of feeling and subjective and mainly confined to
family affairs.358 Hegel’s analysis overlooks the complementary roles each sex plays both in the
family and the public life. To confine one to one role or other is to undermine the capability of
each and this retards the development not only of the women but also of a nation. On the other
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hand, the complementary roles between the two sexes have only come to light in the recent times
and may not have been an issue in Hegel’s time.
II. The Civil Society
The second substantial freedom is concretized in the civil society. In Hegel’s view a
person is one of principles in the civil society. The civil society’s goal is securing the individual
freedom in order to meet one’s needs and attain one’s ends. The civil society is characterized as
the system of needs that requires others for its realization. Here the concrete person stands in a
universal relationship.359 Although one is among others, a person is also a subject by virtue of
pursuing private ends. Consequently, willing one’s ends implies willing other people’s ends. In
this willing of universal ends, the individual transcends individual goals characteristic of the
system of needs, and identifies with the goals of the society. According to Hegel, it is only in
civil society that the rights of all, happiness, and livelihood are realized.360 At this point, Hegel
holds an idealized concept of the civil society. In actual life, there isprivation of happiness,
livelihood and freedom in some members in the society. Therefore, the freedom he envisions is
only possible to some and not others.
In the Hegelian ethics, a central value is the incorporation of individual needs in the
ethical system. Any ethical formulation that takes a human being seriously must incorporate the
person’s needs within that system. Otherwise, ethical principles fall outside the actual person. It
is in this respect that Hegel’s theory goes beyond Kantian moral theory The latter’s principles
advocate duty ‘for its own sake’ and not for the relation of moral law to the agent as a creature of
needs.
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Pelczynski advances this point by characterizing Hegel’s theory of civil society as
positive sense of individualism in modern times.361 His understanding of Hegel’s idea of civil
society is that it is a recognition of rights and interests peculiar and private to individuals. It
represents recognition of individual social and political views that need to be respected even if
they differ from prevailing values and beliefs. The significance of such recognition is that ethical
principles depend on rational subjective conviction rather than being understood as alien and
militating against individual interests. According to Pelczynki, ethical principles must be judged
as directly related to the individual ends in such a way that these ends depend on these principles
for their realization.362
Civil authority is for ensuring administration of justice by protecting individual property
and persons’ lives so that their well-being and livelihood are attained. Consequently, civil
administration has the responsibility to ensure security of everyone in the civil society.363 Hegel
puts the sphere of economy with the parties and institutions concerned, but also maintains that
the public authority must be involved in regulating the general practice of economy.364
Although the civil society is meant to enable the individual meet their needs and achieve
one’s goals, corporations can be so caught up in the maze of profit making that human values are
inverted. As a result, the same human being for the good of whom the creation of civil society is
supposed to serve falls by the wayside. More on this issue will be treated in the next chapter.
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III. The State
In Hegel’s idea of ethical life, civil society realizes itself in the state, and the two are not
reducible to each other. Civil society is a system of needs, characterized by interdependence
among its members to realize their substantive ends. In the state, individuals transcend their own
needs and pass on to goals of the society at large. Hegel characterizes the state as the
objectification of the mind of its citizens. The state is the realization of substantive freedom. In
Williams’ reading of Hegel, the mind of the citizens is objectified through the rational laws and
institutions. What makes the state concrete is that, unlike the family, it is particularized. I take
this to mean that the state is understood as a will and so as a subject.365
The state is concrete because its laws and institutions are actual; that is, they are operative
in the lives of the citizens who live under these laws and institutions. The state is also a subject,
and its subjectivity is infinite because it relates to itself. It incorporates the individual freedom
through its constitution and institutions, so that the rule is not external to the citizens, it is this
incorporation that renders its laws and institutions valid.366 In the state, the power of ethical order
is actualized and what the state enforces is understood as willed by the individual. Through the
state, freedom is raised to a higher sphere from those realized in the family and civil society.
Hegel’s view is that the state is the realization of the ethical ‘Idea.’ For Hegel, Idea is a
self-manifestation of concept of a people in its concreteness; that is, the state’s realization of
freedom, which is the goal of the ethical subject as an individual and as a society. Hegel’s
conception of the state is that it is an ethical mind, a will reflecting on itself, which is the same as
consciousness of a people in its immediacy of custom, mediated in self-consciousness as
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individuals and as citizens with the state as their essence. In Hegel’s thought, the individual and
state are identical. 367
According to Hegel, the state is rational, in as much as it is the actuality of the substantial
will of each individual self-consciousness. As such, priority of the state over individual is crucial
in Hegel’s ethics, and it is the end wherein freedom is realized as supreme right. Consequently,
to be a member of the state is a necessity not an option.368
Hegel maintains that the state must not be confused with the civil society, whose
objective is to protect the individual freedom and property. If the state would be so construed,
individual freedom and interests would become the ultimate reason for their membership in the
state, so that to be a member of state becomes optional. For Hegel, the state is an objectification
of the mind, and only by virtue of being its member is the individual able to lead an ethical life.
Consequently, to be united to the state is the truth and ultimate goal of the individual.369
Hegel’s identification of the individual with the state raises certain issues. While to be a
member of a state is necessary, it is doubtful that this is the ultimate goal. Although the state has
a role in what the individual is and can become, it is not the case that one wishes to identify with
state in its entirety. For example, there are occasions the state makes unwise decisions with
regard to the citizens and foreign policies and the individuals have to differ with the state.
Hegel’s position that the state is an eternal and necessary way of being of the ‘mind.’ is
crucial. His concern is not a historical account of how the state arises, which he holds to be the
sphere of historians. For Hegel, the state is a philosophical rather than a historical issue. In this
distinction, Hegel implies that what is important is not origin but rationality. The latter is state
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sanctioned by its being guided by rational laws. This is, the spirit that unites the members of the
state. Hegel criticizes Rousseau for his characterization of the state as a contract, which for
Hegel is a union of arbitrary wills. On the contrary, unity that is characteristic of the state is
rational, and hence, a spiritual union. According to Hegel, Rousseau’s logical justification of a
state destroys its divine element and authority. For this reason, the logic behind Rousseau’s
theory of contract could not realize the idea of the state but end only with terror.370 Hegel’s
argument on the state reflects his characterization of the contract as a moment, and not the Idea
of a state. In his view, since a contract is so arbitrary, nothing ensures its endurance. In this
respect, Hegel’s theory of state transcends that of Fichte. His conception of the relation of the
individual and society is captured in the following text:
Confronted with claims for individual will, we must remember the fundamental conception that the
objective will is rationality implicit or in conception, whether it be recognized or not by individuals,
whether their whims be deliberately for it or not. We must remember that its opposite, i.e., knowing and
willing or subjective freedom (the only thing contained in the principle of individual will) comprises only
one moment, and therefore a one-sided moment of the idea of the rational will, i.e., of the will which is
rational solely because what it is implicitly, that it also is explicitly.371

The above text expresses the most recurring theme in Hegel’s ethical thought, the relation
between individual and society. For Hegel, the society is the whole of which the individual is a
part. In various instances, Hegel indicates that the individual is an important moment of the
society. In the above text however, the place of individual is undermined in such a way that the
individual is accidental as opposed to being necessary to the society.
The weakness of this view is that any time a nation loses sight of the importance of the
individual, the result is repression and abuse of the human person. Nations have committed
atrocities against members of the state and outside of the state, including colonization and
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slavery, in the name of the nation. In his idealization of the state, Hegel seems to overlook the
relative nature of ‘rationality’ of state. There are times when individuals or communities are
better off without a state. For example, the introduction of states has resulted in civil wars, loss
of millions of lives and displacement of people due to arbitrary demarcation of the of the globe.
As a result, the crises of refugees is a global problem. In principle, the state is rational as a
context of self-realization of individuals and as a nation. However, absolute rationality of state is
questionable. For the victims of civil wars and displacement and all suffering that comes with
that, state is not rational as Hegel claims.
According to Hegel, the state is immediately actual in its autonomy as a self-subsistent
organism through its constitution and laws, international laws in its relation to other nations, and
finally, as a mind that gives shape to itself in world history.372 For Hegel, the state is an
actualization of concrete freedom; freedom in which, rights are recognized and individuals
realize their potential. Further, citizens transcend personal interests and concern themselves with
the universal goal of freedom, recognizing this as they pursue their personal ends. It follows that
society cannot realize its goals except through particular knowing and willing. Conversely, the
individual cannot live and pursue one’s interests except in pursuing universal goals. In Seidel’s
terms, the goals of the state are in the individual and the individuals in the state.373 Hegel argues
that the superiority of the modern state lies in its principle that has a place for subjectivity to
realize itself and at the same time emphasize substantive unity.374 In the Hegelian theory of state,
the individual does not have to abandon one’s subjective pursuits; however, they must be
incorporated in the overall good.
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E
Recognition in Hegelian Ethics
The concept of ‘recognition’ is the linchpin of Hegel’s philosophical system. The notion
is not peculiar to Hegel, but has its roots in Fichte’s practical philosophy. The latter makes
recognition the condition of individual awareness of freedom. Hegel appropriates the notion of
recognition from Fichte. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Fichte argues that a person can be
a human being only in a human community. In Fichte’s doctrine of ‘Natural Right,’ the notion of
recognition plays a vital role. He claims that consciousness of one’s freedom presupposes a
summons, a challenge, addressed to a person by another. This other for Fichte must be a rational
being, for only a rational being understands freedom and is intelligent to know that the other
understands this challenge. Thus, the source of the summons treats the other as a human being,
and demands that the other exercise free efficacy. Consequently, self-consciousness of who one
is, is possible only through another self-consciousness. The role of recognition in Fichte’s
philosophy is:
Only free interaction by means of concepts and in accordance with concepts, only giving and receiving of
knowledge is a distinctive character of humanity by virtue of which alone each person undeniably confirms
himself as a human being.375

The force of Fichte’s claim lies in his argument that in the reality of recognition is the basis for
the possibility not only of practical life in human community, but also knowledge, both of which
are hallmarks of human existence.
Allen Wood denies the validity of a demand or summons as a precondition of selfawareness. He argues that if self-awareness requires a pre-existing object, adding another object
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– a summons, would not help. Instead, adding another object is characteristic of Kant’s problem
in the first antinomy and infinite regress of causes376
I disagree with Wood because Fichte’s point is not meant to solve the problem of infinite
regress of causes; rather, his argument is that freedom is an issue only in community for it is here
that humans interact with one another. Freedom is to order one’s life so that others can exercise
the same freedom. Ordering one’s action is a demand made by human beings of one another.
Fichte’s point is that one must know the other to be capable of self-restraint or of executing what
is required; otherwise, it would not be demanded.
What is problematic in Fichte’s account is that it is not clear how the other knows that the
subject is free. It seems from Fichte that the other knows the self to be free prior to the self’s
knowledge of itself. How the other arrives at the understanding of freedom is not clear. Fichte’s
argument is that awareness of the other person’s demand on one’s conduct is a precondition of
acting according to that demand. Fichte’s claim is that one’s awareness of who one is comes to
the fore through the demands others make on the self. In Fichte’s terms, we become a self only
by being summoned to act freely.377
Wood’s interpretation of Fichte is that recognition requires that free beings differentiate
themselves from one another by allocating a sphere of free activity to themselves and
recognizing the same for others. With this comes the property contract, through which, spheres
for individual freedom are recognized.378 Following Fichte, Wood argues that self-consciousness
requires awareness of another’s demand on self to act in a specific manner. Recognition requires
the subject to respect the free sphere of activity belonging to someone else. Mutual recognition
376
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then is a relation of right in which one’s freedom is limited according to the concept of the other
as a free being.379 Wood’s interpretation is that Fichte’s argument emphasizes being consistent
with oneself as the necessary reason for respecting another’s sphere of free efficacy. Wood
criticizes logical consistency as a reason for respecting another’s property. According to Wood,
that the subject ought to respect the other’s right does not imply a lack of reason(s) to violate
those rights should one think it necessary. The inadequacy of a logical justification of respecting
other’s rights causes Fichte to argues from the perspective of social structures to enforce personal
rights.380
Williams reading of Hegel is that the motif of ‘recognition’ underlies the whole of the
latter’s system. It is the genesis of the concept of actuality of Spirit, with intersubjectivity as its
essential character. Hegel’s underlying premise is that self-consciousness is by mediation.381 The
idea in Hegel’s principle of mediation is that self-consciousness is possible only through
encountering another subject in ‘opposition’ to self. The significance of opposition is that the self
asserts oneself as other and therefore as free.
According to Williams, conscience is the ultimate judge, which in Hegelian ethics is seen
to resolve conflict of duties and arrive at what is right in a given situation. In Williams’ reading
of Hegel, recognition gauges the dualism between nature and subject inherent in Kant’s moral
theory. For Williams, Hegel’s view of mutual recognition reinterprets the ethical as second
nature, and conscience as the power for realizing the good, and what obligation entails in
concrete situation.382
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Wood’s view is that the significance of the recognition consists in Hegel’s utilizing it to
establish the claim that every person has rights that must be respected by everyone. Hegel argues
from the idea of “recognition,” a notion that implies a mutual awareness among persons. Hegel’s
premise concerns the role of recognition in self-consciousness.383
Hegel’s orchestrates “recognition” and its role in realization of self-consciousness in his
“Master/Slave” dialectic. His claim is that self-consciousness exists only if it is acknowledged by
another.384 This other must be another self-consciousness, as opposed to an object; for only
another self can acknowledge a self.
Recognition in Hegel’s dialectic has the meaning of seeing oneself in another. He uses
the concept of self-consciousness ‘coming out of itself,’ to indicate this self-recognition in
another. According to Hegel, this moment implies that in one sense self-consciousness has lost
itself to another for it only sees itself in another. On the other hand, it has displaced the other
because instead of seeing the other it only sees itself.385
The idea of seeing oneself in the other is key in this argument. It implies that the self
cannot realize itself without the other. There is a relation of dependence such that the self
identifies with the other. However, the self must in recognition see the other and oneself.
Therefore, one must be cautious because to see the other as other is to recognize the other’s
freedom. Hegel uses the terms ‘kept back within itself’ to indicate the respect with which one
must approach the other.386
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s interpretation of Hegel is that the self does not lose oneself in a
manner characteristic of obsession with power and honor; were this the case, the self would only
383
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see itself and not the other. He argues that although the self must cancel the other in selfassertion, it must do so with caution out of respect for the other with whom the self identifies as
necessary for self-consciousness.387 In this account, Hegel distinguishes the consciousness as
desire of object from consciousness as desire for recognition by another self. In the former, the
self seeks to utilize the object for its ends. On the contrary, the other self cannot be so utilized
because that self is independent.388
Hegel argues that the significance of the action in both self-consciousnesses is that action
is directed against the other as well as against the self.389 Hegel’s point here cannot be
overemphasized. What one does affects not only the other but also the self; to do away with the
other is self-destruction. In the struggle between ‘master and slave’ the death of one is the end of
the truth of self-certainty that depends on recognition.390 Hegel’s solution is that recognition
must be mutual in its essence. For Hegel, action by one party is meaningless because recognition
can take place only when the two are recognizing. In Hegel’s terms, “Each sees the other do the
same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other; and only does it, if the other does
the same.”
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385

Ibid., §179.
Ibid., §184.
387
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutic Studies, trans. Christopher Smith (New
Haven, NC: Yale University Press, 1976), 63.
388
Hegel, Phenomenology, §182.
389
Ibid.,§ 183.
390
Ibid.,§188.
391
Ibid., §182.
386

148

In Hegel’s analysis, although the master depends on the servant for the things he enjoys,
the servant is still not free. To be truly free means to be able to determine one’s destiny through
the works of one’s labor. If one cannot, the individual is not free even in the sense of abstract
right. As it is, freedom is still a concept that has not been actualized. What is essential is the
servant not only have the concept of his freedom but realize it. As will be shown in the next
chapter, alienation from the product of one’s labor become an important issue in Marrx’s critique
of Hegel.
Hegel and Kant can be compared in their approaches to a theory of ethics/morality. For
Kant, good will must be presupposed for a action to have a moral value. This is because the
subject must act on the basis of the rightness of the action, as opposed to other motives, such as
happiness or any other good, for this requires omniscience. Therefore, disposition of the subject
is crucial for Kant. Walsh argues that Kant’s moral theory cannot for this reason be characterized
as one-sided or subjective. According to Walsh, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals points to the
social dimension of his ethical system; in other words, Kant’s emphasis on subjectivity does not
detract from social dimension of morality.392 Despite the emphasis on the subjective side, it is
not the case that any action passes for morality, as Hegel seems to conclude. Once an action is
performed, it assumes a social reality and becomes a social concern. For this reason, the agent
cannot be the only judge of the rightness of moral actions.
The difference between Kant and Hegel on this point is that Hegel limits motive and
decision only to responsibility and not for the rightness of action. According to Hegel, the
complexity of the external world towards which the moral action is directed means that both
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internal and external aspects of action matter. For this reason, the only act that qualifies for
morality is one that has both subjective and social agreement with what is normative.
Although Hegel makes a valid point about the communal aspect of the ethical, that may
not solve all ethical/moral. What is socially accepted as norms may still be wrong and conflict
with the dignity of a human being. In this case, individuals might differ with what is socially
justified. Hegel seems to think that dissent is limited to communities in which ‘ethical life’ has
not taken shape and so morality is more extraordinary behavior than a way of life.
Walsh points out that Hegel’s ethics is not about moral issues; rather, it is a description of
modern social life in its institutions of family, civil society, and the state, the background from
which the moral judgments must be made. For this reason, the scope of Hegel’s ethical theory is
uniquely broad, and his aim well beyond improving Kant’s theory to a treatment of broader
issues encompassing what he conceives as ‘ethical life.’ 393 Hegel’s ethical theory lays emphasis
on social than personal aspect. For Hegel, the social aspect of moral action is more important
than the rightness of motive.
Hegel recognizes the right of ‘conscience’ and considers it to be the “the highest
subjective right.” This right, however, is formal. As a result, the right of the objective over the
subjective takes priority. The prerogative of objective over subjective is captured in Hegel’s
thought that “true conscience is a disposition to will what is absolutely good”394 By the same
token, he argues that it does not follow that any act arising from conscience is right; rather, what
is rational must not be exclusively individual but also in terms of laws and principles. In this,
Hegel and Kant agree that the universal is the essence of morally/ethically right.
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Walsh draws an important difference between the universality of scientific rules and the
morals, arguing that the former are used without individual verification on the basis that they are
considered universally valid. In this case, one can apply the scientific method without being
accused of preferring foreign authority to free judgment. On the contrary, in the case of morals,
one must personally justify and defend one’s moral principles and cannot quote authority of any
kind to explain or justify one’s actions.395 The difference between the two realms pertains to
involvement of the will in the latter but not in the former. Walsh insists that morality is not about
skill and thinking, but has more to do with judgment and decision, and acting according to
principles that one can appeal to and defend. Ultimately, Hegel seems to downplay the
significance of moral subjectivity. For Walsh, morality involves a more personal commitment
than Hegel seems to admit.396 According to Walsh, morality is both a personal concern and a
social institution, such that not just anything that can pass for morality. Walsh maintains that
even though there is individual expression, there is a limit to that innovation. Morality, like the
law, is concerned with ordering individual freedom according to reason for the common good.
The weight of Walsh’s argument lies in his position that social life is possible only if the
members of society go beyond what the law requires. It takes ‘personal commitment’ to cultivate
elements such as respect, honesty and personal integrity. Without these, human community
would be impossible. Walsh’s argument is essential and can be better appreciated if morality is
understood from the perspective of actual relationships among persons. Morality would not arise
were a human being solitary. Consequently, the shape of relationship cannot be a matter of
individual whims for then it would not be relational. While the right of conscience is primary in
morality, it is not individualistic. Conscience is not formed in isolation from the human
395
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community. One is born and raised in a community and what one considers wrong or right is
already imbued in the person through socialization. Ordinarily, human beings do not explain
away their actions in terms of individual conscience. Right and wrong are not ideas in which one
is free to think anything, but refer to judgments of reality and are not in isolation from human
relationship. Consequently, conscience is both individual and communal. Were it not, laws
would be impossible, for each individual would be isolated within one’s own conscience.
The force of Hegel’s ethical theory is the objective of the next chapter. In view of the
foregoing discussion on Hegel’s ethical thought a word is in order. Hegel’s theory aims at
realization of freedom. He indicates that freedom is realizable only in the context of ethical life.
The question is whether he has succeeded in doing so. My answer is positive but with
qualifications. Despite certain issues that the Hegelian ethics poses, it may be argued that he
makes his case on the conditions for the possibility of human freedom. Hegel’s system of ethical
life is meant to provide this context.
The centerpiece of Kant’s moral theory is the dignity of human person who is an end in
itself. Owing to freedom of rational nature, Kant proposes that the moral law has its object the
realization of highest good; that is morality and happiness. For these goals to be realized,
something more than morality is required, a certain organization of society. As Pelczynski has
argued, Hegel’s ethical life comprises the world of laws and human relations and is the soil in
which abstract right and morality develop. Without it, right and morality remain only abstract.397
What this proposition indicates is that the moral human being that Kant wishes to protect with
‘categorical imperative’ requires a certain arrangement in the society for this to be possible.
Hegel’s system of ethical life endeavors to provide this context. On the other hand, one wonders
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whether the same freedom that Hegel’s state engenders does not turn to be self-destruction of the
society. For instance, freedom in the civil society results in individual’s freedom to expand their
profit-making to the point of loosing the very value of the human person they are meant to serve.
Further, Hegel emphasizes that freedom culminates in political freedom. However, there are
other types of freedom without which human life can be empty and meaningless. For example,
there is a delicate balance between being free as a nation and being free as a person to lead a
meaningful life. In the modern society the problem is not ‘freedom’ but ‘freedoms’. Individuals
can be free citizens such that they can pursue almost anything but are entangled in their
psychological and social problems in such a way that they really are not free and political
freedom does not enable them to lead a quality life.
Finally, the question to be answered is whether Kant’s moral theory can be transcended
by Hegelian ‘ethical life.’ This is not a question of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answer. One of issues that is
yet to be addressed is Hegel’s position on freedom. In his Early Theological Writings, the Hegel
introduces the notion of ‘life.’ In his interpretation of Hegel, T.M. Knox argues that the whole
and absolute is life it is the ‘whole.’ I take this to imply that life as such is opposing terms are
reconciled. In Knox’s terms, law and inclination, particular and universal are unified.398 From
this analysis, it can be deduced that for Hegel, life and freedom is one and the same, for freedom
is the ‘true’ and the ‘whole.’
One of the points to be noted is that Hegel relates freedom with private property. Private
property is objectification of freedom. One of unresolved issues is that with the problem of
poverty in the society it means that the poor cannot participate in life or in freedom. The issue is
crucial because Hegel’s criticism against Kantian morality is that it has no content. It follows that
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validity of Hegel’s arguments is based on the extent to which human dignity that is the
centerpiece of Kant’s moral theory is realizable in Hegelian notion of ethical life.

CHAPTER IV
A CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S ETHICAL THEORY
The objective of this chapter is to provide a critical evaluation of Hegel’s ethical theory.
The chapter advances the argument concerning the importance of Hegel’s development of Kant’s
moral theory and limitations in Hegel’s ethical theory. With regard to the above objective the
chapter comprises three sections: Section A considers the role that the motif of ‘synthesis’ plays
in Hegel’s development of Kantian moral theory. It is argued that Hegel’s emphasis on ‘the
community and the individual’ as constituting the whole of the ethical enables Hegel’s theory to
transcend some of Kant’s moral principles by virtue of situating the subject as part of what forms
‘the whole’. This section brings to the fore the significance of Hegel’s conciliatory position
towards, (1) individual and community; (2). morality and nature; (3).the human and the divine.
Section B examines limitations in Hegel’s ethical principles. First I argue that although
Hegel’s conciliatory position addresses the problem of dualism in Kant’s moral theory, this
synthesis leaves unresolved problems. I advance the argument that Hegel does not adequately
establish how unity of individual and community can be effected in the social and economic
world; for instance, despite Hegel’s argument that the particular and universal good are
inseparable in action, poverty remains an unresolved problem in civil society. Further, it is not
clear how unity of human and divine is effected without reducing one to the other. Second,
unresolved issues arise from Hegel’s position on the state as ‘rational’. With regard to this point,
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I take up prevailing polemics concerning Hegel’s position on the rationality of state. I establish
that the rationality of the state cannot be properly understood without qualifying conditions that
Hegel underrates.
Section C highlights Hegel’s overall contribution to modern ethical reflection. First, I
take up Marx’s challenge concerning the role of philosophy in changing the world. I argue for
the relevance of Hegel’s ethical principles in the contemporary society from global perspective.
The question to be answered is what ‘recognition’ could mean in contemporary society; that is,
how Hegel’s notion of recognition can respond to the problem of alienation in contemporary
society. I conclude the chapter with two points: first I argue that the idea reciprocity is
indispensable aspect of recognition. The objective of the final section is to clarify Hegel’s idea of
recognition in a way that undercuts totalitarian charges against his view of the society as ‘the
whole’. Second, I argue that for recognition to realize the vision that Hegel projects for the
ethical society, his principles need Kant’s vision of the dignity of the human person.
A

Synthesis in Hegel’s Ethical Principles
One of the distinguishing characteristics in Hegel’s ethical thought is the distinction
between ‘morality’ and ‘ethical life’. This distinction can be construed in terms of individual and
community good. Hegel’s position on the difference between the two forms the basis of his
criticism against Kant’s moral theory. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel contends that ‘morality’
and ‘ethics’ are different in that morality is one of the stages of development towards ethical life,
which he characterizes as the Idea. For Hegel, ethical Idea is realized in the state. He contends
that Kant’s ethical principles are limited to morality and this makes ethical life impossible and
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invalidates it.399 As already indicated in the last chapter, Hegel’s ethical formulation is a critique
of Kant’s moral principles. In his philosophical system, Hegel is a synthesizer. He takes opposed
views and effects a single ‘whole’ understood as the beginning, the process of development, and
the goal of the ethical idea. In his criticism against the Kantian principles, Hegel both
appropriates and develops the Kantian moral principles and in some instances, transcends them.
As indicated above, Hegel’s conciliatory position revolves around three relations: individual and
community good, relation of morality and nature, and the relation of human and divine,
individual and community. This section examines how Hegel reconciles these relations.
Hegel alleges that morality is subjective in that it emphasizes the importance of ‘motive’
as what counts in morally worth actions. The problem Hegel finds with this principle is that if the
motive determines the moral value in an action the subject can universalize any motive. As
pointed out in the previous chapter, Kant does not believe that any motive can work as a moral
motive because the canon is that the principle of morality is both within and without. According
to this criteria, the principle is to treat the other human being as an end in itself; hence, the other
becomes the objective principle while the agent is the subjective principle. However, the agent is
still the judge of one’s own intention to treat the other as an end in itself. Hegel holds that the
subject is one side of what makes the ethical ‘whole’ the community is the other aspect. For
Hegel, different opposing aspects of the ethical whole must be reconciled for morality to be
actual. In Phenomenology, Hegel’s position is indicated in his argument on what is really
problematic in morality:
It may seem that, since, in the actual case, duty in general is sundered into an antithesis of individuality and
universality, the duty whose content is the universal itself directly contains the nature of pure duty, and
form and content are thus in accord. It might seem then that action for the general good is to be preferred
to action for the good of individual….400.
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In the above text, Hegel is trying to address the dualism in morality where in, pure duty
means acting for the sake of universal good as opposed to the personal interest or individual
good. In Hegel’s view however, the two are not separable. What Hegel is arguing here is that
universality of action is actually what is existent in the laws and right. The latter are valid
irrespective of the individual knowing and interest. It follows that separation of universal from
particular good militates against the already existing universality of morality owing to its
emphasis on knowledge and conviction of the individual. Hegel insists that the separation
between the universal from individual aspect has two consequences: first, consciousness takes
itself to be free to fulfill or not the universal good. Second, since universality is not determinate,
what one does for oneself is raised to universal status so that any action can be said to be one’s
duty to others. Hegel calls this a ‘self-assured spirit’ with its truth of duty within itself.401
Hegel’s point in this argument is that if Kant’s moral principles are upheld, ethical life
would be impossible. This is because one and the same action is both particular and universal;
that is, the action is individual willing and doing. On the other hand, the action is universal
because once performed, it enters into the objective world and divides into more purposes than
the subject intends. Hegel contends that morality is inadequate and the solution is to move to
ethical life. For Hegel, reason is realized in customs, institutions and laws of the community.
This is different from morality, which he characterized as based on individual autonomy and
conviction. Ethical life on the other hand, is unreflective and is in accordance with the
community’s way of life.
Philip Kain’s interpretation of Hegel is that morality of ethical life is not ‘what ought to
be’ but what ‘is’. According to this line of thinking, ethical life is the way of life of ethical
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community such that the objective of ethical order is already being practiced by the members of
the community.402 Consequently, both subjective and objective, universal and particular
coincide in the agent.
In Kant’s moral theory, duty must be performed for duty’s sake and not for any other
motive such as happiness or consequence the action might bring. However, Hegel’s ethical life
considers the satisfaction of the agent important if the willing of action is to be of any value. He
maintains that since the action is willed and fulfilled by the individual, there has to be selfinterest in the action because at the same time that the subject fulfills the universal ends, the
individual meet one’s own needs such as material and self-fulfillment. Consequently, if the
action is judged as not moral because it is imbued with self-interest, the the ethical is not possible
for every action has individuality in it.
In effect, synthesis of pure duty and action does away with the dualism between pure
duty and the concrete action. In the Hegelian system, a synthesis is achieved when the opposing
poles are reconciled in reason. What is at stake in Kant’s formulation of pure duty is communal
good. Hegel agrees with Kant on the truth as universal but criticizes the separation of universal
and particular aspects of action because this results in abstraction. Hegel’s claim is that there is
no action that is exclusively for self. He denies that an action can be wholly performed for
personal ends with the universal end being only a means to personal ends.403 Based on this
argument Hegel advances the argument that ethical life embraces the family, the civil society,
and the state. In his thought, these elements point to the concrete context within which the human
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agent realizes the good, which for Hegel is freedom understood here as the essence of right and
the goal both of individual and society.404
The significance of this argument the emphasis that subjective and objective ends as not
mutually exclusive and that the subjective aspect of the action as inevitable for it is always
embedded in the very personal satisfaction of a given accomplishment. Consequently, to insist
that the presence of subjective satisfaction annuls the good of the action is to engage in
abstraction. Allan Speight’s understanding is that one does not have to give up personal end in
order to fulfill a duty; rather, one’s desires and interests are identical with ethical duties.405
The notion of ‘the whole’ in Hegelian philosophical system has been explicated in the last
chapter. In ethical life, the whole, according to Speight mediates between reason and desire;
therefore, the whole of duty is not a mortification of what one values but a part of what is
important for self who belongs to institutions of family, the corporations in the civil society, and
the state. The principle of the ‘whole’ has the significance of effecting the continuity of desire
and reason. Consequently, in fulfilling one’s duty, the individual realizes oneself.406
Speight argues that both Kant and Hegel agree that there are rational ends that are not
limited to self-restraint; instead, they also constitute actions concerned with happiness of self and
others and these too are duties. Accordingly, reason and desires are not opposed entities of the
agent but they are continuous with each other such that natural desire for human goods such as
economic and political order are pertinent to proper understanding of the agent’s action.

404

Ibid., §129.
Speight C. Allen, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals and Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Ethics’ in History of
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Fall, 1991), 392.
405

406

Ibid.

159

Speight contends that although in relation to natural desires the agent is free to act on
them, desire-satisfaction requires that one pursue the ends related to them as objects of rational
agency. I take Speight’s argument to imply that even in satisfaction of desires, there is a
distinction between brutes’ and rational satisfaction. In rational satisfaction one is not at the
mercy of desires but can freely direct them according to principles. According to Speight,
Hegel’s project aims to demonstrate how free a agent can manifest rationality and freedom in
pursuing those ends. That means, the agent’s commitment to institutions of family or the
corporations is construed not as mere desires but ends of autonomous agent. As a result, to
participate in the institutions of ethical life is to acknowledge one’s free agency407 Speight’s
interpretation reflects Hegel’s view that in ‘property’ which is a means to meet human needs, the
emphasis is not satisfaction of desire but manifestation of freedom. Hegel argues that no action
can escape the judgment of being selfish, such as desire for happiness, ambition for fame etc.
For this reason, duty for duty’s sake is ‘unreality’ and it becomes a reality in the individuality
whereby, the action is charged with particularity.408
In Hegel’s notion of ethical life, duty and right coincide. “Man has rights so far as he has
duties and duties as far as he has rights”.409 In this proposition, Hegel implies that since rights
have to do with individual self-satisfaction, it follows that these rights are possible only if there
are duties. The essence of morality is that the welfare of others depends on those rights;
therefore, it becomes a duty to further that welfare through these rights.410
The difference between Kant and Hegel on this issue is that although Kant indicates the
difference between duties that can be coerced (legal duties) and those that cannot, (duties of
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virtue) he does not establish how the two are reconciled in the human agent. Consequently, there
is tension between perfect and imperfect duties in his moral theory.
Both Kant and Hegel agree that there is distinction between the rights that can be
defended because they are ethical and virtue, which is not coercible. Accordingly, rights and
duties are separable but they coincide as justifying reasons an agent may have for an action in a
given situation; therefore, the agent can perform a judicial act out of moral reasons.411 The point
is that although rights and virtue are separable reason justifies both as principles for actions.
Speight’s interpretation of Hegel is in agreement with Z.A Pelczynski’s view that the
civil society is characterized by duties that transcend culture or convention; these duties are
objective laws. The role of these laws is to guard against breach of both the principle of right and
morality; they are principles that every person in the modern society accepts and fulfills even
though one may have to make sacrifice in their preference.412
Pelczynki’s point here contains the kernel in Hegel’s idea of ‘the whole’. There is a way
in which the laws of the state can be seen as militating against the individual rights simply
because the state is concerned with the well-being and interests of the all as opposed to
individual good. Consequently, the state may sometimes override individual interests for the
common good. Pelczynski’s point situates duty within the framework of the person who is the
object and basis of duty as opposed to duty for its own sake. While Kant in the idea of universal
good has as the underlying motif as the good of the agent, he does not adequately defend the
position of how duty is related to the individual; rather, he insists on the opposition between duty
to individual and duty to the community; hence, the answer to the question, why should one be
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moral is answered differently by Kant and Hegel. For Kant, duty must be performed because it
is the right thing to do. Although Kant indicates that the object of moral principles is the human
being, he does not establish the concrete implications of this principle. According to Hegel, there
are human reasons as to why the individual should be ethical. He argues that it is important for
the individual to pursue moral goals because one’s self-realization depends on their pursuit. The
latter view is explicit in Philosophy of Right :
The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as non-existence of this or that nation,
family etc. or death of the whole human race. But if it is already established on other grounds and
presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected, then indeed it is a contradiction to
commit theft or murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction of something, i.e., of some content
presupposed from the start as a fixed principle.413

In Hegel’s view, moral principles presuppose a certain context of the moral agent and
without such a context these principles would be meaningless. In his criticism against morality,
Hegel insists that human beings can only attain their highest potential in a well-structured
society, a society in which rights and duties are related in reciprocal fashion. Conceptually, duty
and personal interest are mutually inclusive; the important issues pertains to application of this
concept to reality. As is indicated in section two of this study, universal and individual good are
not as easily reconcilable as Hegel envisions. While the two aspects cannot be separated, they
can be distinguished. Hegel’s limitation is to ignore the distinction by emphasizing on
inseparability. Having explored the first of the relations the study proceeds to examine the
relation between morality and nature.
On Morality and Nature:
Concerning the dualism between morality and nature, Hegel argues that the two cannot
be separated. In Phenomenology, He insists that nature and consciousness are not mutually
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exclusive for consciousness is related to nature in two senses: On the one hand, nature is for
consciousness as an object; that is, nature is the content of consciousness and without it there
cannot be consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is also nature in the sense that a
human being is a natural being; hence, sensuousness is consciousness itself. It follows that
morality and nature both in generic terms and in the terms of sensuousness must be compatible if
morality is to be realized.414
What is important in the synthesis between morality and nature is that nature is
understood as the means through which the subject fulfills duties for duty as purposeful activity
is fulfilled in the natural world. The force of Hegel’s argument is in his establishing the place of
nature as the context of any possible moral activity. In Jean Hyppolite’s terms, “nature mediates
between pure thought and actual duty” This being the case, any separation of duty and nature
makes realization duty impossible. Hegel maintains that the thought of duty and action aimed at
fulfillment of duty are both united.
With regard to relation of morality to happiness, Hegel is not the first to forge this
connection. His position is a retrieval both of Plato and Aristotle’s thought on this issue. Hegel
takes up this idea and weaves it into his notion of ethical life. In the Republic, the motif of justice
underlies the whole dialogue from beginning to the end. In Plato’s analysis, justice is justifiable
in terms of one’s own benefit. He establishes that the more the individual/society moves away
from practice of justice, the more unhappy the individual/society becomes. This is illustrated by
the example of the unhappiness of a tyrant415 In contrast, the myth of Er attests to the happiness
of the just and the misery of the wicked.416 While Plato’s illustrations cannot be taken literally,
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the point at issue is valid, there are human reason for being ethical for justice rewards the one
who practices it.
In ‘Nicomachean’ Ethics, Aristotle argues that it a common experience to connect
happiness with virtue. For Aristotle, the ultimate end of all human activities is happiness, “…for
it is for the sake of this that we do everything else, and the first principle and cause of good is,
we claim, something prized and divine”417 Although there are certain variations concerning the
meaning of happiness, the main point is that happiness and virtuous activity are related.
Hegel’s thought on the relation of morality and happiness transcends Kant’s in that his
view establishes the intrinsic relation between and happiness and morality. For Hegel, duty is a
rational goal. So construed, happiness is related to morality as it derives from realization of a
goal. Kenneth Wesphal’s interpretation of Hegel is that any successful moral action necessarily
produces happiness, for happiness consists in achieving of ends with moral activity being one of
rational ends. Although Hegel holds that the goal of humanity is freedom not happiness, freedom
is activity of self-realization, and this constitutes happiness. It follows that in realization of
rational ends, freedom is presupposed. The kind of freedom that Hegel has in mind is not
unrestricted ego; rather, it is a rational activity in accordance with objective principles.
Westphal holds that Kant and Hegel place emphasis on different aspects of duty. Kant’s view is
that duty must be performed for its own sake. Accordingly, this kind of duty is incompatible with
happiness because it must not consider ends or consequences and must not be motivated by
desire.418 Since for Kant happiness means complete satisfaction of all one’s desires, duty cannot
meet this requirement because it is not concerned about desire satisfaction. On the contrary, it
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must discount all desire as an end of moral activity. Westphal understands Kant to imply that
moral motives must discount all ends and be independent of such ends.419
In contrast, Hegel’s emphasis is on the realization of one’s duty rather than coincidence
of duty and happiness, for the latter is impossible to determine. The difference between Kant and
Hegel on this issues is that for Kant, dutiful activity itself is not a source of happiness. On the
contrary, Hegel holds that non-moral consciousness can by chance find fulfillment in its activity
which is not possible for moral consciousness as its concern is coincidence of virtue and
happiness rather than the happiness that moral activity affords.420 In this argument, Hegel’s
meaning of ‘non-moral’ consciousness is obscure for it could include a sadist’s consciousness. .
One important points to note is that both Hegel and Kant hold that happiness is not a
sufficient principle for ethics. Owing to its subjective nature, it is difficult as Kant notes to
determine objectively what constitutes happiness. Hegel’s strategy of having freedom as the goal
and not happiness has two advantages: first, he is able to establish that freedom does not
preclude happiness; that means happiness although not the goal of moral actions, it supervenes
upon the moral activity. Second, by having the goal of society as freedom, Hegel is able to have
both subjective and objective part of actions because full realization of freedom requires
recognition by others for society is an indispensable context of freedom.
The Divine and Human:
Another reconciliatory position pertains to relation between human and divine.
According to Hegel’s interpretation of Kant, the divine is brought to bear on morality in order to
make sacred the multiple duties arising from pure duty. He argues that since ‘pure duty’ splits to
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many duties and these duties do not fall under pure duty as Kant has it, it is important that the
many duties be subsumed and pure duty. Accordingly, all duties are taken as God’s
commands.421 Hegel insists that for multiple duties to be sacred, they must be rendered so by the
actual consciousness. Since they are made sacred by another being, consciousness does not
consider these duties holy as they are not holy for it. As a result, actual moral actions are judged
as imperfect since they do not fall under pure duty since they are mixed with sensuality. Based
on the latter position, Hegel concludes hat even the divine cannot be a moral being if Kant’s
position were upheld. This is because morality is presented as having a negative relation with
nature, and the divine has a positive relation to it since there is no struggle with inclination;
therefore, the divine cannot be a moral being since his relationship with nature is positive, which
Kant rules out as imperfect. Hegel concludes that pure morality that has no relation with reality;
therefore, it is unreal and cannot actually exist because thinking, willing, and fulfillment of pure
duty would be eliminated.422
Hegel argues that conscience raises itself above the specific laws and every content of
duty; accordingly, it can place whatever content it wishes into its knowing and willing. For
Hegel, conscience is the ‘cradle’ of morality and knows inner voice to be the divine voice. So
construed, conscience is the divine itself and its contemplation is contemplation of its own
divinity. For Hegel, that conscience’s worship is worship of itself.423
The argument here is that conscience has the divine as the lawgiver. In reality however,
this lawgiver is itself; for it is the power that is above any content of the law. For Hegel, this self-
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worship is the worship of the community so that the inner knowing of itself proceeds to selfconsciousness and religion is self-knowledge of community with respect to its Spirit.424
The reconciliation between the divine and human raises unresolved issue. In this position,
it is not clear where the divine begins and ends and where the human. Although the possibility of
this unity can be argued for, it is hard to conceptualize what this really means. For Hegel, what
the consciousness perceives as the divine is actually its own self. In Hyppolite’s terms,
“consciousness becomes what it has always considered to be divine”.425 The problem with this
position is that it is not clear how the two can be so construed without reducing each term to the
other. My understanding of Hegel is that the divine is not outside the totality of humanity for
human consciousness manifests the historical unfolding of the divine. This interpretation is in
agreement with Stephen Houlgate’s reading. The latter holds that “Hegel does not believe in a
Deistic transcendental “Supreme Being” but in the dynamic divine logic of human life through
which human beings are led to full self-understanding”.426 Even granting Hegel’s position of
divine immanent however, the question of God does not only arise from the moral context but
also with regard to the efficient cause of all being. Hegel’s synthesis does not address the
question of origin of all being for even if we grant Hegel’s synthesis of immanence and
transcendence, problem of origin persists.
Hegel idea of having the divine within the community is plausible, for transcendental
idea of God can result into every possible claim on God. As history attests, many evils can be
perpetrated in God’s name. However, divine immanence can be admitted without reducing the
divine transcendence to humanity even the totality of humanity. Hegel makes an unjustified
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conclusion from ‘God with us’ to ‘we are God’. To be sure, the Christian doctrine espouses the
notion of Emmanuel (God with us), an idea of divine immanence among human beings.
However, this doctrine does not translate into humanity is God, for the divine is understood as
breaking into human life not from within humanity but from outside it.
B

Recognition and Ethics
Finally, Hegel’s contribution to contemporary ethical understanding hinges on the notion
of ‘recognition.’ He establishes the indispensable role recognition plays in various phases of
ethical subject. In abstract right Hegel brings this to the fore in his position on contract, the
ethical genesis of intersubjective relations:
Contract presupposes that the parties entering it recognize each other as persons and property owners. It is a
relationship at the level of the mind objective, and contains and presupposes from the start the moment of
recognition…427

Hegel argues that property, which is embodiment of freedom acquires its validity by being
recognized by others. For him, the central character of property is that as an external object it
exists for others; that is, it is what it is by its relation to other things in general. Most importantly,
property exists as an objectification of the will so that the other for whom property exists is
another human being. Based on the idea of property as embodiment of the will, Hegel contends
that relation of will to another will through the mediation of property is the basis of freedom.
Accordingly, possibility of property is not based on ownership of the object but through the will
of another – by recognition.428 The significance of Hegel’s proposition is that not only does it
point to his thesis of freedom as the good and the goal of humanity but in it Hegel establishes the
condition for its realization as recognition. Hegel appreciates as Fichte does that the condition of
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true freedom is its being recognized by other free beings; as such, freedom is possible only in an
organized human community.
Hegel’s position on the role of recognition should not be undersestimated; he insists that
the individual cannot even exist in his own eyes except through recognition. Hegel’s master
/slave dialectic is a demonstration that even the lord cannot be a master ‘in himself’ because the
precondition is recognition and the latter must be from a free being. According to Hegel, the
importance of corporation is that it enables the individual to exist both to oneself and others.
Ultimately, even who one aspires to be has its basis on recognition because even though one is
free to exercise one’s skill, it must be judged by others as contributing to the common good as
opposed to exclusively selfish end.429
In Hegel’s ethical system, recognition implies ‘seeing oneself in another’.430 The idea of
‘seeing oneself in another’ is indicative of ontological interdependence of self on others for one’s
self-realization. Ultimately, the emergence of one’s self-identity is intrinsically connected to
relation with others.
One of the elements of recognition is law. In Hegel’s system of ethics the law mediates in
the principle of recognition. Hegel holds that through it, one recognizes and is recognized by
others. For Hegel, the most important element in the law is language, for it is through the latter
that the law assumes objectivity. He characterizes language as the “most worthy medium” of the
expression of our ideas.431 The argument here is that without language, human thought has no
content and cannot be universal; hence, the law acquires universal character through language.

428

Ibid., §207.
Ibid., §253 – 4.
430
Idem, Phenomenology, §178.
431
Idem, Philosophy of Right, §78.
429

169

On the state level, the language of law becomes a universal language. In Hegel’s terms,
Spirit exists and expresses itself in language, which is self-consciousness existing for another. In
language of law the self and the other coincide and become one self-consciousness.432 Hegel
insists that through the language of law the ethical substance knows what is duty for what it is
and it is through this that individuals recognize themselves in what is expressed in language of
the law. The significance of this notion is that since a particular action is subject to any
judgment, the only basis of its rightness is universality and this is made possible by the law,
which is rendered universal by language.433
There are certain difficulties associated with language. As mentioned earlier, the
language of law is not immune to interpretive corruption. There is possibility of the law being
interpreted to suite the interests of a few rather that to seek justice. Further, law makers may not
necessarily seek the good of all and so the law can stipulate just as well as unjust laws; yet by
virtue of being laws they acquire the status of universality. For example, in history the poor and
women have been victims of unjust laws.
Hegel’s claim that through the law one recognizes and is recognized by others may be
plausible. However, there is more to a comprehensive understanding of the ethical than language
can possibly express. Values, attitudes and beliefs all of which are important elements of
approaching another human being cannot be fitted in the language of law.
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C
Limitations in Hegel’s Ethical Principles
Having explored the various senses in which Hegel has developed the Kantian moral
theory, the discussion proceeds to examine limitations of Hegel’s ethical principles. This section
focuses on the following issues: 1. the problem of poverty; 2. the problem of Hegel’s view on the
rationality of the state; 3. relativism in Hegelian ethics.

I. The Problem of Poverty
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel’s main thesis is that transition from morality to ethical
life is necessary. This is because morality holds contradictory and abstract positions that make
ethical life untenable. According to Hegel, uniting universal and particular aspects of an action
makes realization of the good sough by morality possible for the universal and particular good
are not mutually exclusive. Hegel contends that one and the same action accomplishes individual
as well as universal good. For Hegel, this synthesis is necessary for a comprehensive
understanding of action.
The main difficulty in this synthesis is that it appears conceptually possible but it
collapses when applied to reality; for example, if universal and particular good are not mutually
exclusive, there would not be such a huge rift between the rich and the poor. As Hegel
acknowledges, alienation of some members in the society is not only a fact but also an ethical
problem that is impossible to ignore. Poverty was an issues in Hegel’s time and ours.
I consider the problem of poverty as an important issue for one reason: Hegel’s criticism
against the Kantian moral principles is that the dualism and contradictions inherent in it makes
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ethical life impossible. It follows that if Hegel’s criticism is to be valid, ethical life must be seen
to resolve the problem of poverty. In Hegel’s ethical theory, the goal of ethics is freedom and the
latter is the condition for self-realization. However, freedom is only possible with private
property and this is Hegel’s point in his doctrine of the abstract right. Property for Hegel is
objectification of freedom such that through it the individual exists both to oneself and to others
by virtue of recognition. Since the poor have no property they also have no freedom and without
freedom they cannot attain self-realization as human beings. This would end in the failure of
Hegelian ethical principles.
The difficulty the synthesis of universal and particular good presents is that the position
overlooks the fact that one and the same action can benefit oneself and hurt other another. What
Hegel fails to appreciate is that even though an action cannot be divided, there are aspects of an
action that exclusively relate to the other, for instance, when an individual does something there
is a possibility of one party benefiting and the other not. It is not the case that the same action
necessarily benefits both. For this reason, one act can cause wealth to self and destitution the
other. In the following paragraphs, I examine the various ways in which Hegelian scholars have
tried to address the fore mentioned issue.
Robert Williams argues that the civil society does not create the situation of poverty for
the first time but it worsens the problem by its legitimization of individualism; a principle he
describes as ‘atomistic’. In the latter, each person is concerned with private interests rather than
the common good. The result is that individuals pursue private interests at the expense of the
common welfare. In addition, the civil society’s desire to produce more results in replacing
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human labor with machinery. Accordingly, with the division of labor it becomes impossible for
the individuals to make a living with alternative means.434
The creation of civil society in Hegel’s ethical theory is meant to be the environment in
which the individual and the state can realize their highest potential. What is unfortunate is that
what is supposed to bring about self-realization amounts to unjust structure that creates a
situation poverty, in Hegel terms, the ‘rabble’. Williams points out that not only is the individual
deprived of means of survival in the civil society but also recognition with inevitable outcome of
alienation435 Williams view of Hegel’s civil society is grim:
Hegel’s vision of civil society is tragic because the very conditions necessary for the liberation and exercise
of individual subjective freedom are at the same time conditions that generate conflict, economic
insecurity, unemployment and poverty.436

Williams’ analysis puts into question the justification of civil society portrayed as the hallmark
of modern society. Individualism in the civil society creates not only material poverty but
psychological and social as well; hence, alienation of human person extends to different aspects
of a person’s life.
Marx reacts to this situation arguing that during decline of wealth and in prosperity the
worker is in disadvantage. This is because during the decline of wealth, the worker is paid a
minimum wage barely enough to survive. In prosperity, there is competition for workers and this
means higher wages. However, higher wages results in tendency to overwork and the worker
sacrifices most of his time and freedom to labor. For Marx, great wealth does not translate to
better conditions of living for the worker. Marx’s overall claim is that “Man’s labor confronts
him as another’s property and the means of existence and activity are increasingly concentrated
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in the hand of the capitalist.”437 In Marx’s terms, the worker is reduced to ‘commodity’. The
point here is that the worker’s value rise and fluctuate according to supply and demand. Marx’s
solution to the problem of poverty is that capitalism should be replaced by communism. The goal
of the latter is to abolish private property and this would eliminate class struggle and class
society.438
The defect in Marx’s prescription is that it does not seem to take human nature in its
entirety. There is no way of telling whether there would be no corruption among the would be
classless community. As it is, there would still be ranks in the order of authority that direct state
affairs and nothing guarantees there would not be any abuse of power. Further, it is not clear
what it is in Marx’s theory that would radically change human beings’ natural tendency to
compete. It seems unlikely that nature can be changed by economic change such as one he
proposes.
Marx’s vision of equal opportunity for all is plausible. However, this can be gradually
achieved not by revolution but through reform within the capitalist society. In our contemporary
society, economic life and condition of the workers has changed but it is did not come throught
revolution of replacing capitalism with communism. Further, communism has failed in most of
the societies that embraced it and this is an indication of its inadequacy.
Hegel acknowledges that poverty is an ethical problem. He points out that it is a result of
the civil society itself and it is inevitable given the operations of the latter. He argues that the
division of labor means fewer options to earn a living. In addition, due to specialization,
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overproduction exceeds the consumers. This means lower wages for some and for others no
means to earn a living.439
Hegel points out to the dilemma of helping the poor. On the one hand, morality cannot
resolve the problem of poverty because it is contingent, i.e., it relies on subjective principle of
mercy and benevolence. Further, charitable giving humiliates the poor and robes them of their
independence and self-respect; therefore, the civil society should ensure that charit to the poor is
not necessary. On the other hand, state-giving would violate the principle of civil society in
which each person must work. Additionally, if the poor are given work in order to preserve the
principle of civil society, this gives rise to overproduction, which is the cause of rising
poverty.440
From the above analysis it can be argued that Hegel is vague about what should be done
to help the poor. First, it is not clear why self-respect and sense of independence is violated by
receiving from charity yet in the end the poor would end up begging in the streets, which is
equally humiliating. Second, while charitable giving is unreliable, begging in the streets is not
reliable either for it is also contingent on the generosity and mercy of others. Additionally, it is
not clear why it is more important to preserve the principle of civil society while indeed, to use
Williams’s terms, ‘the poor are casualties of the civil society’. Structures in the civil society
itself give rise to the condition of destitution for some members. Hegel’s dilemma paralyzes all
possibilities to help the poor for he disqualifies both charity and state-giving. Hegel’s position on
the problem of poverty in the society has been interpreted differently by scholars. Allen Wood’s
view is that Hegel leaves the poor to their own fate to beg in the streets. He argues that Hegel’s
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theory of civil society raises an inevitable problem of poverty situation, which he admits cannot
be resolved.441
Stephen Houlgate holds that Hegel’s introduction of the corporations is geared towards
the solution of poverty in the society. He points out that corporations are the civil society itself
taking measure against this problem. Houlgate argues that the corporations are more effective
since they are the will of the people as opposed to imposition of regulations from external
authority of the state.442
In Houlgate’s interpretation, Williams sees in the corporations the answer to the situation
of poverty. According to Williams, the corporations is a mediating social and ethical structure
that is needed in the civil society itself to alleviate the problem of individualism that plagues the
civil society creating a poor class. Following Houlgate, Williams contends that Wood ignores
Hegel’s idea of the corporation and its mediating role is an attempt to resolve the problem of
poverty in the civil society. The corporations are mediating institutions that effect change in the
society and bring about the realization of self-sufficiency envisioned in the civil society.
According to Williams, the mediating structures would address the problem of atomistic
individualism. This mediation activity would put a limit to individualism and so enhance
communal goals.443
From Houlgate and Williams’ interpretations two ideas can be inferred: they both hold
that in Hegel’s idea of the corporations, lies the solution to poverty situation in that within the
corporations, the human person’s dignity is restored through recognition and assurance of
livelihood. I differ from this view. The corporations in today’s society are impersonal entities
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and are not interested in what happens to the individuals. Even though the corporations can to a
certain extent resolve the problem poverty in the sense that both Houlgate and Williams
envision, they are as interested in profit as individuals. As such, the survival of the corporation is
more important than the individual members. Williams is right in his suggestion that there is a
need for mediating institutions but he is mistaken in his idealization of the corporations’ relation
to the individual members.
The main issue pertains to what Hegel’s notion of recognition can mean in the
contemporary society. The important question concerns how Hegel’s idea of recognition would
respond to the problem of alienation in the contemporary society. The answer to this question
will help us understand the relevance of Hegel’s ethical thought in the beginning of the new
century.
It has been noted that despite the affluence of the civil society the later is not able to solve
the problem of poverty.444 Even given Hegel’s introduction of the corporations, alienation
remains an issue in that his analysis does not come up with a positive solution but instead he
points to the dilemma involved in any action aimed at alleviation of poverty.
Williams’ interpretation of Hegel is that destitution is a willed human action arising from
ethical and political decision. He insists that the civil society by its alienation of the poor and
denying the principle of human interdependence is responsible for poverty situation.445 If
Williams interpretation is right, ethical and political decisions can reverse the poverty trend. In
the following section, I propose an ethical view that can both give to the poor and still preserve
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both the sense of self-respect and independence of the human person. This view revolves around
the notion of ‘coexistence and ethical responsibility’.
The notion of responsibility is not lacking in Hegel’s theory of ethics; it attaches to the
idea of rights. As already indicated earlier, duties and rights are intrinsically related. However,
Hegel does not extend responsibility beyond the relation of rights. While Hegel’s position on this
relation is plausible, human responsibility goes beyond rights. Responsibility arises from the
very idea of human co-existence. Coexistence means ethical relationships among human beings
with one another. This relationship can be applied to human beings without detracting from the
principle of civil society.
In Emanuel Levinas characterization a human being cannot evade the responsibility for
the other. Ethical responsibility precedes any analysis that one could ever attempt. Hegel’s
analysis sidesteps this idea. For Levinas, to leave men without food is a fault that no
circumstance can justify. His view is that, voluntary and involuntary does not come into play in
this understanding.446 The idea here is that attending to a poor person is not optional but a
responsibility that comes with coexistence.
Levinas makes a fundamental point in this argument. He calls for original responsibility
inherent in language. He insists that ‘responsibility is the ethical condition of language’ That is,
the idea of language puts human beings in ethical relation. As such, language is not merely a
relations of ideas among human beings but responsibility for the other. Responsibility does not in
any way take away another’s life responsibility. It is stooping to lift the other so that he/she can
be on his feet. It is bringing the human person back from marginalization and isolation. Benezet
Bujo puts this right in his understanding of coexistence as ‘interdependence’ that does not take

178

away ‘independence’ among human beings.447 Bujo’s argument is independence does not
preclude interdependence. The two do not interfere with human self-worth for human life is
essentially both dependence and independence. They both enable the human being to give and
receive from the community. Any separation of the two misses the point of what it is to be truly
human. This concept of responsibility puts alienation into perspective so that it becomes a
corporate issue rather than the victim’s problem. Alienation puts into question the vision of state
for its people and calls for a review of its policies on ownership, labor policies and the whole
question of justice. Hegel’s limitation is to view ethical responsibility as a question of dishing
out aid but it is more than that; it mean advocacy for justice and addressing the causes of the fore
mentioned problem. Far from contradicting the principle of civil society, it calls the members of
the civil society to rise up to their responsibility.
As such, poverty in society is an ethical problem and Hegel’s emphasis on community
Spirit is defensible from the perspective of human responsibility. In Phenomenology, He states:
The Spirit of universal assembly is negative to those systems. To ensure there is no extreme individualism
the government must not let them become rooted and set in isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and
letting the communal Spirit evaporate. Government has from time to time to shake them to their core….448

What the above text suggests is that Hegel is not ignorant of what individualism can do to
the well being of the whole community. Earlier on, it was established that individualism is the
main cause of poverty in the civil society. In the above text, Hegel indicates that the state has a
role of ensuring this does not happen; “it must not let the individuals become rooted and set in
isolation”. Conclusively, it is not the case that Hegel did not attempt to solve the problem of
poverty albeit indirectly, for the state is represented as intervening and overriding individual
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interests for the good of the community. However, Hegel does not established whether or not the
state’s ‘shake-up’ of individual complacency extends to economic ‘shake-up’ or is limited only
to the time of war. The state can assist the poor citizens without violating the principle of civil
society. As a policy maker, the state can make decision with the view of what a given policy can
do for the marginalized in the society.
While the civil society has its positive aspect of enabling the enterprising spirit of the
human being to express itself, it can be an obstacle to well-being of some members; therefore,
the state must regulate individualistic tendencies inherent in the system of civil society. Hegel
interprets charity to the needy as violation of the principle of civil society, yet it is a duty
recognized as noble not only in our time but also by the ancients. In Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle points out to this:
And it is natural that meanness is described as contrary to liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than
prodigality, but men err more often in this direction than in the way of prodigality…. 449

The significance of Aristotle’s text is that it places great emphasis on generosity, a virtue he
characterizes as ‘magnificence,’ understood as giving for the sake of nobility of giving.
According to Aristotle, it is not that one cannot make a mistake in giving; for one can give the
wrong time and to the wrong person(s). However, for Aristotle, it is better to make the mistake of
giving than not to give. By not giving, one not only avoids giving to the undeserving but also to
the one who needs most.
Aristotle’s point is important given Hegel’s argument that giving contradicts the principle
of civil society. For Aristotle, ‘generosity’ is good in itself. His claim is that though there is
chance for error in giving, chances are that in giving one might give to the right person and in not
giving one is not able to do so. Above all, giving transforms both the giver and the recipient. The
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one who gives opens up to a new world of fellow human beings. This aspect is vital to the human
person; it opens the individual to the infinity. Bettina Bergo points out to the centrality of the
notion of ‘infinity’ in Levinas’ thought: it is an ethical term and pertains to relation of
responsibility for the other. The presence of the other interrupts the self’s emersion in the
totalized world of enjoyment and work and calls for openness to the infinity. 450 The significance
of Bergo’s thought here is that it nullifies the kind of analysis that ends in a dilemma in Hegelian
position on the problem of poverty. The moment of the encounter with the other through the
ethical responsibility shatters the limited world for those involved.
Looking at Williams’s analysis concerning how Hegel addresses the problem of poverty,
it can be argued that his view on the corporations’ role in alleviating poverty in civil society is
plausible but it does not go far enough. Although the corporation offers a sense of recognition
and honor to the members in a given institute, chances are that these corporations cannot absorb
every person in the society and some people may not find membership in an institution. In
addition, education and training in certain skills are necessary for employment by institutions. If
for reason of poverty individuals cannot acquire the required skills they cannot belong to the
corporation. Consequently, there will always be poor people in the society for no one
intervention can rid the society of all causes of destitution. I suggest that irrespective of what the
cause is, the poor must not be allowed to sink into the level of non-human situation. This can be
ensured by making policies that ensure the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing,
shelter, healthcare, and basic education are affordable/accessible. The main thing is to respond to
the poor with the appropriate approach, as the situation requires. Some causes of poverty can be
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eradicated some cannot but this does not mean that intervention should be given up. This kind of
intervention can only take place through the state.
Hegel alludes to state intervention by placing the state in such a way that it is both above
the individual persons and the independent institutions in the civil society. Hegel insists that the
“Spirit is the power of the whole, which brings the parts together…giving a sense of lack of
independence and keeping them aware that they have their life only in the whole.”451 From the
preceding thought, Hegel is against the individualism that is responsible for poverty situation
discussed in the Philosophy of Right. Even though Hegel has a place for the individual selfrealization, the state is charged with the responsibility of checking the balance between
communal and individual well-being. The tension between the individual and the communal
interests is a motif that Hegel highlights in his theory of ethics. The emphasis on communal
goals is not to be understood as suppression of the well-being of the individual but for ensuring
that all have an opportunity for self-realization.
Hegel’s thought on the power of the government may seem crude and even
misinterpreted to convey a totalitarian notion. However, it points to the important role the
government can play for the good of all by regulating the economicpolicies in the civil society
that tend to favor a few while others sink into poverty.
Based on the above reasons, I do not think that the corporation is capable of creating a
safety net for the poor as the state would. Since the government can override the certain
corporation policies for the good of all, it has a far-reaching effect than the corporation. This is
not to say that the corporations are not important; it means that their effect on ameliorating the
condition of the poor is more limited compared to the states’.
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II. On the Rationality of the State
One other controversial point concerns Hegel’s view of the state as ‘rational’. There are
various interpretations of Hegel’s thought. Sidney Hook interprets Hegel’s position as indicative
of his close allegiance to the state of Germany. He contends that Hegel is a conservative and a
proponent of socialist ideals.452
Hegel argues that rationality of state is based on its being guided by rational laws and
‘substantial freedom’ According to Hegel, the state is not something to be ‘known’ and
‘understood’ in terms of explicit rationality. He maintains that the external appearances such as
suffering and need for protection are only moments in the state’s historical development not
substance. Hegel insists that rationality of the state pertains to its internal nature not its
phenomenal aspect. By ‘internal’ I take it to mean the concept of the state as an institution with
its economic, political and social structure. According to this line of thinking, the state is
absolute in its authority and in relation to other nations. For Hegel, the state is a divine institution
and eternal in its character. 453
The limitation of this presentation of the state is Hegel’s emphasis on the concept as what
counts for rationality of state. It is not sufficient to characterize the state as rational on the basis
of its idea because it overlooks the absoluteness of what Hegel characterizes as ‘moments’ of
historical development. For example, if a state upholds unjust structures or engages in evil acts
such as genocide, the effects of these events are absolute in that they alter the lives of the victims
forever. The same can be said of destitution. The victims of marginalization cannot realize their
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potential as human beings. Accordingly, it takes more than an idea of the state for the latter to be
characterized as rational.
The two aspects that constitute the ‘rationality’ of state are substantive freedom and laws.
For Hegel, ethical language is explicit in the laws. He maintains that the ethical language is not
corrupted as one found in culture; instead, it is Spirit that has returned to itself; that is, it is selfconsciousness of a people.454 However, how the purity of language can be guaranteed remains a
problem. In political, social and economic world, language articulates ‘just’ as well as ‘unjust’
laws. Unjust laws perpetuate and promote the interests of a few elites at the expense of the rest of
the society. Further, state laws and policies are for the most part made by the advantaged in the
society. As mentioned earlier, the poor often have no voice in state policies that affect them. As a
result, legal or ethical language tends to be biased against them.
In view of the above remarks, it can be argued that Walsh’s critique of Hegel concerning
the latter’s position on individuals’ identity with the state is plausible. According to Walsh, at
times the state is something to be tolerated than something with which the individual can
identify.

455

The issue pertains to how the state can be understood. With the foregoing analysis

Hegel’s position on the rationality of the state is overly stated. His idealization of the state
overlooks the fact that rationality of state is contingent on many factors. Such factors include the
kind of leadership is in state, the external relations with other nations, economics, the kind of
ideologies the state upholds. As such, rationality of a state cannot be without qualification. Any
rational state can only be so understood on the basis of the vision a given state has for its people
and this can be discerned from laws and policies it adapts as means to realize that vision. The
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real test of rationality of state constitutes but not limited to how its poor are doing and only
against such a standard can the rationality of a state be ethically determined. Aspects such as
accessibility of basic education, access to health care, livelihood, security and justice for all are
important constituents of rationality of a state; hence, what Hegel terms as divine aspect of the
state and its absoluteness must be examined against such background and not only against its
internal nature. Considering only its internal aspect ignores the phenomenal aspect.
Acomprehensive view of the state must consider both internal and external aspects taken
together and only then can its rationality be properly determined.
III. Relativism in Hegelian Ethics
Finally, Hegel’s ethical theory suffers from relativism. Walsh points to the difficulties
involved in Hegel’s position concerning evolution of consciousness. According to Walsh. Hegel
cannot show what ethical standards ought to be upheld other than that they develop and displace
one other in a historical fashion.456
Walsh’s criticism is valid from one perspective. So long as there are no fixed ethical
principles any community can justify any principles for the latter are contingent on which stage
the community is in its moral development. Hegel does not think that the outcome of his position
is ethical skepticism but he cannot avoid it. If justice is relative, every community or nation
could hold different standards. Consequently, no nation or community is justified in reproaching
another for degradation of human life. As a result, there cannot be cross-cultural ethical
standards for the right and wrong.
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In Hegel’s theory, nothing is absolutely right or wrong; every ethical positions evolves.
In his notion of ‘development of consciousness’ Hegel avoids absolutism in ethics. Williams’
reading is that Hegel’s position indicates his awareness of the limitations of formal rationalism.
He points out that Hegel, unlike Kant recognizes that certain duties that are justifiable on
personal level can at times conflict with reality. Williams thus compares Hegel’s relativism with
Aristotle’s arguing that both thinkers do not have absolute universal ethical principles that can be
applied in all situations in life.457
I differ from Williams on this point. In Necomachean Ethics Aristotle holds that ethics
cannot admit the precision characteristic of certain sciences such as mathematics. For this reason,
he makes ethics more flexible by introducing the notion of a mean and so depicts virtue as a state
in between two extremes of absolute deficiency and excess in action. Aristotle’s position raises
some difficulties that cannot be discussed here. However, he admits that in certain vices there is
no mean.
But it is not every action, not every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply
badness e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in case of action adultery, theft, murder; for all these and
suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad and not the excess or deficiency of them.
It is not possible then to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong…. Simply to do any of
them is to go wrong.458

The point in this text is that although Aristotle acknowledges there is no precision in ethics, he
also appreciates as Kant does that ‘certain moral principles leap to the eye’ that is, they are
absolute and universal in their nature irrespective of circumstances or place. Conclusively,
although Aristotle adapts a flexible position on ethics, there is, to use Walsh’s terms, “a limit to
moral invention.” In Hegel’s position it is unclear just what ethical principles can be outlived and
which ones ought to be upheld whatever the circumstance or place.
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On the other hand, Hegel’s idea of evolution in ethics is not entirely disadvantageous to
ethics. In history, human beings have known the necessity for individuals/societies to transcend
certain ethical principles characteristic of a given culture and move on to a more comprehensive
view of the ethical. Some religious and political positions held to be ethical at one time have
proved an impediment to full human development; for example, practices such as inquisition,
persecution, and even execution of those who held different views from the mainstream religious
or political views were considered ethical. In addition, nations have promoted discriminatory
laws against others on the basis of religion, race, color or gender. The significance of Hegel’s
position on evolution of ethical principles is that what is ethical can be arrived at through
reflection within the wider human community. In this reflection shallow ethical principles are
replaced by others that are more in keeping with what is truly good for the human beings’
highest aspirations. Were it not for this evolution, the above mentioned social, religious and
political positions would still be in place.
D

Hegelian Ethics and Contemporary Society
One of Hegel’s main critics is Marx. Marx’s charge against Hegelian philosophy is
explicit in his text regarding the point at which philosophy must begin:
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to
heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated,
thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men,
and on this basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of ideological reflexes and
echoes of this life-process.459
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Marx’s criticism suggests that Hegel’s philosophy starts with consciousness and then proceeds to
real life. There is a misinterpretation of Hegel on Marx’s part concerning what Hegel means by
‘consciousness.’ By consciousness, I take Hegel to mean the ‘actual’ life of the human being in
all its activities. Theory of consciousness can only be formulated from actual human activities. In
Phenomenology, consciousness does not imply what goes on in the subjective mind but both
subjective and objective aspect of the human being. Hegel’s philosophy starts with real life for
consciousness is life itself. For Hegel, life and consciousness are one and the same. Accordingly,
Hegel’s starting point is not abstraction from real life. Given this understanding of Hegel, Marx
criticism against of philosophy can be addressed. According to Marx, “ The philosophers have
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it. 460
I. Freedom and Contemporary Sociopolitical Thought
That Hegel’s ethical thought has played a central role in transforming the world can be
argued from two perspectives: first, his idea of the goal of humanity as freedom has had a lasting
influence in the modern democracies. In the modern times, nations shape their political world
around the concept of freedom. In this respect, Wood is correct in noting that modern political
systems cannot resist Hegelian influence.
In Hegel’s theory of ethics, the idea of freedom, its context in the society and the concept
of the Spirit as plurality of consciousnesses are important features that could speak to any
culture. The concept of an ‘I’ as a ‘We’ and a ‘We’ that is an ‘I’ is indispensable for a
comprehensive understanding of ethics.
John Plamenatz points out the important distinction Hegel makes between immediate
freedom and the freedom realized. Plamenatz’s reading of Hegel is that the latter distinguishes
460

Ibid., 123.

188

freedom in the sense of arbitrariness from rationality. Hegel recognizes arbitrariness as freedom,
but insists that this freedom does not constitute the whole of freedom. Plamenatz’s point is
central in understanding Hegel. Freedom to do whatever one wishes is an immature
understanding of freedom because it is pure abstraction. Freedom in terms of arbitrariness is not
realized freedom; full realization of freedom is possible only in ethical life. As already pointed
out, ethical life is that in which the subjective and social aspect of the ethical coalesce; For
Hegel, ‘the whole’ in ethical context constitutes the subject and the society considered together.
It is in this terms that Hegel speaks of ‘I as a We and We that is I’.
Freedom for Hegel is not the immediate freedom of thought, which is immediate
certainty of freedom. Real freedom is realized only in the community with other free beings.
Plamenatz’s interpretations is that while freedom is in a sense ability to chose between
alternatives; true freedom constitutes self-determination according to objective principles. So
construed, freedom is not a mere capacity to choose but to lead an orderly life as a result of one’s
own choice. The choices that one makes have to do with life governed by objective principles.461
In bringing in the idea of objective principles, Plamenatz insists on essential condition of
realization of freedom; exercise of freedom must be recognized by others. This brings in the
legitimacy of property because it is in the latter that the will becomes objective. In Plamenatz’s
terms, property is a claim that is recognized by others. Following Hegel, he argues that property
is not a manifestation of desire; instead, it is an ethical language that others speak as well;
therefore, ethical language is a language between persons existing in a relation of rights. Claims
of rights are only valid from the perspective of recognition. The force of Hegel’s theory of right
is that without property, there is no freedom, for property is objectification of the latter.
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Ultimately, freedom is a communal concept other than individual since the community must be
the context of its realization.
His vision of freedom as the goal of humanity has implications well beyond the western
civilizations. With post-colonial Africa, the rise of independent nations means that one’s identity
is no longer based on a particular ethnic group but on one’s nation. The greatest challenge to
African societies is to identify oneself with the larger community outside one’s cultural group.
With the wave of democratization of African nations the idea of freedom no longer means
freedom in an ethnic group but in a larger community – the nation. The result is that what
counted as the ethical in one’s cultural group is challenged by other cultures outside one’s own
and the law is often at odds with cultural ethical values.
The relevance of Hegel’s concept of freedom is that it contributes to broader
understanding of human freedom beyond one’s cultural group. The notion of rights and
responsibilities, the laws and constitution and all that goes with the idea of democracy is an
important contribution. What freedom could mean in the emerging new Africa needs articulation
in a way that is relevant to the African cultural, religious and social milieu. Democracy can
indeed, find a home in African continent, for freedom is not a cultural right but a human good,
goal and identity. The central issues is how it can be understood so that it does not result in terror
and chaos as it has in some African nations.
To be sure, African communities had a political system and social-economic setup prior
to colonization. Democracy is not westernization but a certain political-social structure that can
be reinterpreted into any culture. One of the chief differences is that African type of democracy
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took place within a limited ethnic group. As such, people did not see themselves as a nation
because they were not guided by the same constitution. With establishment of states, there are no
longer tribal leaders but government officials with the president as the overall head of state.462
These are dramatic changes in the political systems in recent decades; Therefore, it is more
urgent and even necessary to articulate the meaning of freedom in a new way as the context in
which it was culturally understood has changed.
In today’s world, it is impossible to speak of a pure culture unmixed with other cultures.
Accordingly, it is not possible to speak of pure African culture. The influence of the western
civilizations results into a different thought system that is a synthesis of both western and
African. In this respect, Hegel’s concept of recognition as the basis of possibility of freedom
needs to be reinterpreted within the African context.
The most important implication of the concept of ‘I as a We and a We that is I’ is the
indispensable role of community in self-realization. Hegel’s position has been interpreted as
having the tinge of totalitarian orientation. This is a misinterpretation; Hegel’s vision of
community never loses the sight of the individual and it is against indifference to individual
interests that his criticism against morality is directed. Hegel’s position on the place of individual
is explicit in the Philosophy of Right:
Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed; instead, they should be put in
correspondence with the universal, and thereby both they and the universal are upheld. The isolated
individual, so far as his duties are concerned, is in subjection; but as a member of civil society he finds in
fulfilling his duties to it protection of his person and property, regard for his welfare, the satisfaction of the
depth of his being, the consciousness and feeling of himself as a member of the whole….463

The main idea in the above text is that Hegel is not against ‘individuality’ but ‘individualism’.
There is a difference between the two. The former is the condition for possibility of any ethic, for
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willing and doing have their ground on the individuality. The latter refers to self-isolation from
the human community and is obsessed with self-interest to the point of sacrificing the good of
others. For Hegel, individualism must be curbed for it results in the dissolution of community
spirit. Further, individualism contributes to poverty situation in the society.464 In his emphasis on
community, Hegel establishes that while individual has to plan and make choices, it is the
community that makes possible realization of those plans. Accordingly, who one is and what one
can become is only possible within the community of other human beings. Hegel’s articulation
of what constitutes the ethical whole is a milestone in his theory.
In the African thought system, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ does not exist; yet selfidentity is intrinsically tied to the community. Hegel’s notion of an “I that is a We, and a We that
is I” corresponds to the African view of a person. This idea is explicit in John Mbiti’s view:
In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporately. He owes his existence
to other people, including those of the past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the
whole….465

Mbiti’s characterization of African notion of a person sheds light on comprehensive view of the
human person. One is not seen to be part of the whole so as to be totalized under the whole;
rather, it is a belonging that makes ‘recognition’ possible. To be human is to belong to a human
community as opposed to merely being rational. To belong to human community is to have a
place in that community and implies assuming a responsibility and sharing in the privileges of
belonging to a given community. It is in this sense that Mbiti argues that “Only in terms of other
people does the individual become conscious of his own being, his own duties, privileges and
responsibilities towards himself and toward other people”.466 The argument in this proposition is
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that to be a human being is to be in a dynamic relation with others and without this relationship
there is no self-identity. Mbiti’s text reechoes Hegel’s view concerning indispensability of others
for self-determination. In Mbiti’s text, a human being is so understood not merely in terms of
being rational, but in relation to one’s place in the society in which one gives and receives in
reciprocal fashion. As a result, the human person simultaneously exists to oneself and others.
Mbiti goes on to explain that the belongingness of the individual to the community is manifest in
corporate living: suffering, rejoicing and even thinking etc. are corporate events rather than in
isolation. Mbiti like Hegel perceives human identity as deriving from the individual’s relatedness
with others so that one can only say “ I am because we are, and because we are, I am.”467
Hegel’s idea of ‘recognition’ underlies the global relationship. Nations can recognize one
another as free nations rather than possible colonies. In any confrontation, the aim is to initiate
dialogue rather than domination. In these respects, Hegel’s thought has not just ‘interpreted’ the
world but has also transformed it in significant ways.
This is not to say that there are no pitfalls in global relationships. Mutuality of
recognition between nations is yet to blossom to fullness. While there is no overt domination in
terms of occupation by foreign power, economical and political domination has taken the place
of traditional domination. There is a tinge of neocolonialism in global relations among nations;
for example, political and economic polices are determined by others. In one sense, Hegel’s
concept of mutual recognition among nations is an ideal. As Hegel acknowledge in the
Philosophy of Right serious conflict that result to war has at times replaced mutual recognition
among nations.
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II. Reciprocity as the Essence of Ethical Relationship
The view that human identity is dependent on relationship with others has an implication
that becoming a person is a process since human relationship from which self-identity arises is a
process.468 The real meaning of recognition then is a process that enables the human self to
emerge not just as an individual but also as a community for this relationship is a network among
persons. Properly understood, the principle of recognition means that even one’s talents that are
at the core of self-identity depend on recognition by others. The whole meaning of Hegel’s idea
of recognition is explicit in Williams’ analysis:
….Hegel believes that if ethics is possible, then the threshold of the ethical must not only be open toward
the other as the horizon of decision, but also crossed in actually making decision and commitments
consistent with ethical life and freedom. When that threshold is crossed self and others must both count
mutually recognizing each other and be ethically transformed.469

The emphasis in Williams’ thought is the centrality of the idea of ‘reciprocity’ in recognition.
The importance of this notion is that it allows the self and the other to stand on an equal footing;
that means in the principle of recognition there is no privileged party.
The idea of reciprocity goes contrary to Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of the ethical in
Totality and Infinity. In this text, Levinas places greater emphasis on the ‘other’ as the
determinant of the ethical arguing that the other as the ethical principle is always beyond the
subject.470 Levinas’ idea on human responsibility for the other is valid; however, his emphasis on
the priority of the other does not do justice to the ethical relationship in which both self and the
other must participate in the act of recognizing. The validity of Hegel’s position on mutuality of
recognition has its ground on the idea that the self must rationally justify the ethical principle of
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recognition, understood, as indispensable for self-realization. Hegel succeeds in establishing that
ultimately, each person engages and commits oneself to principles that play a role in one’s selfidentity. While this can be judged as selfish, it is the means by which an individual furthers the
well-being of others. As Williams reflects, “The result of mutual recognition that includes union,
self-overcoming, and freedom is freedom and community in which freedom is not only preserved
but also enhanced….”471 The point is that mutuality in recognition is a union of wills and is the
basis of freedom, which is the essence of ethical life.
Hegel’s notion of recognition presents the greatest challenge to today’s society. It implies
a move from confrontation to dialogue. The former approach is an attitude of power, the latter
approach is an attitude of respect in awareness of the other’s freedom. The former approach
seeks to have the other bend to the dictates of the self, the latter approach seeks a common
ground and recognition that each party has to make certain concessions for a better relationship.
Hegel’s vision of recognition as the basis of world Spirit or the ethical order is within
reach, for it is a political decision to arrive at just and peaceful relations among nations. On the
other hand, the ethical order is also at distant horizons because human beings tend to trade
lasting values for short-term ones. However, the goal of Hegel’s ethical thought is well taken. He
makes a good case that human agency is behind whatever the world has become and it is
responsible for the future world. It is in human beings’ capacity to chose and create the kind of
the world they want to have.
Hegel’s view of the society as ‘the whole’ can be understood either as having a
totalitarian vision or holding a hope for a society of responsible freedom. Both interpretations are
possible depending on which aspect the reader wishes to emphasize. However, the latter position
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seems to be a more representation of Hegel’s thought in Philosophy of Right and
Phenomenology. In this respect, Willims characterizations of the main orientation in Hegel’s
vision of an ethical society is plausible:
Ethical life is non-totalitarian, articulated totality that liberates and safeguards freedom and alterity. Ethical
life in Hegel’s sense is not totalitarianism but a bulwark against it…. Hegel’s ethics of recognition not only
remains relevant to contemporary concerns as counterdiscourse to modernity; as correction to both ancient
and the moderns, it still has much to offer our disrupted and fragmented cultural situations….472

Williams’ interpretations is in accord with Shlomo Avineri’s reading of Hegel that for
objective rules of reason to hold, one must take into consideration the subjective side.473 What
this means is that the human agent must have subjective motivations to adhere to objective
principles. Without such subjective justification, the moral/ethical principle fall by the way side.
In other words, the subject must acknowledge one’s stakes in the ethical principles. Avineri’s
interpretation undercuts the interpretation that Hegel’s is an ethic with no place for the individual
and so endorsing an empty universalism. Pelczynski’s interpretation denies that Hegel is an
authoritarian and an enemy of individual rights; his view is that Hegel is a precursor of
individual rights and a proponent of a rational constitution that can defend and guarantee those
rights.474
The two possible interpretations of Hegel are that he has no place for the individual or he
is proponent of individual rights. I think both Avineri and Pelczynki’s interpretations are
plausible. A careful reading of Philosophy of Right reveals that although Hegel’s position is that
the society is ‘the whole’ of which the individual is a part, he is also concerned about the
individual welfare. His criticism of Kant is geared towards placing the subject in the proper place
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in the ethical system as opposed to universality that does not consider the context of the subject.
There are more textual evidence in support of both Avineri and Pelczynski’s interpretation than
against it. In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s objective is to establish the point that there is a
contradiction in overemphasis of the universal and seeks to reconcile the universal and particular
aspects of the moral subject. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel insists on necessity of considering the
subjective side of the action. His overall position of the relation between the individual and
society is:
The right of the subject’s particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other words the right of subjective
freedom is the pivot and center of the difference between antiquity and the modern times. This right in its
infinity is given expression in Christianity and has become the universal effective principle of a new form
of civilization.475

With this text and others, Hegel cannot be reckoned as an enemy of individual right. Based on
textual account, the idea that Hegel is against individual welfare is a one-sided interpretation. To
be sure, Hegel insists that true freedom is only possible within the society. But to interpret this
position as indicative of a totalitarian vision of society is incorrect. Properly understood, Hegel
works towards a synthesis of opposing views of subjective and objective, individual and
community. White Beck re-echoes this position in his view of the individual as a convergence of
universal and particular who does not give laws to others that he does not give to himself.
However, it remains an issue whether the idea of synthesis is also realized in the actual life.
In view of Hegel’s notion of recognition as the essence of the ethical society, it can be
argued that for the idea of recognition and the society he envisions to be realized, he needs
Kant’s vision of dignity of the human person. If Hegel’s notion of recognition is to be relevant in
our day, the ‘value of humanity’ in the Kantian terms ‘human dignity’ must be an essential part
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of the idea of recognition. That means, political and economical structures have to be in keeping
with the most comprehensive understanding of human being.
What is really problematic in Hegel’s civil society is that the dignity of a human person is
not part of the principle determining the policies. A human being is used not as an end in itself
but as a means to wealth. Marx’s indictment of the civil society is valid; human beings should
not sink into the level of commodity, as was the case in Marx’s time. If this is to be avoided,
Kant’s principle of humanity must always guide society policies, political, economic or
otherwise. The charge that the Kantian ethics is abstract means that the individual does not
understand the heart of Kant’s message in the Formula of Humanity. It is when the world loses
sight of this principle that all kinds of abuse are perpetrated against human beings; both the past
and present this has always been the case. This is Kant’s legacy to humanity, a real guide for
what another human being stands for. In this respect, Kant and Hegel’s theories can be appealed
to as a philosophical response to global issue of alienation. The reason to appeal to both theories
is that taken by itself, one is not adequate to respond to the issues that confront our contemporary
world.
The force of Kant’s theory lies in his unshakable position concerning the dignity or value
of the human person. On this, his moral theory arises and returns. He espouses the idea of human
freedom. For Kant, the idea of human dignity is grounded on human beings’ rational nature in
virtue of which rational nature is endowed with the capacity to set ends as self-determination and
this must be respected. Kant is a respecter of what Hegel would characterize as arbitrary
freedom. For Kant and Hegel, this is the basis of objective freedom; ‘autonomy’ in Kant’s
theory, ‘substantive’ freedom for Hegel.
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For Kant, human dignity is paramount. Whatever ends that individual/communal activity
wishes to achieve, the given activity must have human dignity as the guiding principle.
Consequently, it is on the basis of the value of human being that state laws arise and end.
Conclusively, moral/ethical theory that loses sight of the human being as an end ignores a vital
element of what constitutes the ethical. Kant’s concept of the value of human person is that laws
and policies cannot be said to realize the human good if only a few members in a community
realize that good. This is important not only in domestic but also on global level. The influence
of Kant’s thought can hardly be overemphasized. The sharpened awareness of human rights has
its roots from Kant’s view of human dignity as inviolable. It can be argued that the reality of
alienation in its varied forms has its cradle as failure on the part of human beings to see the value
of humanity as Kant saw it and to take part in realizing it. If human dignity were the guiding
principle for policies among nations, alienation and other forms of marginalization would not
occur.
While the centerpiece in Kant’s thought is the dignity of the human person, there are
certain positions in Kant’s theory that make his ethical principles untenable. As indicated in the
last chapter, Kant’s position on the place of the ‘subject’ in his system of ethics is problematic.
The weight of Hegel’s ethical system lies in situating the subjective as a condition for
comprehensive understanding of the moral action. In this, the subjective is brought to bear on
what constitutes the ethical whole. In Hegel’s analysis, satisfaction of the subject is necessary,
for willing and doing can only have meaning from this perspective. It is for this reason that
Hegel perceives an organized state as an important condition for the realization of the individual
and communal good.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
For Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, ethical thought revolves around freedom. The thrust of
Hegel’s discourse is to establish a relation between individual and communal freedom. By idea
of synthesizing polarities of different aspects of human freedom Hegel aimed at resolving this
tension. The objective of this section is to identify what is problematic in Hegel’s ethical system
and fill in this gap.
Hegel’s thesis is that the ‘true’ is the ‘whole.’ T. M. Knox understands Hegel’s idea of
the ‘whole’ or ‘absolute’ as ‘life.’ Understood in this in life both law and inclination coalesce.476
According to Knox, love and life in Hegel’s system are synonymous; it is the point at which the
synthesis of opposing terms is realized. If Knox is right in this interpretation, Hegel’s proposition
concerning the absolute, the whole cannot be underestimated. It explains, his project of tying to
unify opposing poles in his ethical system. Accordingly, Hegel’s ethical system establishes a
relation between subjective and objective freedom that makes an ethical whole – a synthesis of
individual and communal freedom. For Hegel, freedom is the absolute good. It turns out that
freedom is life, the whole and absolute good. So understood, Hegel unifies individual and
communal good and its realization in concrete life. Kant and Hegel are in unison regarding to the
ultimate goal of humanity, although they differ about how and in which sense the highest good
is realized. Hegel contributes to modern ethical reflection the view that the state is an ethical
institution through which concrete freedom of the individual and the community is realized. In
other words, the state is the synthesis of subjective and objective freedom.477

476
477

Hegel, Early Theological Writings, 52.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §260.

200

For Hegel, private property is justified because it concretizes freedom. Hegel’s position is
central to Marx and is the basis of Marx’s argument against of Hegel. According to Marcuse’s
reading of Marx, if property is the objectification of freedom, it follows those in society’s poor
are not free: Hence the ‘proletariat’ class is neither free nor persons, for they have no property
and cannot participate in Spirit.478 Marcuse’s reading of Marx is that poverty in the society takes
away the force of Hegel’s thesis justifying a civil society whose framework rests on the concept
of labor. Marcuse asserts that civil society is unjust because its forms of labor result in alienation
of the human person rather than in human fulfillment. Labor denotes ‘universal suffering,’ and
‘universal injustice’.479
Bernard Cullen among others points out that the reality of poverty in society is one of the
dark aspects in Hegelian ethical thought.480 Despite Hegel’s endeavors to unify the opposing
poles of individual and communal good, realization of this good is possible only to some. Private
property as the objectification of freedom holds the possibility of individual self-realization, yet,
paradoxically is the cause of alienation among human beings.481
Marcuse identifies Hegel’s problem to be extravagant notion that thought and reality
synchronize. According to Marcuse, Hegel mistakes progress in consciousness as resulting in
higher and better forms of is reality. Hegel’s notion of the synthesis between individual and
communal good, appears conceptually noble. However, the history of injustice and oppression
shows the contrary.482 Despite the notion of the state as the realization of concrete freedom,
freedom as Hegel has it is realizable only by some.
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Marcuse’s argument is crucial to evaluating the extent to which Hegel’s thought advances
individual freedom; for example, Hegel’s concept is that the individual is a part of the ‘whole’,
the whole being the society.483 In this, Hegel reiterates the Aristotelian notion of wholes and
parts, substance and accident. So understood, the individual is accidental to the concept of the
whole. But the problem of this notion is in presenting the individual as dispensable and
replicable. While by ‘whole’ and ‘part’ Hegel implies the idea of dependence and
interdependence in human existence, he falls short of portraying the real significance of the
individual, the uniqueness of each person. The individual has a unique place and so is a
necessary member of the community. This idea is echoed by Boju who argues that even though
the African view emphasizes community, individual is a necessary member of the society.
Individuals are indispensable for they hold ethical convictions and conduct. As such, the group
does not dissolve individual identity.484 Theodore Adorno articulates this point in his critique of
Hegel. According to Adorno, integration of the universal and the particular has meant loss of
particularity.485 It follows that while the idea of dependence and interdependence is
understandable, it is not as smooth as it sounds. In question here is the harmony between
individual and communal freedom. Hegel’s thesis of the state as the realization of concrete
freedom raises the question concerning the extent to which this notion is realized by all.
The reality is that some members in society are victims of alienation. To be sure, Hegel is
not ignorant of the problem. Indeed, his portrayal of the plight of the poor and various solutions
indicate this awareness. He points out that while on the phenomenal level it takes the shape of
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material privation, the end result is a degeneration of values and self-respect. In Cullen’s terms,
the end product of poverty is ‘spiritual decay’.486
Scholars disagree as to whether or not Hegel offers any definitive solution. My reading
of Hegel is that although he weighs different solutions, he ends in a dilemma. Even if it is that
Hegel’s idea of corporations is a solution to the problem of poverty, Hegel’s treatment of this
issue is adequate. He argues that whichever solution is used to ameliorate the problem, such as
charitable-giving, leaving the responsibility to the civil administration, etc. exacerbates the
problem.487
Hegel suggests that since overproduction is the cause of poverty , there is a need to seek
outside markets which means establishing colonies abroad.488 In this Hegel ignores ethical
repercussions of colonization. A colonized nation is no longer free but a mere instrument of slave
labor. More over, colonization destroys the culture and values that are the moral fiber of any
people. One may argue that in Hegel’s position the end justifies the means. However, this
approach disagrees with the idea of the value of a person, and defies the essence of justice.
Indeed, one cannot speak of ethics to a colonized nation.
In my understanding of Hegel, his attempts to resolve the problem of poverty fail not
because they are useless but because they are one-sided. If all there is to the problem is giving to
the poor, the result, is a failure because there is an end to giving. Although Hegel discusses the
effects of poverty, he fails to see how the causes of poverty interlock. He sees overproduction as
the cause, it is not the only one. Poverty is an interplay of forces against individuals and
communal development. Viewed from multiple perspectives, the problem must be resolved on
486
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various fronts. Accordingly, neither charitable-giving nor government provisions ought to be
dismissed as Hegel suggests. Charity should not be an end in itself but should have as its
objective bringing independence to the individual.
Hegel’s claim that true freedom is possible only within society is well taken, for solitary
freedom is no freedom. Adorno, agrees that freedom is never to be conceived apart from human
society. In Adorno’s terms, freedom is entwined not to be isolated.489 Fichte’s position that one
becomes a human being only among others remains valid in Hegelian ethics. However this does
not translate into subsumption of individuals within what is characterized as the universal Spirit.
In this respect Adorno’s point that it is the individuals who experience injustice is valid. In this
there is no synthesis of particular and universal. A crucial aspect of Hegel’s analysis is his
position that society is responsible for the situation of poverty; it arises from actions of society.
Therefore, society is capable of reversing the trend of poverty. I propose two measures as
antipoverty principles: (1) justice must be at the base of antipoverty activity. (2) development
must be necessarily understood and approached from a broad vision.

A
The Principle of Justice
In John Rawls’ discourse, justice is defined as fairness.490 While this is a general
definition, it is not mysterious to any rational being. Rawls characterizes justice as agreement of
what is right among parties living together as equal and free rational beings. For Rawls and
certainly for Hegel, justice is not leveling people in terms of ownership and liberties. According
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to Rawls, inequalities must be justified only in terms of the common good.491

From this

understanding it may be rightly argued that there cannot be freedom without the realization of
justice. For Ralws, justice is the basis of any possible cooperation among human beings and this
cooperation is necessary.492 Therefore, true freedom is possible only if justice becomes the
guiding principle of the state.
Rawls notion of justice hinges on Kant’s ‘formula of autonomy’ in which the respect of a
human being is grounded on human capacity for self-legislation. It presupposes a profound
understanding of a rational being capable of leading an ethical life within an ethical community.
To act with justice and to promote just policies means acting according to our truest self, human
beings capable of living as equal rational beings.493 If rationality as is argued implies a capacity
to set ends, justice would mean equal opportunities for all to develop their human potential.
Ralws’ point here is crucial; it implies that acting with justice is not only to treat the
human persons in understanding of who they are but also to enable them to act like humans.
Accordingly, the more unjust the community is, the less likely to act humanly are the members.
Therefore, to foster a just community is a condition for freedom for one cannot act freely if one
is not treated like a free being. This is the condition for members in the society live truly ethical
life as Hegel envisions, it take more than law enforcement; fairness is necessary. In Aristotle’s
terms, justice is a complete virtue because where there is justice all other virtues are found.494 It
follows that where justice is not the principle guiding state polices, all other values in the
community disintegrate.
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B
Broad Vision of Development
“Until the lions have their historians, the tales of hunting will always glorify the hunter.”
Alan B. Durning’s discussion on development begins with this African proverb. The point here is
who says what about development. According to Durning, the twentieth century was considered
a century of economic miracles. However, this characterization belongs to the elites of the world;
those at the margins of the society have a different perspective.495 A statistical report on the
status of the world poor is unnecessary because world events speak for themselves. However it
helps to note the truth of the lions and the tales of hunting. Alienation in today’s society is a
reality that philosophy cannot ignore.
In his discussion of development, Albert T. Dalfovo begins with the startling remark that
development becomes a problem itself or compounds the problem it aims to solve.496 Dalfovo’s
reflection raises one of the most pressing questions today. He blames the negative results of
development on the prevailing notion that limits it to economic.
What is the place of philosophy in the scheme of human development especially in the
impoverished countries. During the Pan-African Symposium on “Problematics of an African
Philosophy,” Claude Summer remarked on the irrelevance of question on the nature of
philosophy while people were dying of hunger. Following Summer, Dalfovo contends that the
important question no longer pertains to the nature of philosophy, but the relevance of
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philosophy to pressing issues of today.497 In Africa the discipline of philosophy is challenged to
offer an approach to the problems facing the Third World. Philosophy can offer a broader vision
and a more comprehensive approach to development as educators in higher institutes. According
to Dalfovo, there is a need for a clarified philosophical approach to development.
As in Hegel’s time, Africa as a the developing continent is confronted with social and
political problems, of poverty, the AIDS epidemic, environmental degradation, and civil wars
that have claimed millions of lives in the last century and continue to do so in the twenty-first
century. Opposed to a more traditional approach of purely speculative analysis of the human
relationship with the world, philosophy must engage in these issues. In Dalfovo’s terms, “ …it is
important to recognize that development is a question before being an answer, it is a problem
before being a solution.”

498

Unlike the prevailing idea of resolving today’s problems with

development, at issue is to identify what problems or questions is developmental activity a
solution or an answer.499
Poverty is a generic term denoting a ‘degraded’ human life. Robert McNamara, then of
the World Bank, described the ethos of poverty in 1978, in terms that left no room for
imagination:
A condition of life so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality
and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency.500

This description is familiar to many in the Developing Nations today. Poverty is as debilitating to
human life today as it was it was in Hegel’s time. Durning reflects that poverty extends beyond
economic problems; it drains human dignity and self-respect. Durning reiterates Hegel’s view of
the effect of poverty: it results to a ‘rabble mentality’ among its victims.

497
498

Ibid., 37.
Dalfovo, 38.

207

The force of poverty moves across local, national, and international levels. Locally, the
poor have no assets. For this reason, they are physically weak and prone to diseases. This
combines with helplessness and overpopulation to make their situation unbearable. On the
national level, government policies often biased against the rural population so that development
takes place in cities. In addition, the affluent’s banking their money abroad has resulted in the
rich getting richer and the poor poorer.501 On the international level, the developing countries’
debt is overwhelming. The late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania lamented that the only
choice left is to starve the children to death in order to pay the debt. Unfortunately, many
countries in the African continent have witnessed this tragedy.502
The place of philosophy in this context is to come up with a philosophy of the
development of the whole human person. Dalfovo notes that to many, the concept of
development is limited to ‘catching up with the West’ in mere economic terms. Development
must be rid of this idea and brought to mean bringing wholeness to human life in terms culture,
moral, and political as well as economic wholeness.503
Dalfovo’s argument has various implications. First, it calls for a different criterion of
evaluating development. It cannot any more mean economic development, but development of
the whole person and for all people, not just a few. Characterization of the twentieth century as
an era of development is contradicted by historical evidence, which shows not only that the
standard of many poor people has remained stagnant but that it has continued to fall. Second,
when the emphasis of development is economic, human development lags behind. It is not
uncommon to see towers rising up in large cities while the rural poor are neglected and
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corruption is rampant; economic development is not necessarily the development of a people. A
broader vision of development offers a critical evaluation of what development would mean in a
given cultural setting. This approach does not settle for tall buildings in the cities but it is
inquires into the standard of living for all. Development from a broader perspective includes the
whole social system’s moving from a degraded life to spiritual and material development.
Development must be guided by two ingredients of justice as fairness. First, it must be
guided by what Rawls conceives as the ‘principle of difference’. By this is meant adapting
policies that maximize the prospects of the least advantaged in the society. According to Rawls,
increasing the opportunities of those better off rarely improves the opportunities of the least
advantaged.504 This principle, does not take away from the prospects of the well-to-do, rather, it
is a preference for the marginalized so that the whole society is better off. Rather than a social
system in which only a few are well off, this principle benefits everyone in the society.
Most of the evils in society have as their root the gap between the rich and the poor. The
wider this gap is the more a society deteriorates morally. In any nation, when standards of the
least fortunate are improved everyone including the affluent is better off.
The ‘redress principle’ goes hand in hand with the difference principle. The redress
principle has the idea of compensation to those whose social status is unfavorable due to no fault
of their own. Such misfortune may be due to natural conditions or other contingencies; for
example, not all people make their way to college. It is important that the system provide other
opportunities to these individuals so they can be contributing members of society.
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But socially least-favored goes well beyond academic status; it embraces refugees and
other emigrant persons. This is important in African countries wherein millions of people have
been displaced by civil wars and are seeking refuge in more stable nations. These groups are at
the mercy of many contingences, and if not well handled they can jeopardize the security,
stability, and other aspects of life in the host countries.
Rawls argues that inequalities are not a problem to be eliminated, but neither can they be
ignored. The framework of society can be in such a way that no one gains or loses due to natural
or social contingencies. That is, society has the responsibility of ensuring that inequalities do not
in themselves warrant alienation of some members in the society. Rawls rejects the idea that
nature is primarily unjust and so human injustice follows as a matter of course. According to
Rawls, the so called injustice in natural distribution cannot be used to condone injustice, for it is
human actions that determine the effects of the unequal distribution of human potential.
In view of the principle of justice and a comprehensive vision of development, reversing
the poverty trend and its debilitating effect on human life demands measures that reflect
Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of development: “putting first those whom society puts last.”
According to Gandhi, any activity towards development must be tested using the following
criterion:
….recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you
contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control
over his life and destiny? 505

Alleviating poverty and for development to help the poor it calls them to participate in
the process. It may pertain to redistribution or reform in ownership of resources such as land.
More importantly, placing the poor first means that development must have the poor as
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beneficiaries, participants in development, and advisors and leaders. Durning insists that the only
true experts on poverty are the poor.506 Accordingly, there is a need for fostering organized poor
as a grass-root antipoverty strategy.
Second, good development begins with education. One of the underlying causes of
poverty is illiteracy. Education has been judged as the foundation of a healthy society both in
antiquity and no less in our times. In Hegel’s analysis education and skill are important resources
denied the poor:
Not caprice, however but also only contingencies, physical conditions, and factors grounded in external
circumstances …may reduce men to poverty. – their poverty leaves them more or less deprived of all the
advantages of society, the opportunity of acquiring skill or education of any kind as well as administration
of justice, the public health services, and often even of the consolation of religion….507

A serious consequence of illiteracy is the adverse effect it has on the individual’s
capacity to earn a living. In developing countries, education and skill are directly linked with
bread at table. Durning’s documentation supports Hegel’s claim in the observation that the
majority of poor people everywhere are illiterate. For lack of education the poor cannot acquire
information and knowledge they so badly need. Even among landless workers, those who can
read and write are at an advantage over those who cannot.508
Education is pivotal. The uneducated do not know their rights and are vulnerable to
exploitation and injustice of every kind. Education then must be at the base of any policy aimed
at human development. Its value extends beyond economic opportunities; it enables the
individual to enjoy one’s culture and participate in the affairs of society, creating a sense of selfworth.509
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A third antipoverty strategy is to educate women. Women’s education not only raises the
level of income in families but equips them with information for better nutrition and family
planning. The last point is crucial in Africa where overpopulation has meant less land for
cultivation and degradation of environment.510 With improved nutrition, child mortality
decreases. Consequently, families do not need to produce many children to ensure that some
survive.
Education of women does not mean that education for men is disregarded; both men and
women need to develop their potential. However, women everywhere experience worse poverty.
In Africa there is no poor man like a poor woman because cultural barriers prohibit women from
taking certain occupations.
Finally, an antipoverty strategy requires providing low-cost clean water and health care.
Poor people are more susceptible to diseases and weakness due to malnutrition. Poverty is a
vicious circle. For lack of food the poor have no energy to work, and for lack of work they have
no money to buy food. Therefore is no one approach to poverty is adequate. Instead, poverty
must be countered from various fronts in conjunction with one another. Every action against
poverty contributes to the goal of breaking the cycle if the long-term goal is empowerment for
independence and control over one’s destiny. This undercuts Hegel’s argument that giving to the
poor destroys the principle of the civil society. Still, Hegel’s argument that the problem of
poverty cannot be left to the contingency of charity is valid. This is because charity-giving
cannot continue indefinitely. Accordingly, to reverse the poverty trend takes individual, local,
national, and international ethical resolve.
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Those working for development in the Third World attest that a setback to development
is the arms trade. No sooner is a health clinic, school, and infrastructure built than civil war
breaks out using imported war technology; all is destroyed. More promising is what individuals
can do for themselves if empowered nonviolently. However, the individual, the local
government, the nation, and indeed, the nations of the world must keep in sight the infinite value
of the human being as envisioned by Kant and realizes this value through freedom as Hegel
envisions. To invest in humanity is the only worthy cause.
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